Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be rather passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how the pregnant person’s bodily experience and bodily movement transforms as pregnancy advances. We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulates affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organisation that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2524.001.0001 · Cited by 3,470
Gallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind
Colombetti, G. (2014) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262019958.001.0001 · Cited by 622
Linguistic Bodies: The Continuity between Life and Language
Di Paolo, E. A., Cuffari, E. C., & De Jaegher, H. (2018) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11244.001.0001 · Cited by 510
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497 · cited 1×
“The notions of individuality, asymmetry, and normativity capture in more detail the conditions for agency, so we will explore them next (Barandiaran et al., 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2017).”
BackgroundDi Paolo, E. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9042-3 · Cited by 371 · cited 1×
“To have an intuitive understanding of self-individuation, imagine that the system ‘encapsulates’ its constitutive parts into a functional or physical boundary.3 In organizational terms, this is defined as operational closure (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014).”
Background
Cited by
The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life
Ciaunica, A., Constant, A., Preissl, H., & Fotopoulou, K. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103117 · Cited by 105
Enactive Ethics: Difference Becoming Participation
Di Paolo, E. A., & De Jaegher, H. (2022) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-021-09766-x · Cited by 99
Making us Autonomous: The Enactive Normativity of Morality
Pescador Canales, C., & Mojica, L. (2022) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-022-09795-0 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Quintero, A. M., & De Jaegher, H.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2020-08-14
- Volume
- 11
- Pages
- 1977-1977
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3049205927
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 3.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01977
- The paper
- Quintero, A. M., & De Jaegher, H. (2020). Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01977
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.