Theories of consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 162 of the 165 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper reviews four major theories of consciousness and argues that their empirical commitments, explanatory targets, and points of disagreement need to be made clearer for theory testing to mature. It concludes that iterative comparison and refinement of these theories should improve understanding of consciousness.
Key findings
- The review covers four prominent approaches: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories, and integrated information theory.
- For each approach, the paper identifies what aspect(s) of consciousness it aims to explain, its neurobiological commitments, and the empirical data cited in support.
- The authors argue that current theories are not yet clearly related to each other and may not yet be empirically distinguishable.
- The paper proposes that three kinds of development are needed to support a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness, though the text provided does not list those three ways explicitly.
Methods
- Narrative review of theoretical approaches to consciousness rather than a new empirical study.
- Synthesizes and compares existing literature on four major theories, focusing on their explanatory scope, neurobiological commitments, and supporting evidence.
- Uses discussion of prominent empirical debates to assess whether theories can be distinguished empirically.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished.
- The text does not specify the three development needs it mentions, so the actionable content of that framework is not stated in the provided text.
- As a review, it depends on existing theoretical and empirical work rather than presenting new data; this is evident from the text.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 2 Not valid · 0 Not checked · 2 Own results and interpretations
- Probably not a substantial claim. 4
- It may state two separate claims as one. 1
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“These theories have been developed, tested and refined through decades of highquality neuroscientific research (for recent reviews, see Seth & Bayne 2022, Yaron et al. 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Seth & Bayne 2022
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“At least 22 distinct theories of consciousness are taken seriously [62]”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [62]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The new naturalist approach seems to require a more elaborate sort of reflective equilibrium than what either Andrews or Seth [41,48] imagine, since in addition to ToCs and the empirical evidence from comparative, neuroscientific and psychological research, we need to add evolutionary theory.”
From Consciousness at sea (2025) · cites this paper as [41]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Many scientific theories of consciousness have been proposed (see Seth & Bayne 2022 for a list).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Seth & Bayne 2022
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Re fi ning these theories, which are among the most in fl uential in the fi eld [12,13,35], has driven signi fi cant methodological progress [36].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [12]
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Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01657-x · Cited by 2,338
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Crick, F. & Koch, C. Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Semin. Neurosci. 2, 263–275 (1990).
- Varela, F. J. Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem. J. Conscious. Stud. 3, 330–350 (1996).
- Dennett, D. C. Welcome to strong illusionism. J. Conscious. Stud. 26, 48–58 (2019).
- Chalmers, D. J. & McQueen, K. in Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness (ed Gao, S.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 2022).
- Haun, A. M., Tononi, G., Koch, C. & Tsuchiya, N. Are we underestimating the richness of visual experiences? Neurosci. Conscious. 3, 1–4 (2017).
- Baars, B. J. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988).
- Chalmers, A. What is This Thing Called Science? (Queensland Univ. Press, 2013).
- Jackendoff, R. Consciousness and the Computational Mind (MIT Press, 1987).
- Chalmers, D. J. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 23, 200–219 (1995). This work presents the classic statement of the philosophical distinction between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness.
- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (MIT Press, 1993).
Cited by
Beniczky, S., Trinka, E., Wirrell, E., Abdulla, F., Al Baradie, R., Alonso Vanegas, M., Auvin, S., Singh, M. B., Blumenfeld, H., Bogacz Fressola, A., et al. (2025) · Epilepsia · doi:10.1111/epi.18338 · Cited by 426
Organoid intelligence (OI): the new frontier in biocomputing and intelligence-in-a-dish
Smirnova, L., Caffo, B. S., Gracias, D. H., Huang, Q., Morales Pantoja, I. E., Tang, B., Zack, D. J., Berlinicke, C. A., Boyd, J. L., Harris, T. D., et al. (2023) · Frontiers in Science · doi:10.3389/fsci.2023.1017235 · Cited by 276
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T.
- Affiliations
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Seth, Anil K.
- Venue
- Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Published
- 2022-05-03
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 439-452
- ISSN
- 1471-003X (ISSN-L)
- 1471-0048
- OpenAlex
- W4225414052
- Cited by
- 880
- References
- 165
- Citations by year
- 2026: 211 · 2025: 222 · 2024: 248 · 2023: 149 · 2022: 46
- FWCI
- 24.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Nature reviews. Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- theory of consciousness, higher-order theories, global workspace theory, reentry, predictive processing, integrated information theory, biological basis of consciousness, physical basis of consciousness, theory testing, neuroscience of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Consciousness, Humans, Neurosciences
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- Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.