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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 24 of the 55 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case

Open access
Lacalli, Thurston · 2026 · Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

This paper extends an earlier analysis of the functions attributable to consciousness, applying it to a modular/constitutive model that limits the role conscious sensations are allowed to play in integrative processes operating at scale.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that consciousness can be modeled as modular and constitutive rather than globally integrative, and that conscious vision is best understood through position-dependence: the spatial location of each module has perceptual consequences. It proposes that conscious vision may have evolved because it supports learned gaze control, attention, and memory encoding in ways zombie alternatives cannot.

Key findings

  • Conscious visual awareness is proposed to have the property of position-dependence, meaning the physical location of each contributing module affects perception; this is presented as the key mechanism for constructing a 2-dimensional visual display.
  • The paper argues that conscious gaze control can serve as a mechanism for registering salient visual features in ways that have no preconscious counterpart, and that this supports the acquisition of agency through learning.
  • It distinguishes two evolutionary paths: conversion of existing unconscious pathways versus reallocation to new modular structures. The author favors reallocation for a modular/constitutive model, while allowing that conversion may still be possible in some cases.
  • The paper concludes that conscious vision may have an adaptive advantage through attention control and memory encoding; it also suggests that species with less reliance on vision may still have position-dependent conscious contents in other modalities.

Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical paper using a modular/constitutive model of consciousness as the main framework, with vision as the test case.
  • Integrates arguments from evolutionary theory, neuroscience, and prior consciousness literature; the text discusses concepts such as broadcast models, zombie counterparts, conversion vs reallocation, and the hard problem.
  • Main analysis is a logical and comparative argument, not an empirical experiment, using vision, gaze control, and memory learning as explanatory anchors.

Limitations

  • The author repeatedly states that key claims are conjectural, especially the claim that there is no zombie alternative to a position-dependent conscious visual percept.
  • The paper says it cannot determine the actual evolutionary sequence by which contents were added to consciousness, and that it does not know whether vision was among the first contents.
  • Evidence is limited by the paper’s own scope: the analysis is not designed for species where vision plays a different or subordinate role and does not provide direct empirical tests of the proposed mechanism.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430

Cites

76 of 77 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

FIGURE 1 Mental causation for a broadcast (signal/response) model of consciousness in two time scales: in real time the ontological issue of causal efficacy, and in evolutionary time the problem of why those effects confer an adaptive advantage. The conundrum this illustrates arises from the hard problem, that assumptions about the causal efficacy of a mechanistic signal say nothing about whether awareness of the signal is also causally efficacious. The cycle can be broken at two points, but doing so on the ontological side depends on understanding the nature of consciousness as a component of physical reality, a daunting task, while on the evolutionary side it depends on identifying the adaptive advantage of consciousness over all competing non-conscious alternatives. The premise of this paper is that a modular/constitutive model of consciousness, combined with the property (for vision specifically) of positional dependence, may resolve the evolutionary question, thus breaking the cycle. Doing so offers the prospect of advancing our understanding of the advantages conferred by conscious vision while providing a starting point for addressing Velmans’ question, of the proximate reason consciousness evolved.
FIGURE 1 Mental causation for a broadcast (signal/response) model of consciousness in two time scales: in real time the ontological issue of causal efficacy, and in evolutionary time the problem of why those effects confer an adaptive advantage. The conundrum this illustrates arises from the hard problem, that assumptions about the causal efficacy of a mechanistic signal say nothing about whether awareness of the signal is also causally efficacious. The cycle can be broken at two points, but doing so on the ontological side depends on understanding the nature of consciousness as a component of physical reality, a daunting task, while on the evolutionary side it depends on identifying the adaptive advantage of consciousness over all competing non-conscious alternatives. The premise of this paper is that a modular/constitutive model of consciousness, combined with the property (for vision specifically) of positional dependence, may resolve the evolutionary question, thus breaking the cycle. Doing so offers the prospect of advancing our understanding of the advantages conferred by conscious vision while providing a starting point for addressing Velmans’ question, of the proximate reason consciousness evolved.CC BY · PubMed Central
FIGURE 2 Stages by which a modular/constitutive visual percept might be constructed if its resolution was incrementally improved by the evolutionary expedient of adding more modules. (A) Conscious vision in the absence of position-dependence where the visual percept simply averages the input from both eyes. (B) Conscious vision dependent on two modules, one for each eye, so the percept distinguishes between inputs to the left eye, shaded in this case, compared to the right eye. (C) Multiple modules, which allows the percept to display a rudimentary image, in this case of a light source toward which gaze is directed. The contribution of each active module to the percept is shown as having well-defined edges, simply as a matter of convenience, where they might instead have been realized as a set of focal centers whose amplitude grades off over distance. Overlap is possible, as in panel (C), if the modules are not structured and positioned to avoid this outcome. (D) A more fully evolved visual system with many more modules, the majority of which are now much smaller (shown where active as white dots) and form a non-overlapping array, here imaging a face. The limited resolution is intended to show how the face might appear at an intermediate stage in the maturation of the visual system, but it could also represent an intermediate stage in an evolutionary process. Blue arrows show successive steps in gaze during a hypothetical conscious visual search, the question being whether these can be supposed to have different costs and benefits compared with gaze shifts under the control of computational filters.
FIGURE 2 Stages by which a modular/constitutive visual percept might be constructed if its resolution was incrementally improved by the evolutionary expedient of adding more modules. (A) Conscious vision in the absence of position-dependence where the visual percept simply averages the input from both eyes. (B) Conscious vision dependent on two modules, one for each eye, so the percept distinguishes between inputs to the left eye, shaded in this case, compared to the right eye. (C) Multiple modules, which allows the percept to display a rudimentary image, in this case of a light source toward which gaze is directed. The contribution of each active module to the percept is shown as having well-defined edges, simply as a matter of convenience, where they might instead have been realized as a set of focal centers whose amplitude grades off over distance. Overlap is possible, as in panel (C), if the modules are not structured and positioned to avoid this outcome. (D) A more fully evolved visual system with many more modules, the majority of which are now much smaller (shown where active as white dots) and form a non-overlapping array, here imaging a face. The limited resolution is intended to show how the face might appear at an intermediate stage in the maturation of the visual system, but it could also represent an intermediate stage in an evolutionary process. Blue arrows show successive steps in gaze during a hypothetical conscious visual search, the question being whether these can be supposed to have different costs and benefits compared with gaze shifts under the control of computational filters.CC BY · PubMed Central
FIGURE 3 The consciousness machine, a device for thinking about how consciousness evolved, modified from Lacalli (2023). Each cycle represents the transition from generation to generation, so that contents change incrementally in consequence of the actions of natural selection. The outer casing encloses all the algorithmic processes carried out by the brain, which may or may not depend on external inputs. The latter are required for neurophysical models of consciousness, both to supply a physical source, in the form of a neurophysical input (NPI, blue arrow), from which the various contents of consciousness are constructed, but also to establish a link to behavior (LTB). A second external input (the dashed purple arrow) is required to ensure that conscious sensations are not epiphenomenal, a condition that must apply to both a hypothetical signal and conscious awareness of that signal. Because the machine operates in evolutionary time, real time events are not represented, so the internal workings of the box labeled LTB are invisible to evolution. This highlights the distinction that needs to be drawn between the link to behavior as a guarantor of causal efficacy and the learning process required in each generation to generate conscious agency, the latter then being an externality that must be dealt with separately. SCs are the selector circuits that specify which sensations are to be evoked, a requirement for any theory where consciousness depends on neurocircuitry.
FIGURE 3 The consciousness machine, a device for thinking about how consciousness evolved, modified from Lacalli (2023). Each cycle represents the transition from generation to generation, so that contents change incrementally in consequence of the actions of natural selection. The outer casing encloses all the algorithmic processes carried out by the brain, which may or may not depend on external inputs. The latter are required for neurophysical models of consciousness, both to supply a physical source, in the form of a neurophysical input (NPI, blue arrow), from which the various contents of consciousness are constructed, but also to establish a link to behavior (LTB). A second external input (the dashed purple arrow) is required to ensure that conscious sensations are not epiphenomenal, a condition that must apply to both a hypothetical signal and conscious awareness of that signal. Because the machine operates in evolutionary time, real time events are not represented, so the internal workings of the box labeled LTB are invisible to evolution. This highlights the distinction that needs to be drawn between the link to behavior as a guarantor of causal efficacy and the learning process required in each generation to generate conscious agency, the latter then being an externality that must be dealt with separately. SCs are the selector circuits that specify which sensations are to be evoked, a requirement for any theory where consciousness depends on neurocircuitry.CC BY · PubMed Central
FIGURE 4 Separating agency from meaning. For consciousness with agency to evolve, using a position-dependent modality such as vision as an example, we require a learning process (circumscribed by the blue circle) such that attention is selectively directed to a percept which, for a modular/constitutive model of conscious vision, would be position-dependent. The reinforcement step required for the learning process (R) can then be either conscious or unconscious. The figure shows the situation if R is unconscious, which would be the case if unconscious valence-like phenomenal states can exist as a consequence of neural activity. For consciousness to incorporate meaning, a separate step extrinsic to the learning process would then be required to incorporate valence and hence meaning, in which case position-dependent contents could evolve independently of those conferring valence. The alternative is for valence to be intrinsic to the reinforcement process (R would depend on experiential states), so agency and meaning would be acquired together. At issue here is the question of whether consciousness could evolve without meaning, so that a consciousness consisting of only one content, say only vision, would be possible in principle.
FIGURE 4 Separating agency from meaning. For consciousness with agency to evolve, using a position-dependent modality such as vision as an example, we require a learning process (circumscribed by the blue circle) such that attention is selectively directed to a percept which, for a modular/constitutive model of conscious vision, would be position-dependent. The reinforcement step required for the learning process (R) can then be either conscious or unconscious. The figure shows the situation if R is unconscious, which would be the case if unconscious valence-like phenomenal states can exist as a consequence of neural activity. For consciousness to incorporate meaning, a separate step extrinsic to the learning process would then be required to incorporate valence and hence meaning, in which case position-dependent contents could evolve independently of those conferring valence. The alternative is for valence to be intrinsic to the reinforcement process (R would depend on experiential states), so agency and meaning would be acquired together. At issue here is the question of whether consciousness could evolve without meaning, so that a consciousness consisting of only one content, say only vision, would be possible in principle.CC BY · PubMed Central
FIGURE 5 A proposal for how a modular, constitutive consciousness might operate in functional terms if, either because of limitations intrinsic to awareness or simply as a matter of evolutionary contingency, it does not participate in integrative pathways operating at scale. Conscious contents (in blue) would then act only indirectly on memory, actions, and secondary percepts, via non-conscious pathways (black arrows), because the modular/constitutive model limits their ability to exert causal effects over distance. Memory pathways, which also operate in a non-conscious mode, are in red. There are then two “streams” of consciousness. First (A), a perceptual stream, of primary percepts that can be simple (phenomenal percepts) or complex (e.g., vision) that contribute to memory encodings which, when activated by recall mechanisms, generate secondary percepts including visual images and thought. Second (B), the intervention streams, whereby conscious and unconscious memories influence actions in progress through motivational control mechanisms, altering an animal’s navigation through its habitat, for example [the MDIS model from Lacalli (2024b)], or for thought, navigation through a series of visual or linguistic states. Feedback is required for both of these, where for action sequences this would include external stimuli generated as a consequence of the action in question (dashed arrow), but for thoughts is internal (the arrow labeled F), whether initiated by an inner voice, visual images, or affective memories. The diagram accords with the premise, that from an evolutionary perspective consciousness should be thought of primarily as a servant of memory, performing a restricted set of functions that involve it far less in sensory integration than most theories of consciousness suppose. Missing from the figure is any explicit reference to attention control, despite its importance to this account, because it is a skill acquired through a developmental process, while the figure shows only causal structure, not specific real-time events.
FIGURE 5 A proposal for how a modular, constitutive consciousness might operate in functional terms if, either because of limitations intrinsic to awareness or simply as a matter of evolutionary contingency, it does not participate in integrative pathways operating at scale. Conscious contents (in blue) would then act only indirectly on memory, actions, and secondary percepts, via non-conscious pathways (black arrows), because the modular/constitutive model limits their ability to exert causal effects over distance. Memory pathways, which also operate in a non-conscious mode, are in red. There are then two “streams” of consciousness. First (A), a perceptual stream, of primary percepts that can be simple (phenomenal percepts) or complex (e.g., vision) that contribute to memory encodings which, when activated by recall mechanisms, generate secondary percepts including visual images and thought. Second (B), the intervention streams, whereby conscious and unconscious memories influence actions in progress through motivational control mechanisms, altering an animal’s navigation through its habitat, for example [the MDIS model from Lacalli (2024b)], or for thought, navigation through a series of visual or linguistic states. Feedback is required for both of these, where for action sequences this would include external stimuli generated as a consequence of the action in question (dashed arrow), but for thoughts is internal (the arrow labeled F), whether initiated by an inner voice, visual images, or affective memories. The diagram accords with the premise, that from an evolutionary perspective consciousness should be thought of primarily as a servant of memory, performing a restricted set of functions that involve it far less in sensory integration than most theories of consciousness suppose. Missing from the figure is any explicit reference to attention control, despite its importance to this account, because it is a skill acquired through a developmental process, while the figure shows only causal structure, not specific real-time events.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

19 Valid · 5 Not valid · 14 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations

73 more claims · 7 with their cited sources checked

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Citations

Cites

Show all 72 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Allen, 2020, Animal consciousness
  2. Shapiro, 2024, Embodied cognition

Metadata

Authors
Lacalli, T.
Affiliations
University of Victoria (CA)
Corresponding author
Lacalli, Thurston
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2026-06-22
Volume
17
Pages
1829430-1829430
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7165520396
Cited by
0
References
72
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Princeton University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
function of consciousness, conscious vision, gaze control, position dependence, hard problem of consciousness, visual experience, agency, attentional control, memory encoding, emergent consciousness, valence

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
The paper
Lacalli, T. (2026). The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430

Data sources

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