A formal model of interpersonal inference
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
INTRODUCTION: We propose that active Bayesian inference-a general framework for decision-making-can equally be applied to interpersonal exchanges. Social cognition, however, entails special challenges. We address these challenges through a novel formulation of a formal model and demonstrate its psychological significance. METHOD: We review relevant literature, especially with regards to interpersonal representations, formulate a mathematical model and present a simulation study. The model accommodates normative models from utility theory and places them within the broader setting of Bayesian inference. Crucially, we endow people's prior beliefs, into which utilities are absorbed, with preferences of self and others. The simulation illustrates the model's dynamics and furnishes elementary predictions of the theory. RESULTS: (1) Because beliefs about self and others inform both the desirability and plausibility of outcomes, in this framework interpersonal representations become beliefs that have to be actively inferred. This inference, akin to "mentalizing" in the psychological literature, is based upon the outcomes of interpersonal exchanges. (2) We show how some well-known social-psychological phenomena (e.g., self-serving biases) can be explained in terms of active interpersonal inference. (3) Mentalizing naturally entails Bayesian updating of how people value social outcomes. Crucially this includes inference about one's own qualities and preferences. CONCLUSION: We inaugurate a Bayes optimal framework for modeling intersubject variability in mentalizing during interpersonal exchanges. Here, interpersonal representations are endowed with explicit functional and affective properties. We suggest the active inference framework lends itself to the study of psychiatric conditions where mentalizing is distorted.
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Cites
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The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency
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Self-citationEmotions, self-esteem, and paranoid episodes: An experience sampling study
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Active inference: a process theory
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00912 · Cited by 1,156
Self-citationFriston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., ODoherty, J., & Pezzulo, G. (2016) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.06.022 · Cited by 674
Self-citationActive Inference, Curiosity and Insight
Friston, K. J., Lin, M., Frith, C. D., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J. A., & Ondobaka, S. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00999 · Cited by 351
Self-citationComputational psychiatry: towards a mathematically informed understanding of mental illness
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“8 19 It is true that the new science of epigenetics (heralded by Engel 4 almost 40 years ago) also places genes fi rmly in their environmental context; but as an explanation of mental illness, a gene – environment interaction in the absence of any computational speci fi cation is a sandwich without…”
BackgroundGeneralised free energy and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w · Cited by 236
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Metadata
- Authors
- Moutoussis, M., Trujillo-Barreto, N. J., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. J.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-03-25
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 160-160
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2017794063
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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