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Theories of consciousness

Seth, Anil K., Bayne, Tim · 2022 · Nature Reviews Neuroscience

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 162 of the 165 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

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  2. Full textRead the full text
  3. Reference list162 references found
  4. Reference check162 of 162 references checked
  5. StatisticsRecomputed
  6. Claims4 claims anchored to a quote
  7. Cited sourcesChecked
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Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper reviews four major theories of consciousness and argues that their empirical commitments, explanatory targets, and points of disagreement need to be made clearer for theory testing to mature. It concludes that iterative comparison and refinement of these theories should improve understanding of consciousness.

Key findings

  • The review covers four prominent approaches: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories, and integrated information theory.
  • For each approach, the paper identifies what aspect(s) of consciousness it aims to explain, its neurobiological commitments, and the empirical data cited in support.
  • The authors argue that current theories are not yet clearly related to each other and may not yet be empirically distinguishable.
  • The paper proposes that three kinds of development are needed to support a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness, though the text provided does not list those three ways explicitly.

Methods

  • Narrative review of theoretical approaches to consciousness rather than a new empirical study.
  • Synthesizes and compares existing literature on four major theories, focusing on their explanatory scope, neurobiological commitments, and supporting evidence.
  • Uses discussion of prominent empirical debates to assess whether theories can be distinguished empirically.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished.
  • The text does not specify the three development needs it mentions, so the actionable content of that framework is not stated in the provided text.
  • As a review, it depends on existing theoretical and empirical work rather than presenting new data; this is evident from the text.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4

Cites

162 of 162 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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    Citations

    Cites

    Show all 162 references

    Research works printed but not linked: 10

    1. Crick, F. & Koch, C. Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Semin. Neurosci. 2, 263–275 (1990).
    2. Varela, F. J. Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem. J. Conscious. Stud. 3, 330–350 (1996).
    3. Dennett, D. C. Welcome to strong illusionism. J. Conscious. Stud. 26, 48–58 (2019).
    4. Chalmers, D. J. & McQueen, K. in Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness (ed Gao, S.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 2022).
    5. Haun, A. M., Tononi, G., Koch, C. & Tsuchiya, N. Are we underestimating the richness of visual experiences? Neurosci. Conscious. 3, 1–4 (2017).
    6. Baars, B. J. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988).
    7. Chalmers, A. What is This Thing Called Science? (Queensland Univ. Press, 2013).
    8. Jackendoff, R. Consciousness and the Computational Mind (MIT Press, 1987).
    9. Chalmers, D. J. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 23, 200–219 (1995). This work presents the classic statement of the philosophical distinction between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness.
    10. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (MIT Press, 1993).

    Cited by

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    Metadata

    Authors
    Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T.
    Affiliations
    Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
    Corresponding author
    Seth, Anil K.
    Venue
    Nature Reviews Neuroscience
    Published
    2022-05-03
    Volume
    23
    Issue
    7
    Pages
    439-452
    ISSN
    • 1471-003X (ISSN-L)
    • 1471-0048
    OpenAlex
    W4225414052
    Cited by
    880
    References
    165
    Citations by year
    2026: 211 · 2025: 222 · 2024: 248 · 2023: 149 · 2022: 46
    FWCI
    24.38
    Type
    journal article
    Language
    en
    Open access
    closed
    Licence
    Locations
    • Nature reviews. Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
    • PubMed (publishedVersion)
    • Figshare (submittedVersion)
    Topics
    • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
    • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
    • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
    Keywords
    theory of consciousness, higher-order theories, global workspace theory, reentry, predictive processing, integrated information theory, biological basis of consciousness, physical basis of consciousness, theory testing, neuroscience of consciousness
    MeSH terms
    Consciousness, Humans, Neurosciences

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    CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Theories of consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4
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    Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4

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