The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind
Abstract
A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science. In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.
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An inextricable affective component is inherent in all this.
“Inherent in all this is an inextricable affective component (Colombetti, 2014).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Colombetti, 2014
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Guendelman, S., Medeiros, S., & Rampes, H. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00220 · Cited by 577 · see citing works
The body social: an enactive approach to the self
Kyselo, M. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency
Di Paolo, E. A., Lawler, D., & Vaccari, A. P. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00632-9 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“Inherent in all this is an inextricable affective component (Colombetti, 2014).”
Background
- Authors
- Colombetti, G.
- Corresponding author
- Colombetti, Giovanna
- ORCID
- Colombetti, Giovanna
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2014-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W4206296132
- Cited by
- 622
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 78 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 67 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 44 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 10.34
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- enactivism, affective science, emotions, embodied cognition, basic emotions, appraisal, bodily feelings, neurophenomenology, dynamical systems theory, lived body, empathy, philosophy of mind, emotion and cognition
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