The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moments in Time
Open accessAbstract
It has been suggested that perception and action can be understood as evolving in temporal epochs or sequential processing units. Successive events are fused into units forming a unitary experience or "psychological present." Studies have identified several temporal integration levels on different time scales which are fundamental for our understanding of behavior and subjective experience. In recent literature concerning the philosophy and neuroscience of consciousness these separate temporal processing levels are not always precisely distinguished. Therefore, empirical evidence from psychophysics and neuropsychology on these distinct temporal processing levels is presented and discussed within philosophical conceptualizations of time experience. On an elementary level, one can identify a functional moment, a basic temporal building block of perception in the range of milliseconds that defines simultaneity and succession. Below a certain threshold temporal order is not perceived, individual events are processed as co-temporal. On a second level, an experienced moment, which is based on temporal integration of up to a few seconds, has been reported in many qualitatively different experiments in perception and action. It has been suggested that this segmental processing mechanism creates temporal windows that provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and the experience of nowness. On a third level of integration, continuity of experience is enabled by working memory in the range of multiple seconds allowing the maintenance of cognitive operations and emotional feelings, leading to mental presence, a temporal window of an individual's experienced presence.
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Citations
Cites
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 3×
“…this approximate time range, it has been proposed that anterior insular cortex function may provide the continuity of subjective awareness by temporally integrating a series of elementary building blocks – successive moments of self-realization informed by the interoceptive system (Craig, 2009).”
Working memory: Looking back and looking forward
Baddeley, A. (2003) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1201 · Cited by 5,200
Short-term retention of individual verbal items.
Peterson, L., & Peterson, M. J. (1959) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0049234 · Cited by 2,939
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 1×
“Within this temporal horizon mental presence unfolds integrating mental processes and enabling conscious experience of a narrative self that has personal identity and continuity over time (Gallagher, 2000).”
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 1×
“It depends on the integration of multiple mental operations that lead to intentional behavior – created by ongoing activity of a global workspace, integrating activity from multiple distributed and specialized brain areas (Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).”
Poeppel, D. (2003) · Speech Communication · doi:10.1016/s0167-6393(02)00107-3 · Cited by 1,315
Meng, M., & Tong, F. (2004) · Journal of Vision · doi:10.1167/4.7.2 · Cited by 417 · cited 2×
“During continuous presentation, one aspect lasts on average for around 3 s before a switch in perspectives occurs, with some inter-individual variability and variance attributable to stimulus characteristics of the particular ambiguous figure (Gómez et al., 1995; von Steinbüchel et al., 1999; Meng and Tong, 2004; Korn…”
Wittmann, M. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0003 · Cited by 349
Self-citationTemporal window of integration of auditory information in the human brain.
Yabe, H., Tervaniemi, M., Sinkkonen, J., Huotilainen, M., Ilmoniemi, R. J., & Näätänen, R. (1998) · Psychophysiology · doi:10.1017/s0048577298000183 · Cited by 216
Pre-semantically defined temporal windows for cognitive processing.
Pöppel, E. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0015 · Cited by 211
Cited by
The inner sense of time: how the brain creates a representation of duration
Wittmann, M. (2013) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3452 · Cited by 394
Self-citationWittmann, M., Peter, J., Gutina, O., Otten, S., Kohls, N., & Meissner, K. (2014) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.02.011 · Cited by 78
Self-citationNormal blindness: when we look but fail to see
Wolfe, J. M., Kosovicheva, A., & Wolfe, B. (2022) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2022.06.006 · Cited by 51
A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness
Skipper, J. I. (2022) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104772 · Cited by 31
The subjective present and its modulation in clinical contexts.
Tschacher, W., Ramseyer, F., & Bergomi, C. (2013) · Timing & Time Perception · doi:10.1163/22134468-00002013 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Wittmann, M.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 66-66
- ISSN
- 1662-5145 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2122202264
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 13.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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