What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The nature of consciousness is considered one of science’s most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today’s neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term “the hard problem” to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these “non-local” properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness.
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Citations
Cites
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Method
Cited by
A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
Evidence of quantum-entangled higher states of consciousness
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“Combining our results with these insights leads us to propose that, if Wahbeh et al. [79] work on fundamental consciousness is accurate, plasticity may play a significant role and could serve as a biological marker for progress in this area.”
InfluentialMathematical proof of the Fisher-Escolà Q statistical distribution in quantum consciousness modeling
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“Similarly, von Lucadou [67] and other researchers [69] suggest that certain perceptual experiences beyond the senses may be grounded in the principles of uncertainty and nonlocality [70].”
Our brains sense the future through a new quantum-like implicit learning mechanism
Escolà-Gascón, Á. (2024) · Brain Research Bulletin · doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2024.111048 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Wahbeh, H., Radin, D., Cannard, C., & Delorme, A.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2022-09-07
- Volume
- 13
- Pages
- 955594-955594
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4294930960
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 6.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Wahbeh, H., Radin, D., Cannard, C., & Delorme, A. (2022). What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594
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