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Ecological validity of virtual environments to assess human navigation ability

Open access
van der Ham, Ineke J. M., Faber, Annemarie M. E., Venselaar, Matthijs, van Kreveld, Marc J., Löffler, Maarten · 2015 · Frontiers in Psychology
Cited by 81

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Route memory is frequently assessed in virtual environments. These environments can be presented in a fully controlled manner and are easy to use. Yet they lack the physical involvement that participants have when navigating real environments. For some aspects of route memory this may result in reduced performance in virtual environments. We assessed route memory performance in four different environments: real, virtual, virtual with directional information (compass), and hybrid. In the hybrid environment, participants walked the route outside on an open field, while all route information (i.e., path, landmarks) was shown simultaneously on a handheld tablet computer. Results indicate that performance in the real life environment was better than in the virtual conditions for tasks relying on survey knowledge, like pointing to start and end point, and map drawing. Performance in the hybrid condition however, hardly differed from real life performance. Performance in the virtual environment did not benefit from directional information. Given these findings, the hybrid condition may offer the best of both worlds: the performance level is comparable to that of real life for route memory, yet it offers full control of visual input during route learning.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00637

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Metadata

Authors
van der Ham, I. J. M., Faber, A. M. E., Venselaar, M., van Kreveld, M. J., & Löffler, M.
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2015-05-27
Volume
6
Pages
637-637
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1532179415
Cited by
81
References
6
FWCI
6.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.