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The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case
Open accessAbstract
This paper extends an earlier analysis of the functions attributable to consciousness, applying it to a modular/constitutive model that limits the role conscious sensations are allowed to play in integrative processes operating at scale.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that consciousness can be modeled as modular and constitutive rather than globally integrative, and that conscious vision is best understood through position-dependence: the spatial location of each module has perceptual consequences. It proposes that conscious vision may have evolved because it supports learned gaze control, attention, and memory encoding in ways zombie alternatives cannot.
Key findings
- Conscious visual awareness is proposed to have the property of position-dependence, meaning the physical location of each contributing module affects perception; this is presented as the key mechanism for constructing a 2-dimensional visual display.
- The paper argues that conscious gaze control can serve as a mechanism for registering salient visual features in ways that have no preconscious counterpart, and that this supports the acquisition of agency through learning.
- It distinguishes two evolutionary paths: conversion of existing unconscious pathways versus reallocation to new modular structures. The author favors reallocation for a modular/constitutive model, while allowing that conversion may still be possible in some cases.
- The paper concludes that conscious vision may have an adaptive advantage through attention control and memory encoding; it also suggests that species with less reliance on vision may still have position-dependent conscious contents in other modalities.
Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical paper using a modular/constitutive model of consciousness as the main framework, with vision as the test case.
- Integrates arguments from evolutionary theory, neuroscience, and prior consciousness literature; the text discusses concepts such as broadcast models, zombie counterparts, conversion vs reallocation, and the hard problem.
- Main analysis is a logical and comparative argument, not an empirical experiment, using vision, gaze control, and memory learning as explanatory anchors.
Limitations
- The author repeatedly states that key claims are conjectural, especially the claim that there is no zombie alternative to a position-dependent conscious visual percept.
- The paper says it cannot determine the actual evolutionary sequence by which contents were added to consciousness, and that it does not know whether vision was among the first contents.
- Evidence is limited by the paper’s own scope: the analysis is not designed for species where vision plays a different or subordinate role and does not provide direct empirical tests of the proposed mechanism.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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![FIGURE 5 A proposal for how a modular, constitutive consciousness might operate in functional terms if, either because of limitations intrinsic to awareness or simply as a matter of evolutionary contingency, it does not participate in integrative pathways operating at scale. Conscious contents (in blue) would then act only indirectly on memory, actions, and secondary percepts, via non-conscious pathways (black arrows), because the modular/constitutive model limits their ability to exert causal effects over distance. Memory pathways, which also operate in a non-conscious mode, are in red. There are then two “streams” of consciousness. First (A), a perceptual stream, of primary percepts that can be simple (phenomenal percepts) or complex (e.g., vision) that contribute to memory encodings which, when activated by recall mechanisms, generate secondary percepts including visual images and thought. Second (B), the intervention streams, whereby conscious and unconscious memories influence actions in progress through motivational control mechanisms, altering an animal’s navigation through its habitat, for example [the MDIS model from Lacalli (2024b)], or for thought, navigation through a series of visual or linguistic states. Feedback is required for both of these, where for action sequences this would include external stimuli generated as a consequence of the action in question (dashed arrow), but for thoughts is internal (the arrow labeled F), whether initiated by an inner voice, visual images, or affective memories. The diagram accords with the premise, that from an evolutionary perspective consciousness should be thought of primarily as a servant of memory, performing a restricted set of functions that involve it far less in sensory integration than most theories of consciousness suppose. Missing from the figure is any explicit reference to attention control, despite its importance to this account, because it is a skill acquired through a developmental process, while the figure shows only causal structure, not specific real-time events.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/10753d3ab5c4476995bd8a6f8a5b1dc5/the-function-s-of-consciousness-revisited-insights-from-a-modular-constitutive-figure-5.jpg)
Verification
Claims the paper makes
19 Valid · 5 Not valid · 14 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“The visual display could then be constructed point-by-point by the action of separate modules, each acting as a hotspot.”
§ The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case > A modular/constitutive model of consciousness as it might apply to vision The core premise of this paper is that the contents of consciousness can be generated by modular structures, small groups of neurons in other words, each capable of producing a particular sensation when instructed to do so. Zeki (2003) has suggested a modular model for vision to explain certain subcomponents of the visual experience, but the idea can be extended to account for the construction of the visual display itself by adopting something closer to the hotspot idea used by Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) to account for the subcortical production of sensations of pleasure, of “liking” rather than wanting. The visual display could then be constructed point-by-point by the action of separate modules, each acting as a hotspot. While this differs from the majority view of how conscious percepts are generated, it is not difficult to understand in conceptual terms. The conceptual problem arises if we choose also to assume, as I do here, that the causal effects of being aware of an experiential state are also localized, to the immediate vicinity of the module that produced it. This challenges not only our intuition, that consciousness operates globally, but also the consensus view, that it is an integrative construct that arises from the activity of highly interconnected cortical networks responsive to conscious signals (Varela et al., 2001; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Petersen and Sporns, 2015). However, despite widespread acceptance of the integrative model, there is no scientific justification for rejecting the alternative, that conscious sensations can be localized in both their mode of production and their ability to exert causal effects. The reasons why are dealt with in the paper preceding this one (see Lacalli, 2025), the point being that the hard problem prevents us from knowing how our global sense of awareness is generated at a mechanistic level. Being aware of individual sensations may then simply be a matter of those sensations having been produced, regardless of whether the distance over which they are able to exert direct causal effects is large or small3. To proceed further along this line of argument requires the additional assumption that conscious visual experience has the property of position-dependence, meaning that the spatial position of each module, either in absolute or relative terms, has perceptual consequences. The remainder of this section is devoted to exploring this idea further, but it is in my view more than an idea, but instead very possibly the only idea offering a plausible mechanistic explanation for how patterns of sensory input and processing can be mapped from the neural substrate to a corresponding perceptual space, whether for vision or for any other sensory modality. For those who might disagree, I challenge them to offer alternative suggestions, specific as to mechanism, as to how the trick might otherwise be done. A complication for conscious vision is whether it incorporates integrative features, as the binding argument would suggest (see Feldman, 2012; Lo and Zeki, 2014; Zeki, 2020; Peters et al., 2024; Di Lollo, 2012 for the counterargument), which would make the visual display we experience something of a hybrid, combining features of both primary and secondary percepts. This is less of a problem for this analysis than one might suppose because my explanatory target is the structure of the visual display in and of itself, which can be treated as a primary percept so long as the integrative features of conscious vision, whatever those are, are later evolutionary additions. One reason for using vision as an example is the central role it plays in behavioral control, to quote Merker (2012, pg. 48), that it is “the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.” While this may be something of an over-generalization, given the role other sensory modalities play in the lives of various species, notably nocturnal ones, the importance of vision to species active during daylight can hardly be denied. Vision in vertebrates dates to the Palaeozoic, and well-developed eyes are in fact a key feature for distinguishing fossil vertebrates from non-vertebrate chordates (Shimeld and Holland, 2000; Lacalli, 2001). Consciousness in vertebrates, in contrast, is generally assumed to track the evolution of the neocortex, which would place its origins near the base of the amniotes, among early terrestrial vertebrates (Cabanac et al., 2009; Allen and Trestman, 2020). If we accept both that scenario and Ordovician conodonts as a model for ancestral fishes, there would have been a considerable interval when early vertebrates would have foraged and hunted prey visually, directing the eyes, head and body entirely without consciousness. Which then begs the question, that if a fully conscious visual display is so central to behavioral control in terrestrial vertebrates, how could their aquatic ancestors have survived without it? This deserves some further comment because it bears on the habits and survival strategies of early fishes. The key point is that their brains would not have been much larger than those of the protochordates that preceded them except for the addition of dedicated centers for processing sensory inputs, from the visual, olfactory and vestibular organs. Visual information at this early stage of vertebrate evolution would have been mapped topographically to the midbrain tectum, and then accessed to monitor changes in the animal’s surroundings due to its own movements, the motion of nearby conspecifics, and of moving targets that might be food items (Burr and Thompson, 2011). All of this, assuming it was accomplished by specialized computational filters, would have required a dedicated set of circuits able to perform the appropriate computational tasks with optimal efficiency. Judging by the role vision plays today in predator/prey interactions, minimizing the time required for visual inputs to influence such behaviors has probably always been crucial to survival. Consider a shark attacking a school of anchovies for example. For the anchovies the response is schooling behavior, which is predominantly guided by visual cues (Viscido et al., 2004), but is optimally effective only if the response of the school as a coordinated whole is faster than the predator’s ability to adjust its own attack speed and direction. The implication, assuming this represents a long-standing adaptive issue, is that there has, since the Cambrian, been an ongoing arms race in mechanisms for visual attack and visually-controlled avoidance responses where the disadvantages of relying on a conscious display format for vision, given the time required to assemble and respond to such a display (Zeki, 2020), might have outweighed the advantages. The issue is not then whether fishes today do or do not have conscious vision, but rather with the case to be made for an ancestral mode of visual processing comprised of multiple computational filters, each able to respond selectively and as rapidly as possible to particular patterns of tectal activity. It is a then separate question whether any one of those filters performed something akin to a global surveillance function. If so, it would have been that filter the conversion option would have converted to a conscious mode of operation. Given the range of tasks vision performs (e.g., see Frisby and Stone, 2010; DiCarlo et al., 2012; Poggio and Serre, 2013), this begs the question of why that particular conversion was an adaptive solution if, in consequence, the behavioral role played by all other filters was thereby reduced. The problem in part lies in our inability to judge the costs and benefits of different combinations of filters, some operating in a conscious mode and others unconsciously, but this difficulty extends to other sensory modalities. For those represented by phenomenal contents the issue is the hard problem, which denies us knowledge of how a conscious phenomenal state and its non-conscious counterpart differ at a mechanistic level. Arguments in principle are therefore not possible, because we cannot claim that there is necessarily a mechanistic difference between the two. Language and thought are more easily dealt with because of the evolutionary sequence: that if the ability to consciously perceive sound evolved before speech and language, which is almost certainly the case, speech and language would have been secondary additions to an already well-established auditory consciousness. There would then be no reason to evolve a zombie counterpart of an inner voice in competition with a conscious one already in operation. For vision, however, this argument does not apply because there is no basis for supposing that the ability to consciously perceive light evolved before the events that made a 2-dimensional visual percept conscious. It could instead have been a case of coevolution, with a pre-existing zombie form of vision being converted to a conscious mode of operation as the ability to consciously perceive light evolved. Hence the conversion option remains on the table which, for a modular/constitutive model of conscious vision, would mean that the relevant modular structure was already in place, operating in a non-conscious mode. To ground the argument further in some particulars, consider a representational theory (see Gennaro, 2018 on representational theories) where the conversion option would simply convert unconscious representations directly into conscious ones. Since one function of conscious vision is to provide a searchable visual database, we would then require a preconscious visual representation that was searchable, but also a preconscious mechanism for performing the search. If the latter depended on a self-like entity, it is the output of that entity that would, with conversion, be rendered conscious. This accords with the idea that it is the interaction between sensory representations and a self that generates an experiential state (e.g., see Merker, 2013), but if a zombie self is also possible, we have no more understanding of the adaptive advantage of converting its mode of operation to a conscious one than we do for any other such conversion. What is required instead is a reason that zombie vision and conscious vision are mechanistically different, as that is the condition that must be satisfied if there are to be circumstances where the costs and benefits favor one over the other. This condition would be guaranteed for modular/constitutive model if the visual percept were grounded in real 3-dimensional space by a property, position-dependence, that is intrinsic to awareness and has no computational counterpart, which would break the cycle in Figure 1 for both conversion and reallocation. By doing so it would move the argument one step beyond simply asserting that, having evolved, consciousness must in principle have some advantage, because for conscious vision the source of the advantage could be identified: that it derives from the property of position-dependence and the link between real space and perceptual space that property makes possible. There are two problems here, the first being whether we can assert that there must be a mechanistic difference between conscious vision and all possible non-conscious alternatives, or if it is at best a conjecture. Logic would suggest the former: that what we are now asking of zombie vision is more than the production of a non-conscious phenomenal state, but instead of a mapping generated computationally that embodies spatial information that is made available to the neurons that monitor the map by mechanisms other than computational ones. This is a contradiction in terms if there is no way for this to be accomplished except through consciousness, and indeed there is the potential here for an operational definition of consciousness based on access to information embodied in exactly such a map. But without knowing how conscious visual percepts are both generated and monitored at a mechanistic level, the possibility of valid counterarguments to the above claim cannot be ruled out. Hence I will treat the non-existence of a zombie alternative to a position-dependent conscious visual percept as a conjecture, albeit one with strong logical support, which makes the conclusions of this account, in that respect, conditional. The second problem is that, even if the conjecture is correct, establishing an advantage in principle for conscious vision does not tell us precisely what that advantage is. The result of the entire exercise is then less than fully satisfying from an evolutionary perspective, but on the positive side the status of hard problem is changed, because it is shown to be less an absolute limit on our understanding of why the brain might not just as well operate in the dark, without consciousness, than an obstacle that can be overcome by a suitably chosen set of assumptions4. Setting aside the above conceptual issues, along with the various caveats concerning conversion, I want to move on to the problem posed by the reallocation option, of evolving conscious vision from the ground up. Multiple evolutionary innovations are required with this option because it depends on new structures (the modules) performing new functions. There is first the problem of devising a mechanism for generating a conscious awareness of light sensations regardless of the source of the stimulus. The resulting percept would then do no more than sum the inputs from both eyes, so if one is brightly illuminated and the other is shaded, the resulting percept would be uniform and intermediate in intensity (Figure 2A). To provide even the most rudimentary information about stimulus source we would need, at the very least, a means of distinguishing inputs to each eye. But the ability to do so (Figure 2B) is a key step toward generating a full visual display because all that requires is more modules, each producing an output reflecting its topographical location (Figure 2C). The resulting percept would automatically manifest as a 2-dimensional display if it exists to direct gaze, because eyes have two orthogonal degrees of freedom, up/down and side-to-side, which by default places the viewpoint between the eyes at the point where those axes converge. The problem is how to evolve a conscious mechanism of gaze control when a highly effective unconscious one with multiple capabilities (e.g., see Schiller and Tehovnik, 2005; Hutton, 2008) is already in place. This requires a balance to be struck between conscious gaze control and the competing actions of unconscious mechanisms, which might, for example, depend on evolving a means of preventing gaze from being unconsciously re-directed from a percept that deserves more attention than a computational filter would give it. An additional source of information would be required to justify conscious intervention, which is where encoded memories enter, as a way of providing that information. A competition between mechanisms is the predicted result, evidence for which comes from the different timescales of gaze shifts during visual search of faces (Kauffman et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2024), the problem being that we do not know how these timescales map to underlying mechanisms, whether conscious or not. Caveats aside, the point is that once a conscious component is present, the unconscious process of registering visual stimuli, seeing in other words, would for some subjects be replaced by a process dependent on consciousness that I will refer to as “looking” that through memory is adjustable in response to past conscious experience. But if looking requires agency, and agency must be learned, what we also require is a learning process that occurs in real time and is reinforced by a reward. This accords with the idea that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020; Lacalli, 2024a) and with theories placing associative learning at the core of what consciousness achieves (e.g., Ginsburg and Jablonka, 2007; Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022). Both depend on inputs from memory and imply knock-on effects on the way memories are encoded. Precisely why is shown in Figure 2D, a representation of a face as it might be consciously perceived by a neonate. I portray the image as poorly resolved because for our species vision develops incrementally after birth (Colombo, 2001), an indication that one or more steps in the processing sequence are operating in a less than optimal way (Kiorpes, 2016). This is considered adaptive because it permits a cognitive transition in the way visual features are categorized, from the general to the specific (Vogelsang et al., 2018). Early memory encodings would then be overwritten as details were added to templates established earlier in the learning process, where it may matter whether those templates were generated in the first instance by conscious visual inputs or unconscious ones. The idea that gaze control and selective attention are core functions of conscious vision accords with the widespread recognition of the adaptive benefit of controlling attention, both in general terms and for vision (Thompson and Parasuraman, 2012; Moore and Zirnsak, 2017; Pitts et al., 2018), but in particular that it is “through [gaze shifts] that the brain most immediately expresses its behavioral priority of the moment, and it is to them that it yokes the recruitment of the remainder of its motoric equipment in implementing actions” (Merker, 2012, pg. 46). The importance to this conception of having a central viewpoint prompts me to suggest a way of assessing theories of consciousness (at least as they apply to conscious vision as we experience it), which is that any theory should be required to explain both how a conscious visual display like our own is produced and also how it is anchored in the real world by its viewpoint. One problem with connectomal network-based theories is their failure to provide the bridge between physical space and perceptual space this would appear to require, a problem easily solved by a modular/constitutive model. Which then directs attention away from the cortical integrative processes on which network-based theories depend toward the subcortical neural centers Merker identified as important including, for vision, the dorsal pulvinar. There is a caveat to consider as well, however, that it again matters whether conscious vision evolved by conversion or reallocation. For the former, insights into the structure of the visual display will inform both our understanding of the conscious percept and the unconscious computational processes on whose conversion to consciousness that percept depends whereas, for reallocation, there is no such linkage. Even a complete understanding of the neural circuitry responsible for unconscious responses to visual stimuli in brains like ours would not only then be inadequate as a basis for explaining conscious vision, but might well be entirely irrelevant to that explanation.
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section “Causal hedonic hotspots for hedonic enhancements” describes brain sites involved in pleasure and ‘liking,’ not modules constructing a visual display. Searches for point-by-point visual construction and visual hotspots found no passage addressing that claim; page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“the alternative, that sensations are produced and act locally, and only locally, cannot be ruled out on scientific grounds (Lacalli, 2025).”
§ The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case > Introduction This is one of a series of papers examining consciousness from an evolutionary perspective, the intent in this installment being to extend my analysis of the functions attributable to consciousness (Lacalli, 2024b) to the modular/constitutive model of consciousness introduced in the paper immediately preceding this one (Lacalli, 2025)1. The central premise of the model is that conscious sensations are generated by groups of neurons (the modules) that can be small in relative terms and localized elsewhere than the cortex. Evidence for this comes from the work of Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) on the sub-cortical hotspots responsible for sensations of pleasure (of liking rather than wanting), which begs the question of whether sensations generated locally might also be restricted to having only local effects. This would add an additional constraint to the way such a consciousness would function and, for a broadcast model of consciousness dependent on a signal, makes explicit the problem of signal range, of whether it is large or small, and how the signal is propagated, or if it is. The point here is that few theories pay much attention to the response component of conscious awareness, that a broadcast signal only has causal effects if it is monitored and responded to (see Irwin, 2023 on the monitor function). If this depends on comparatively small groups of neurons that play no direct role in integrative processes operating on a large scale, there would be no route by which conscious sensations could do so either. Hence, though a minority view (Merker, 2007; Earl, 2019), it remains within the bounds of possibility that integrative processes coordinated by the cortex operate largely if not exclusively in an unconscious mode. And while this is at odds with intuition, that consciousness is “big” (Blumenfeld, 2023) and integrative on a large scale (see Morsella et al., 2016 on the integrative consensus), the alternative, that sensations are produced and act locally, and only locally, cannot be ruled out on scientific grounds (Lacalli, 2025). The intuitive sense that consciousness is both big and integrative would then be explained simply as a sampling bias: that we are consciously aware of no more than a fraction of the brain’s operations, which loom large in our imagination only because they are conscious. The modular/constitutive model of consciousness then invites further investigation, my intent here being to demonstrate its utility as a conceptual device for thinking about the functions consciousness evolved to perform, including the minimum it must do to be adaptive if it does not participate directly in large-scale integrative processes. First, in section 2, there are theoretical issues requiring attention, among which is the problem of explaining the adaptive advantage of consciousness if, as proposed by Polák and Marvan (2019), non-conscious phenomenal states could perform many of its functions just as effectively. There is also a preconception to be dealt with, that the evolution of consciousness was simply a matter of converting neural pathways operating in a non-conscious mode to a conscious one. The alternative, the premise of the modular/constitutive model, is that the production of conscious sensations depends on neural structures and circuits that have no preconscious counterparts operating in a fashion that also has no preconscious counterpart. Section 3 is devoted to conscious vision, both how a 2-dimensional percept might be constructed, but also what is required for conscious vision to have an advantage over unconscious visual search. This leads to conclusions that largely validate the ideas of Merker (2012, 2013) on gaze control as the key to understanding the adaptive advantage of conscious vision, providing theoretical support for his analysis. Section 4 explores the learning task required if Cleeremans’ premise is correct, that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020) or, more precisely, that if conscious agency depends on a learning process, what that process is. A crucial part of the argument in sections 3 and 4 depends on experiential states of awareness having properties. The term is intended here to refer to features intrinsic to such states that are more fundamental than those more routinely used to describe the qualitative character of conscious experience, when constructing similarity or quality spaces for example (Raffman, 2015; Rosenthal, 2015), or in my own analysis of experience space (Lacalli, 2021, 2022). These more fundamental properties must then exhibit features unique to consciousness and guide behavior in ways that cannot be duplicated by non-conscious mechanisms. The only obvious example I can provisionally identify, given this more stringent requirement, is position-dependence, the supposition that the position of each module in physical space has perceptual consequences. This, for vision, provides an explanation for the construction of a visual percept and the precondition required if an alternative form of gaze control is to be imposed over one previously dependent on reflex alone. There should then be mechanistic differences between conscious and reflexive forms of gaze control, where the assumption is that conscious vision would have evolved to take advantage of those differences. The argument is more complex if unconscious vision was instead converted from an unconscious mode of operation to a conscious one, but the conclusion does not change, evidence that the hard problem may not be as restrictive as usually supposed in constraining what can and cannot be said about the adaptive advantage of consciousness. A focus on gaze control differs from previous arguments that I and others have made regarding learning and memory, as central to the adaptive advantage conferred by consciousness (Bronfman et al., 2016; Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022; Budson et al., 2022; Lacalli, 2024a,b). The issue here is not that consciousness is less important to learning and memory systems than those accounts suppose, but a recognition that the advantage of consciousness lies in the synergies it makes possible. The analysis is extended in section 5 to deal with conscious contents other than vision, with a recognition that there are species that rely less on vision than we do, nocturnal mammals for example and bats in particular, and taxa with an expanded sensory response, e.g., to thermal radiation in the case of pit vipers. Despite these differences, the distinction that matters for this analysis is that between contents that exhibit position-dependence, which could be vision as we experience it or something else, and those, mainly valence-related, that do not. The question at issue is whether it is possible to deduce, simply through an exercise in logic, if both would necessarily have been part of an emergent consciousness, or in contrast, if a consciousness consisting of contents belonging to just one category, say just vision, or just affect, would be possible. At its core this is a question about whether the reinforcement process required to learn agency must be conscious, which equates to asking whether the adaptive advantage of consciousness depends on its ability to assign meaning to sensory experience. Ideas are advanced to explain why valence, and hence meaning, evolved, but the analysis falls short of answering either that question or what I have referred to as Velmans’ question (see Velmans, 2012), as to the proximate reason consciousness itself evolved. This limits what one can say about the sequence in which contents were added to an evolving consciousness, but brings more clearly into focus the questions that need answers if we are to discover what that sequence was.
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Lacalli, 2025 source
In “Modularity, and a constitutive solution to the combination problem” (page not provided), Lacalli says there are no scientific grounds for rejecting the possibility that awareness acts causally only locally. The same section discusses sensations produced in small neural subunits and explains how consciousness could operate without action over distance. (LLM, conf=0.91)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“there is no scientific justification for rejecting the alternative, that conscious sensations can be localized in both their mode of production and their ability to exert causal effects.”
§ The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case > A modular/constitutive model of consciousness as it might apply to vision The core premise of this paper is that the contents of consciousness can be generated by modular structures, small groups of neurons in other words, each capable of producing a particular sensation when instructed to do so. Zeki (2003) has suggested a modular model for vision to explain certain subcomponents of the visual experience, but the idea can be extended to account for the construction of the visual display itself by adopting something closer to the hotspot idea used by Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) to account for the subcortical production of sensations of pleasure, of “liking” rather than wanting. The visual display could then be constructed point-by-point by the action of separate modules, each acting as a hotspot. While this differs from the majority view of how conscious percepts are generated, it is not difficult to understand in conceptual terms. The conceptual problem arises if we choose also to assume, as I do here, that the causal effects of being aware of an experiential state are also localized, to the immediate vicinity of the module that produced it. This challenges not only our intuition, that consciousness operates globally, but also the consensus view, that it is an integrative construct that arises from the activity of highly interconnected cortical networks responsive to conscious signals (Varela et al., 2001; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Petersen and Sporns, 2015). However, despite widespread acceptance of the integrative model, there is no scientific justification for rejecting the alternative, that conscious sensations can be localized in both their mode of production and their ability to exert causal effects. The reasons why are dealt with in the paper preceding this one (see Lacalli, 2025), the point being that the hard problem prevents us from knowing how our global sense of awareness is generated at a mechanistic level. Being aware of individual sensations may then simply be a matter of those sensations having been produced, regardless of whether the distance over which they are able to exert direct causal effects is large or small3. To proceed further along this line of argument requires the additional assumption that conscious visual experience has the property of position-dependence, meaning that the spatial position of each module, either in absolute or relative terms, has perceptual consequences. The remainder of this section is devoted to exploring this idea further, but it is in my view more than an idea, but instead very possibly the only idea offering a plausible mechanistic explanation for how patterns of sensory input and processing can be mapped from the neural substrate to a corresponding perceptual space, whether for vision or for any other sensory modality. For those who might disagree, I challenge them to offer alternative suggestions, specific as to mechanism, as to how the trick might otherwise be done. A complication for conscious vision is whether it incorporates integrative features, as the binding argument would suggest (see Feldman, 2012; Lo and Zeki, 2014; Zeki, 2020; Peters et al., 2024; Di Lollo, 2012 for the counterargument), which would make the visual display we experience something of a hybrid, combining features of both primary and secondary percepts. This is less of a problem for this analysis than one might suppose because my explanatory target is the structure of the visual display in and of itself, which can be treated as a primary percept so long as the integrative features of conscious vision, whatever those are, are later evolutionary additions. One reason for using vision as an example is the central role it plays in behavioral control, to quote Merker (2012, pg. 48), that it is “the dominant sense in terrestrial vertebrates and the general framework with which the other senses are aligned.” While this may be something of an over-generalization, given the role other sensory modalities play in the lives of various species, notably nocturnal ones, the importance of vision to species active during daylight can hardly be denied. Vision in vertebrates dates to the Palaeozoic, and well-developed eyes are in fact a key feature for distinguishing fossil vertebrates from non-vertebrate chordates (Shimeld and Holland, 2000; Lacalli, 2001). Consciousness in vertebrates, in contrast, is generally assumed to track the evolution of the neocortex, which would place its origins near the base of the amniotes, among early terrestrial vertebrates (Cabanac et al., 2009; Allen and Trestman, 2020). If we accept both that scenario and Ordovician conodonts as a model for ancestral fishes, there would have been a considerable interval when early vertebrates would have foraged and hunted prey visually, directing the eyes, head and body entirely without consciousness. Which then begs the question, that if a fully conscious visual display is so central to behavioral control in terrestrial vertebrates, how could their aquatic ancestors have survived without it? This deserves some further comment because it bears on the habits and survival strategies of early fishes. The key point is that their brains would not have been much larger than those of the protochordates that preceded them except for the addition of dedicated centers for processing sensory inputs, from the visual, olfactory and vestibular organs. Visual information at this early stage of vertebrate evolution would have been mapped topographically to the midbrain tectum, and then accessed to monitor changes in the animal’s surroundings due to its own movements, the motion of nearby conspecifics, and of moving targets that might be food items (Burr and Thompson, 2011). All of this, assuming it was accomplished by specialized computational filters, would have required a dedicated set of circuits able to perform the appropriate computational tasks with optimal efficiency. Judging by the role vision plays today in predator/prey interactions, minimizing the time required for visual inputs to influence such behaviors has probably always been crucial to survival. Consider a shark attacking a school of anchovies for example. For the anchovies the response is schooling behavior, which is predominantly guided by visual cues (Viscido et al., 2004), but is optimally effective only if the response of the school as a coordinated whole is faster than the predator’s ability to adjust its own attack speed and direction. The implication, assuming this represents a long-standing adaptive issue, is that there has, since the Cambrian, been an ongoing arms race in mechanisms for visual attack and visually-controlled avoidance responses where the disadvantages of relying on a conscious display format for vision, given the time required to assemble and respond to such a display (Zeki, 2020), might have outweighed the advantages. The issue is not then whether fishes today do or do not have conscious vision, but rather with the case to be made for an ancestral mode of visual processing comprised of multiple computational filters, each able to respond selectively and as rapidly as possible to particular patterns of tectal activity. It is a then separate question whether any one of those filters performed something akin to a global surveillance function. If so, it would have been that filter the conversion option would have converted to a conscious mode of operation. Given the range of tasks vision performs (e.g., see Frisby and Stone, 2010; DiCarlo et al., 2012; Poggio and Serre, 2013), this begs the question of why that particular conversion was an adaptive solution if, in consequence, the behavioral role played by all other filters was thereby reduced. The problem in part lies in our inability to judge the costs and benefits of different combinations of filters, some operating in a conscious mode and others unconsciously, but this difficulty extends to other sensory modalities. For those represented by phenomenal contents the issue is the hard problem, which denies us knowledge of how a conscious phenomenal state and its non-conscious counterpart differ at a mechanistic level. Arguments in principle are therefore not possible, because we cannot claim that there is necessarily a mechanistic difference between the two. Language and thought are more easily dealt with because of the evolutionary sequence: that if the ability to consciously perceive sound evolved before speech and language, which is almost certainly the case, speech and language would have been secondary additions to an already well-established auditory consciousness. There would then be no reason to evolve a zombie counterpart of an inner voice in competition with a conscious one already in operation. For vision, however, this argument does not apply because there is no basis for supposing that the ability to consciously perceive light evolved before the events that made a 2-dimensional visual percept conscious. It could instead have been a case of coevolution, with a pre-existing zombie form of vision being converted to a conscious mode of operation as the ability to consciously perceive light evolved. Hence the conversion option remains on the table which, for a modular/constitutive model of conscious vision, would mean that the relevant modular structure was already in place, operating in a non-conscious mode. To ground the argument further in some particulars, consider a representational theory (see Gennaro, 2018 on representational theories) where the conversion option would simply convert unconscious representations directly into conscious ones. Since one function of conscious vision is to provide a searchable visual database, we would then require a preconscious visual representation that was searchable, but also a preconscious mechanism for performing the search. If the latter depended on a self-like entity, it is the output of that entity that would, with conversion, be rendered conscious. This accords with the idea that it is the interaction between sensory representations and a self that generates an experiential state (e.g., see Merker, 2013), but if a zombie self is also possible, we have no more understanding of the adaptive advantage of converting its mode of operation to a conscious one than we do for any other such conversion. What is required instead is a reason that zombie vision and conscious vision are mechanistically different, as that is the condition that must be satisfied if there are to be circumstances where the costs and benefits favor one over the other. This condition would be guaranteed for modular/constitutive model if the visual percept were grounded in real 3-dimensional space by a property, position-dependence, that is intrinsic to awareness and has no computational counterpart, which would break the cycle in Figure 1 for both conversion and reallocation. By doing so it would move the argument one step beyond simply asserting that, having evolved, consciousness must in principle have some advantage, because for conscious vision the source of the advantage could be identified: that it derives from the property of position-dependence and the link between real space and perceptual space that property makes possible. There are two problems here, the first being whether we can assert that there must be a mechanistic difference between conscious vision and all possible non-conscious alternatives, or if it is at best a conjecture. Logic would suggest the former: that what we are now asking of zombie vision is more than the production of a non-conscious phenomenal state, but instead of a mapping generated computationally that embodies spatial information that is made available to the neurons that monitor the map by mechanisms other than computational ones. This is a contradiction in terms if there is no way for this to be accomplished except through consciousness, and indeed there is the potential here for an operational definition of consciousness based on access to information embodied in exactly such a map. But without knowing how conscious visual percepts are both generated and monitored at a mechanistic level, the possibility of valid counterarguments to the above claim cannot be ruled out. Hence I will treat the non-existence of a zombie alternative to a position-dependent conscious visual percept as a conjecture, albeit one with strong logical support, which makes the conclusions of this account, in that respect, conditional. The second problem is that, even if the conjecture is correct, establishing an advantage in principle for conscious vision does not tell us precisely what that advantage is. The result of the entire exercise is then less than fully satisfying from an evolutionary perspective, but on the positive side the status of hard problem is changed, because it is shown to be less an absolute limit on our understanding of why the brain might not just as well operate in the dark, without consciousness, than an obstacle that can be overcome by a suitably chosen set of assumptions4. Setting aside the above conceptual issues, along with the various caveats concerning conversion, I want to move on to the problem posed by the reallocation option, of evolving conscious vision from the ground up. Multiple evolutionary innovations are required with this option because it depends on new structures (the modules) performing new functions. There is first the problem of devising a mechanism for generating a conscious awareness of light sensations regardless of the source of the stimulus. The resulting percept would then do no more than sum the inputs from both eyes, so if one is brightly illuminated and the other is shaded, the resulting percept would be uniform and intermediate in intensity (Figure 2A). To provide even the most rudimentary information about stimulus source we would need, at the very least, a means of distinguishing inputs to each eye. But the ability to do so (Figure 2B) is a key step toward generating a full visual display because all that requires is more modules, each producing an output reflecting its topographical location (Figure 2C). The resulting percept would automatically manifest as a 2-dimensional display if it exists to direct gaze, because eyes have two orthogonal degrees of freedom, up/down and side-to-side, which by default places the viewpoint between the eyes at the point where those axes converge. The problem is how to evolve a conscious mechanism of gaze control when a highly effective unconscious one with multiple capabilities (e.g., see Schiller and Tehovnik, 2005; Hutton, 2008) is already in place. This requires a balance to be struck between conscious gaze control and the competing actions of unconscious mechanisms, which might, for example, depend on evolving a means of preventing gaze from being unconsciously re-directed from a percept that deserves more attention than a computational filter would give it. An additional source of information would be required to justify conscious intervention, which is where encoded memories enter, as a way of providing that information. A competition between mechanisms is the predicted result, evidence for which comes from the different timescales of gaze shifts during visual search of faces (Kauffman et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2024), the problem being that we do not know how these timescales map to underlying mechanisms, whether conscious or not. Caveats aside, the point is that once a conscious component is present, the unconscious process of registering visual stimuli, seeing in other words, would for some subjects be replaced by a process dependent on consciousness that I will refer to as “looking” that through memory is adjustable in response to past conscious experience. But if looking requires agency, and agency must be learned, what we also require is a learning process that occurs in real time and is reinforced by a reward. This accords with the idea that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020; Lacalli, 2024a) and with theories placing associative learning at the core of what consciousness achieves (e.g., Ginsburg and Jablonka, 2007; Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022). Both depend on inputs from memory and imply knock-on effects on the way memories are encoded. Precisely why is shown in Figure 2D, a representation of a face as it might be consciously perceived by a neonate. I portray the image as poorly resolved because for our species vision develops incrementally after birth (Colombo, 2001), an indication that one or more steps in the processing sequence are operating in a less than optimal way (Kiorpes, 2016). This is considered adaptive because it permits a cognitive transition in the way visual features are categorized, from the general to the specific (Vogelsang et al., 2018). Early memory encodings would then be overwritten as details were added to templates established earlier in the learning process, where it may matter whether those templates were generated in the first instance by conscious visual inputs or unconscious ones. The idea that gaze control and selective attention are core functions of conscious vision accords with the widespread recognition of the adaptive benefit of controlling attention, both in general terms and for vision (Thompson and Parasuraman, 2012; Moore and Zirnsak, 2017; Pitts et al., 2018), but in particular that it is “through [gaze shifts] that the brain most immediately expresses its behavioral priority of the moment, and it is to them that it yokes the recruitment of the remainder of its motoric equipment in implementing actions” (Merker, 2012, pg. 46). The importance to this conception of having a central viewpoint prompts me to suggest a way of assessing theories of consciousness (at least as they apply to conscious vision as we experience it), which is that any theory should be required to explain both how a conscious visual display like our own is produced and also how it is anchored in the real world by its viewpoint. One problem with connectomal network-based theories is their failure to provide the bridge between physical space and perceptual space this would appear to require, a problem easily solved by a modular/constitutive model. Which then directs attention away from the cortical integrative processes on which network-based theories depend toward the subcortical neural centers Merker identified as important including, for vision, the dorsal pulvinar. There is a caveat to consider as well, however, that it again matters whether conscious vision evolved by conversion or reallocation. For the former, insights into the structure of the visual display will inform both our understanding of the conscious percept and the unconscious computational processes on whose conversion to consciousness that percept depends whereas, for reallocation, there is no such linkage. Even a complete understanding of the neural circuitry responsible for unconscious responses to visual stimuli in brains like ours would not only then be inadequate as a basis for explaining conscious vision, but might well be entirely irrelevant to that explanation.
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Lacalli, 2025 source
In “Modularity, and a constitutive solution to the combination problem” (page unavailable), the paper describes a modular account in which sensations are produced in small centers of activity. It also says there are “no scientific grounds for rejecting” the possibility that awareness acts causally only locally. The claim presents this as an alternative that cannot be scientifically ruled out, not as an established finding. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Evidence for this comes from the work of Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) on the sub-cortical hotspots responsible for sensations of pleasure (of liking rather than wanting)”
§ The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case > Introduction This is one of a series of papers examining consciousness from an evolutionary perspective, the intent in this installment being to extend my analysis of the functions attributable to consciousness (Lacalli, 2024b) to the modular/constitutive model of consciousness introduced in the paper immediately preceding this one (Lacalli, 2025)1. The central premise of the model is that conscious sensations are generated by groups of neurons (the modules) that can be small in relative terms and localized elsewhere than the cortex. Evidence for this comes from the work of Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) on the sub-cortical hotspots responsible for sensations of pleasure (of liking rather than wanting), which begs the question of whether sensations generated locally might also be restricted to having only local effects. This would add an additional constraint to the way such a consciousness would function and, for a broadcast model of consciousness dependent on a signal, makes explicit the problem of signal range, of whether it is large or small, and how the signal is propagated, or if it is. The point here is that few theories pay much attention to the response component of conscious awareness, that a broadcast signal only has causal effects if it is monitored and responded to (see Irwin, 2023 on the monitor function). If this depends on comparatively small groups of neurons that play no direct role in integrative processes operating on a large scale, there would be no route by which conscious sensations could do so either. Hence, though a minority view (Merker, 2007; Earl, 2019), it remains within the bounds of possibility that integrative processes coordinated by the cortex operate largely if not exclusively in an unconscious mode. And while this is at odds with intuition, that consciousness is “big” (Blumenfeld, 2023) and integrative on a large scale (see Morsella et al., 2016 on the integrative consensus), the alternative, that sensations are produced and act locally, and only locally, cannot be ruled out on scientific grounds (Lacalli, 2025). The intuitive sense that consciousness is both big and integrative would then be explained simply as a sampling bias: that we are consciously aware of no more than a fraction of the brain’s operations, which loom large in our imagination only because they are conscious. The modular/constitutive model of consciousness then invites further investigation, my intent here being to demonstrate its utility as a conceptual device for thinking about the functions consciousness evolved to perform, including the minimum it must do to be adaptive if it does not participate directly in large-scale integrative processes. First, in section 2, there are theoretical issues requiring attention, among which is the problem of explaining the adaptive advantage of consciousness if, as proposed by Polák and Marvan (2019), non-conscious phenomenal states could perform many of its functions just as effectively. There is also a preconception to be dealt with, that the evolution of consciousness was simply a matter of converting neural pathways operating in a non-conscious mode to a conscious one. The alternative, the premise of the modular/constitutive model, is that the production of conscious sensations depends on neural structures and circuits that have no preconscious counterparts operating in a fashion that also has no preconscious counterpart. Section 3 is devoted to conscious vision, both how a 2-dimensional percept might be constructed, but also what is required for conscious vision to have an advantage over unconscious visual search. This leads to conclusions that largely validate the ideas of Merker (2012, 2013) on gaze control as the key to understanding the adaptive advantage of conscious vision, providing theoretical support for his analysis. Section 4 explores the learning task required if Cleeremans’ premise is correct, that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020) or, more precisely, that if conscious agency depends on a learning process, what that process is. A crucial part of the argument in sections 3 and 4 depends on experiential states of awareness having properties. The term is intended here to refer to features intrinsic to such states that are more fundamental than those more routinely used to describe the qualitative character of conscious experience, when constructing similarity or quality spaces for example (Raffman, 2015; Rosenthal, 2015), or in my own analysis of experience space (Lacalli, 2021, 2022). These more fundamental properties must then exhibit features unique to consciousness and guide behavior in ways that cannot be duplicated by non-conscious mechanisms. The only obvious example I can provisionally identify, given this more stringent requirement, is position-dependence, the supposition that the position of each module in physical space has perceptual consequences. This, for vision, provides an explanation for the construction of a visual percept and the precondition required if an alternative form of gaze control is to be imposed over one previously dependent on reflex alone. There should then be mechanistic differences between conscious and reflexive forms of gaze control, where the assumption is that conscious vision would have evolved to take advantage of those differences. The argument is more complex if unconscious vision was instead converted from an unconscious mode of operation to a conscious one, but the conclusion does not change, evidence that the hard problem may not be as restrictive as usually supposed in constraining what can and cannot be said about the adaptive advantage of consciousness. A focus on gaze control differs from previous arguments that I and others have made regarding learning and memory, as central to the adaptive advantage conferred by consciousness (Bronfman et al., 2016; Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022; Budson et al., 2022; Lacalli, 2024a,b). The issue here is not that consciousness is less important to learning and memory systems than those accounts suppose, but a recognition that the advantage of consciousness lies in the synergies it makes possible. The analysis is extended in section 5 to deal with conscious contents other than vision, with a recognition that there are species that rely less on vision than we do, nocturnal mammals for example and bats in particular, and taxa with an expanded sensory response, e.g., to thermal radiation in the case of pit vipers. Despite these differences, the distinction that matters for this analysis is that between contents that exhibit position-dependence, which could be vision as we experience it or something else, and those, mainly valence-related, that do not. The question at issue is whether it is possible to deduce, simply through an exercise in logic, if both would necessarily have been part of an emergent consciousness, or in contrast, if a consciousness consisting of contents belonging to just one category, say just vision, or just affect, would be possible. At its core this is a question about whether the reinforcement process required to learn agency must be conscious, which equates to asking whether the adaptive advantage of consciousness depends on its ability to assign meaning to sensory experience. Ideas are advanced to explain why valence, and hence meaning, evolved, but the analysis falls short of answering either that question or what I have referred to as Velmans’ question (see Velmans, 2012), as to the proximate reason consciousness itself evolved. This limits what one can say about the sequence in which contents were added to an evolving consciousness, but brings more clearly into focus the questions that need answers if we are to discover what that sequence was.
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) source
The Abstract distinguishes ‘wanting’ from ‘liking, or pleasure itself’ and says liking is generated by hedonic hotspots. The ‘Causal hedonic hotspots for hedonic enhancements’ section identifies subcortical hotspots that amplify liking reactions, supporting the cited example of localized pleasure generation. (LLM, conf=0.90)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The central premise of the model is that conscious sensations are generated by groups of neurons (the modules) that can be small in relative terms and localized elsewhere than the cortex.”
§ The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case > Introduction This is one of a series of papers examining consciousness from an evolutionary perspective, the intent in this installment being to extend my analysis of the functions attributable to consciousness (Lacalli, 2024b) to the modular/constitutive model of consciousness introduced in the paper immediately preceding this one (Lacalli, 2025)1. The central premise of the model is that conscious sensations are generated by groups of neurons (the modules) that can be small in relative terms and localized elsewhere than the cortex. Evidence for this comes from the work of Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) on the sub-cortical hotspots responsible for sensations of pleasure (of liking rather than wanting), which begs the question of whether sensations generated locally might also be restricted to having only local effects. This would add an additional constraint to the way such a consciousness would function and, for a broadcast model of consciousness dependent on a signal, makes explicit the problem of signal range, of whether it is large or small, and how the signal is propagated, or if it is. The point here is that few theories pay much attention to the response component of conscious awareness, that a broadcast signal only has causal effects if it is monitored and responded to (see Irwin, 2023 on the monitor function). If this depends on comparatively small groups of neurons that play no direct role in integrative processes operating on a large scale, there would be no route by which conscious sensations could do so either. Hence, though a minority view (Merker, 2007; Earl, 2019), it remains within the bounds of possibility that integrative processes coordinated by the cortex operate largely if not exclusively in an unconscious mode. And while this is at odds with intuition, that consciousness is “big” (Blumenfeld, 2023) and integrative on a large scale (see Morsella et al., 2016 on the integrative consensus), the alternative, that sensations are produced and act locally, and only locally, cannot be ruled out on scientific grounds (Lacalli, 2025). The intuitive sense that consciousness is both big and integrative would then be explained simply as a sampling bias: that we are consciously aware of no more than a fraction of the brain’s operations, which loom large in our imagination only because they are conscious. The modular/constitutive model of consciousness then invites further investigation, my intent here being to demonstrate its utility as a conceptual device for thinking about the functions consciousness evolved to perform, including the minimum it must do to be adaptive if it does not participate directly in large-scale integrative processes. First, in section 2, there are theoretical issues requiring attention, among which is the problem of explaining the adaptive advantage of consciousness if, as proposed by Polák and Marvan (2019), non-conscious phenomenal states could perform many of its functions just as effectively. There is also a preconception to be dealt with, that the evolution of consciousness was simply a matter of converting neural pathways operating in a non-conscious mode to a conscious one. The alternative, the premise of the modular/constitutive model, is that the production of conscious sensations depends on neural structures and circuits that have no preconscious counterparts operating in a fashion that also has no preconscious counterpart. Section 3 is devoted to conscious vision, both how a 2-dimensional percept might be constructed, but also what is required for conscious vision to have an advantage over unconscious visual search. This leads to conclusions that largely validate the ideas of Merker (2012, 2013) on gaze control as the key to understanding the adaptive advantage of conscious vision, providing theoretical support for his analysis. Section 4 explores the learning task required if Cleeremans’ premise is correct, that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020) or, more precisely, that if conscious agency depends on a learning process, what that process is. A crucial part of the argument in sections 3 and 4 depends on experiential states of awareness having properties. The term is intended here to refer to features intrinsic to such states that are more fundamental than those more routinely used to describe the qualitative character of conscious experience, when constructing similarity or quality spaces for example (Raffman, 2015; Rosenthal, 2015), or in my own analysis of experience space (Lacalli, 2021, 2022). These more fundamental properties must then exhibit features unique to consciousness and guide behavior in ways that cannot be duplicated by non-conscious mechanisms. The only obvious example I can provisionally identify, given this more stringent requirement, is position-dependence, the supposition that the position of each module in physical space has perceptual consequences. This, for vision, provides an explanation for the construction of a visual percept and the precondition required if an alternative form of gaze control is to be imposed over one previously dependent on reflex alone. There should then be mechanistic differences between conscious and reflexive forms of gaze control, where the assumption is that conscious vision would have evolved to take advantage of those differences. The argument is more complex if unconscious vision was instead converted from an unconscious mode of operation to a conscious one, but the conclusion does not change, evidence that the hard problem may not be as restrictive as usually supposed in constraining what can and cannot be said about the adaptive advantage of consciousness. A focus on gaze control differs from previous arguments that I and others have made regarding learning and memory, as central to the adaptive advantage conferred by consciousness (Bronfman et al., 2016; Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022; Budson et al., 2022; Lacalli, 2024a,b). The issue here is not that consciousness is less important to learning and memory systems than those accounts suppose, but a recognition that the advantage of consciousness lies in the synergies it makes possible. The analysis is extended in section 5 to deal with conscious contents other than vision, with a recognition that there are species that rely less on vision than we do, nocturnal mammals for example and bats in particular, and taxa with an expanded sensory response, e.g., to thermal radiation in the case of pit vipers. Despite these differences, the distinction that matters for this analysis is that between contents that exhibit position-dependence, which could be vision as we experience it or something else, and those, mainly valence-related, that do not. The question at issue is whether it is possible to deduce, simply through an exercise in logic, if both would necessarily have been part of an emergent consciousness, or in contrast, if a consciousness consisting of contents belonging to just one category, say just vision, or just affect, would be possible. At its core this is a question about whether the reinforcement process required to learn agency must be conscious, which equates to asking whether the adaptive advantage of consciousness depends on its ability to assign meaning to sensory experience. Ideas are advanced to explain why valence, and hence meaning, evolved, but the analysis falls short of answering either that question or what I have referred to as Velmans’ question (see Velmans, 2012), as to the proximate reason consciousness itself evolved. This limits what one can say about the sequence in which contents were added to an evolving consciousness, but brings more clearly into focus the questions that need answers if we are to discover what that sequence was.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section “Causal hedonic hotspots for hedonic enhancements” describes small, localized sites outside the cortex that can amplify pleasure-related ‘liking’ reactions. But “Evolutionary origins of brain systems for hedonic reactions” distinguishes those reactions from conscious feelings, which may require additional neural mechanisms. The paper therefore does not establish the claimed model of how conscious sensations generally are generated. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
73 more claims · 7 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 165 claims and to verify the 4 references still open.
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Citations
Cites
The brainweb: phase synchronization and large-scale integration
Varela, F., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35067550 · Cited by 4,761 · cited 1×
“…intuition, that consciousness operates globally, but also the consensus view, that it is an integrative construct that arises from the activity of highly interconnected cortical networks responsive to conscious signals (Varela et al., 2001; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Petersen and Sporns, 2015).”
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
How does the brain solve visual object recognition?
DiCarlo, J. J., Zoccolan, D., & Rust, N. C. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.01.010 · Cited by 1,790 · cited 1×
“Given the range of tasks vision performs (e.g., see Frisby and Stone, 2010; DiCarlo et al., 2012; Poggio and Serre, 2013), this begs the question of why that particular conversion was an adaptive solution if, in consequence, the behavioral role played by all other filters was thereby reduced.”
Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.02.018 · Cited by 1,730 · cited 2×
“…visual experience, but the idea can be extended to account for the construction of the visual display itself by adopting something closer to the hotspot idea used by Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) to account for the subcortical production of sensations of pleasure, of “liking” rather than wanting.”
Arbib, M. A. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000038 · Cited by 1,164 · cited 1×
“…function of consciousness [similarly, the flexible response mechanism of Earl (2014)], but also with current ideas that see language as an extension of gestural control (Arbib, 2005; Gentilucci and Corballis, 2006) with a common syntactical structure (Pulvermüller, 2014; Boeckx and Fujita, 2014).”
Discriminative and affective touch: Sensing and feeling.
McGlone, F., Wessberg, J., & Olausson, H. (2014) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.05.001 · Cited by 1,112
Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868 · cited 2×
“Hence, though a minority view (Merker, 2007; Earl, 2019), it remains within the bounds of possibility that integrative processes coordinated by the cortex operate largely if not exclusively in an unconscious mode.”
The Development of Visual Attention in Infancy
Colombo, J. (2001) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.337 · Cited by 673 · cited 1×
“I portray the image as poorly resolved because for our species vision develops incrementally after birth (Colombo, 2001), an indication that one or more steps in the processing sequence are operating in a less than optimal way (Kiorpes, 2016).”
Pleasure: the common currency.
Cabanac, M. (1992) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80594-6 · Cited by 589 · cited 1×
“…in our own consciousness, the expectation is that an emergent consciousness would contain both, which accords with the argument that affect should lie at the core of an evolved consciousness (e.g., see Cabanac, 1992; Dickinson and Balleine, 2010; Butlin, 2020; Cleeremans and Tallon-Baudry, 2022).”
Brain networks and cognitive architectures
Petersen, S. E., & Sporns, O. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.027 · Cited by 553 · cited 1×
“…intuition, that consciousness operates globally, but also the consensus view, that it is an integrative construct that arises from the activity of highly interconnected cortical networks responsive to conscious signals (Varela et al., 2001; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Petersen and Sporns, 2015).”
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Allen, 2020, Animal consciousness
- Shapiro, 2024, Embodied cognition
Metadata
- Authors
- Lacalli, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Victoria (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Lacalli, Thurston
- ORCID
- Lacalli, Thurston
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2026-06-22
- Volume
- 17
- Pages
- 1829430-1829430
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC13333348
- OpenAlex
- W7165520396
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 72
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Princeton University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- function of consciousness, conscious vision, gaze control, position dependence, hard problem of consciousness, visual experience, agency, attentional control, memory encoding, emergent consciousness, valence
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
- The paper
- Lacalli, T. (2026). The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.