Cited by 622Embodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind

Colombetti, Giovanna·2014·The MIT Press eBooks

Abstract

A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science. In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.

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Crossref · 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019958.001.0001

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Authors
Colombetti, G.
Corresponding author
Colombetti, Giovanna
Venue
The MIT Press eBooks
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2014-01-01
OpenAlex
W4206296132
Cited by
622
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 52 · 2025: 78 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 67 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 44 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 2
FWCI
10.34
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
enactivism, affective science, emotions, embodied cognition, basic emotions, appraisal, bodily feelings, neurophenomenology, dynamical systems theory, lived body, empathy, philosophy of mind, emotion and cognition

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