The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy
Open accessAbstract
This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call "conscious thought" is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called "conscious thought" in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like "mind wandering" into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the "self-representational blink" (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological "unit of identification" (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.
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Cites
The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
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The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 1×
“…attention and simply does what it always does: it automatically and continually minimizes prediction error by monitoring body and immediate environment for potential unexpected events (Friston, 2010; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012, p. 84; Hohwy, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth, 2013).”
BackgroundWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1×
“…thought to mind wandering and daydreaming could be gradual; perception itself is subtly modulated by expectation, prediction and anticipation, see Clark (2013); Madary (2013), and relatedly, mind wandering will not be an all-or-nothing affair, but will allow for various degrees and fluctuations…”
BackgroundHölzel, B. K., Lazar, S. W., Gard, T., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Vago, D. R., & Ott, U. (2011) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691611419671 · Cited by 3,024
Wandering minds: the default network and stimulus-independent thought
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Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 · Cited by 2,691
A wandering mind is an unhappy mind
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1192439 · Cited by 2,575
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“The concept of “mind wandering” was originally introduced into debate as a phenomenological notion (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006), i.”
BackgroundInfluentialInteroceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
Temporary suppression of visual processing in an RSVP task: an attentional blink?
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Cited by
Predictive Processes and the Peculiar Case of Music
Koelsch, S., Vuust, P., & Friston, K. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.10.006 · Cited by 557
Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology
Madary, M., & Metzinger, T. K. (2016) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2016.00003 · Cited by 435
Self-citationAm i self-conscious? (or does self-organization entail self-consciousness?)
Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579 · Cited by 197
Artificial suffering: an argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology
Metzinger, T. (2021) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s270507852150003x · Cited by 182
Self-citationDoing things with thoughts: brain–computer interfaces and disembodied agency
Steinert, S., Bublitz, C., Jox, R., & Friedrich, O. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0308-4 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 931-931
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1988744735
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 7.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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