Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper has a critical and a constructive part. The first part formulates a political demand, based on ethical considerations: Until 2050, there should be a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology, strictly banning all research that directly aims at or knowingly risks the emergence of artificial consciousness on post-biotic carrier systems. The second part lays the first conceptual foundations for an open-ended process with the aim of gradually refining the original moratorium, tying it to an ever more fine-grained, rational, evidence-based, and hopefully ethically convincing set of constraints. The systematic research program defined by this process could lead to an incremental reformulation of the original moratorium. It might result in a moratorium repeal even before 2050, in the continuation of a strict ban beyond the year 2050, or a gradually evolving, more substantial, and ethically refined view of which — if any — kinds of conscious experience we want to implement in AI systems.
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“This would presumably have substantial ethical, legal, and social implications [ 81,82].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [81]
Citations
Cites
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Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060 · cited 4×
“What is ethically relevant is the space of possibilities opened up by the transition from \minimal phenomenal experience" (MPE) [Windt, 2015; Metzinger, 2020a] to \minimal phenomenal selfhood" (MPS) [Blanke and Metzinger, 2009].”
InfluentialSelf-citationSinger, P. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511975950 · Cited by 882
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“Here, I am exclusively concerned with \phenomenal transparency", namely a functional property that some conscious but no unconscious states possess (cf. Metzinger [2003a], Met-zinger [2003b] for references and a concise introduction).”
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Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
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Self-citationThe feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience
Aru, J., Larkum, M. E., & Shine, J. M. (2023) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2023.09.009 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd
- Published
- 2021-02-19
- Volume
- 08
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 43-66
- ISSN
- 2705-0785 (ISSN-L)
- 2705-0793
- OpenAlex
- W3132199556
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 45 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 29.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- artificial consciousness, AI ethics, research ethics, moral status of AI
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- Metzinger, T. (2021). Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1142/s270507852150003x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.