The DOI matches its Crossref record; 143 of the 143 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Active inference and epistemic value
Abstract
We offer a formal treatment of choice behavior based on the premise that agents minimize the expected free energy of future outcomes. Crucially, the negative free energy or quality of a policy can be decomposed into extrinsic and epistemic (or intrinsic) value. Minimizing expected free energy is therefore equivalent to maximizing extrinsic value or expected utility (defined in terms of prior preferences or goals), while maximizing information gain or intrinsic value (or reducing uncertainty about the causes of valuable outcomes). The resulting scheme resolves the exploration-exploitation dilemma: Epistemic value is maximized until there is no further information gain, after which exploitation is assured through maximization of extrinsic value. This is formally consistent with the Infomax principle, generalizing formulations of active vision based upon salience (Bayesian surprise) and optimal decisions based on expected utility and risk-sensitive (Kullback-Leibler) control. Furthermore, as with previous active inference formulations of discrete (Markovian) problems, ad hoc softmax parameters become the expected (Bayes-optimal) precision of beliefs about, or confidence in, policies. This article focuses on the basic theory, illustrating the ideas with simulations. A key aspect of these simulations is the similarity between precision updates and dopaminergic discharges observed in conditioning paradigms.
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In the citing paper
“Under active inference, actions that evince informative observations (i.e., observations that resolve the most uncertainty) are preferred. This drive is known as the ‘epistemic value’ or ‘salience’ [86].”
From Epistemic Communities under Active Inference (2022) · cites this paper as [86]
In the citing paper
“This means that epistemic value and pragmatic value (e.g. utility or reward functions) have the same currency and can be accommodated within the same (information hungry) Bayesian scheme – where this Bayesian scheme prescribes how agents can infer or learn reward contingencies (Friston et al., 2015).”
From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Friston et al., 2015
In the citing paper
“Under these circumstances the CS elicits a burst of dopamine firing that is effectively transferred from the US to the CS.”
From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Friston et al. (2015)
In the citing paper
“This example shows that hierarchical inference offers a sufficient explanation for dopamine responses in terms of the confidence or precision about subsequent behaviour.”
From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Friston et al. (2015)
In the citing paper
“Self-evidencing agents not only act in order to realize prior preferences, but they also engage in novelty-seeking behaviours that realize epistemic value (Friston et al. 2015, 2016).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Friston et al. 2015
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Citations
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Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 3×
“ACTIVE INFERENCE This section describes active inference, in which inference and behavior are seen as consequences of minimizing variational free energy or, equivalently, maximizing Bayesian model evidence (Friston, 2010).”
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Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 3×
“Furthermore, active inference extends established metaphors for purely perceptual processing, in particular, hierarchical Bayesian filtering and predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999).”
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“Furthermore, active inference extends established metaphors for purely perceptual processing, in particular, hierarchical Bayesian filtering and predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999).”
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Continual lifelong learning with neural networks: A review
Parisi, G. I., Kemker, R., Part, J. L., Kanan, C., & Wermter, S. (2019) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2019.01.012 · Cited by 3,117
Active inference: a process theory
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Self-citationWhat do we mean by prediction in language comprehension?
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“…it as defining the generative model that the agent is employing at any given time, such that the goal is achieved by minimising Bayesian surprise across the whole model (see Friston et al., 2015, for a more general discussion of the relationships between utility and generative models).”
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“The same notion of minimizing expected prediction errors in the future (i.e., uncertainty) underlies extension of active inference into the domain of goal-directed-decision making and planning (Friston et al., 2015).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K., Rigoli, F., Ognibene, D., Mathys, C., Fitzgerald, T., & Pezzulo, G.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- King's College London (GB)
- National Research Council (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Friston, Karl
- ORCID
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-03-13
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 187-214
- ISSN
- 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-8936
- OpenAlex
- W2059320470
- Cited by
- 731
- References
- 143
- Citations by year
- 2026: 75 · 2025: 64 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 53 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 89 · 2020: 71 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 73 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 14
- FWCI
- 32.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- correction (2016-05-06)
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- BOA (University of Milano-Bicocca) (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
- SDL (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- EU Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-270138)
- Wellcome Trust (088130/Z/09/Z)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Reinforcement Learning in Robotics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Keywords
- active inference, free energy principle, epistemic value, extrinsic value, information gain, exploration-exploitation balance, expected utility, Bayesian surprise, risk-sensitive control, reinforcement learning, choice behavior
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Choice Behavior, Concept Formation, Decision Making, Humans, Memory, Short-Term, Models, Psychological, Knowledge
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- Friston, K., Rigoli, F., Ognibene, D., Mathys, C., Fitzgerald, T., & Pezzulo, G. (2015). Active inference and epistemic value. Cognitive Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1020053
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