Consciousness and its hard problems: Separating the ontological from the evolutionary.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness “machine” is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.
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Citations
Cites
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“TYPE Hypothesis and Theory PUBLISHED 07 July 2023 DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576 Frontiers in Psychology 02 frontiersin.org explaining biological innovations of any kind, in that, as expressed by Dobzhansky (1973), “nothing makes sense in biology except in light of evolution.””
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Cited by
The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective
Lacalli, T. C. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423 · Cited by 26
“The evolution of agency (formally, a link between conscious contents and behavior, see Lacalli, 2023), would then have depended very specifically on innovations at the neurocircuitry level that rendered some component of memory responsive, either directly or indirectly, to the sensations generated…”
Self-citationThe self and conscious experience
Marchetti, G. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1340943 · Cited by 14
“This is what, for example, Lacalli (2023) maintains, based on an evolutionary account (agency, or S, requires real-time feedback, while this is not required by consciousness).”
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Lacalli, T. C. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1394669 · Cited by 4
“My previous analysis of the issue (Lacalli, 2023) led me to conclude that this, in more precise terms, means that agency must be learned, so that consciousness of the kind we are familiar with, which confers agency at the level of the individual, requires a learning process repeated in each…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationLacalli, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
“Theory tells us, however, that the LTB must incorporate a real-time memory-dependent learning process if a form of consciousness is to emerge that confers agency on the individual [see Lacalli (2023, 2024a) for the full argument].”
Self-citationAnimal Consciousness: Exploring Theoretical, Methodological and Ethical Issues
(2026) · Frontiers research topics · doi:10.3389/978-2-8325-7635-9
Metadata
- Authors
- Lacalli, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Victoria (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Lacalli, Thurston
- ORCID
- Lacalli, Thurston
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2023-07-07
- Volume
- 14
- Pages
- 1196576-1196576
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC10362341
- OpenAlex
- W4383533418
- Semantic Scholar
- 341b402a5c6f8e1fdd82cbbf6023b51466ff18ad
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 73
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 1.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, evolution of consciousness, ontology of consciousness, biological realism, neuronal connectivity, information flow, higher-order theories, agency, learning, evolutionary innovation
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