Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 80 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Introduction: Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is widely expected to improve transparency and support appropriate human reliance on AI-assisted decision-making. However, the psychological processes through which explainability relates to reliance remain insufficiently understood, and explainability, transparency, and trust have largely been examined separately. Objectives: This study develops and tests a psychological model of cognitive transparency in which AI explainability, algorithmic transparency, and perceived AI accuracy are associated with human reliance on AI through cognitive understanding, cognitive trust, and trust calibration, with AI literacy as a boundary condition. Methods: A cross-sectional online survey was completed by 342 AI users in South Korea in May and June 2026. Each participant evaluated one self-selected AI system that they had personally used; all constructs were measured by self-report. The data were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS 4. Results: AI explainability (β = 0.349) and algorithmic transparency (β = 0.297) were positively associated with cognitive understanding. Cognitive understanding (β = 0.388) and, more strongly, perceived AI accuracy (β = 0.492) were associated with cognitive trust. Cognitive trust was associated with trust calibration (β = 0.631), which was associated with human reliance on AI (β = 0.600). All hypothesized indirect effects were significant, and AI literacy strengthened the association between AI explainability and cognitive understanding (β = 0.192). The model explained 36%–54% of the variance in the endogenous constructs and showed medium predictive power. Conclusion: The findings are consistent with a sequence in which explainable AI relates to reliance through users’ understanding and trust judgments. Because all constructs were self-reported and measured at a single point in time, the results describe associations among users’ perceptions rather than causal effects, independently verified calibration, or objectively appropriate reliance. The findings suggest that AI developers in domains such as healthcare, education, and finance, where calibrated reliance is critical, should pair user-facing explanations with information about system accuracy and with AI literacy support.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This cross-sectional survey of 342 AI users in South Korea tests a PLS-SEM model in which perceived AI explainability and algorithmic transparency relate to human reliance on AI through cognitive understanding, cognitive trust, and (self-assessed) trust calibration, with AI literacy as a moderator. All ten hypotheses were supported, but the authors stress that the design captures associations among self-reported perceptions, not causal effects or objectively appropriate reliance.
Key findings
- AI explainability (β = 0.349, p < 0.001) and algorithmic transparency (β = 0.297, p < 0.001) were positively associated with cognitive understanding; cognitive understanding (β = 0.388) and, more strongly, perceived AI accuracy (β = 0.492) were associated with cognitive trust.
- Cognitive trust was associated with trust calibration (β = 0.631) and trust calibration with human reliance on AI (β = 0.600); all hypothesized indirect effects were significant, including the full serial path from explainability to reliance (β = 0.051, 95% CI [0.032, 0.075]).
- AI literacy strengthened the explainability → cognitive understanding association (interaction β = 0.192, p < 0.001; simple slopes 0.156 at −1 SD vs. 0.541 at +1 SD), though its own main effect on cognitive understanding was not significant (β = 0.078, p = 0.153).
- The model explained 38.1% of variance in cognitive understanding, 54.3% in cognitive trust, 39.8% in trust calibration, and 36.0% in human reliance; SRMR = 0.048, with medium predictive power overall but weak for reliance (Q²predict = 0.102).
Methods
- Quantitative cross-sectional online survey conducted in South Korea in May–June 2026; 463 responses received, 121 removed (93 incomplete, 28 duplicates), leaving 342 valid responses (73.9% usable rate). Sample was 54.1% male, 68.1% aged 20–30, 75.1% frequent/very frequent AI users; recruited by non-probability convenience sampling among university students and early-career professionals.
- Each participant evaluated one self-selected AI system they had personally used (system type not recorded); all eight constructs were measured with three self-developed reflective items on a five-point Likert scale, with AI literacy items referring to AI in general.
- Data analyzed with PLS-SEM in SmartPLS 4 (path weighting, 3,000 iterations), with measurement model assessment (loadings, α, ρA, ρC, AVE, Fornell-Larcker, HTMT, cross-loadings), full collinearity assessment for common method bias, bootstrapping (5,000 subsamples), PLSpredict and CVPAT for out-of-sample prediction, and a two-stage approach for moderation with simple-slope probing.
Limitations
- Stated by the authors: the cross-sectional design precludes causal or temporal ordering, and alternative orderings (e.g., trust shaping perceived understanding) are plausible; all constructs were self-reported, so understanding, calibration, and reliance were not objectively verified; one trust calibration item ("I rely on the system appropriately") refers to reliance and may have inflated the calibration–reliance association; participants evaluated self-selected, unrecorded systems; items were newly developed with no pilot test or expert panel review, and the AI literacy measure overlaps with self-efficacy; the English-language questionnaire and a convenience sample of South Korean students and early-career professionals limit generalizability; common method variance cannot be ruled out entirely.
- Evident from the text: the study did not measure system performance, mental models, or affective trust, so the calibration construct is explicitly a metacognitive self-judgment that "may diverge from actual calibration"; the authors also note reliance was only weakly predicted (Q²predict = 0.102), and the two non-hypothesized indirect effects (full serial path; algorithmic transparency → cognitive trust) are exploratory and require confirmation.
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1 Valid · 4 Not valid · 46 Not checked · 111 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“A persistent obstacle is that many advanced AI models, particularly deep learning systems, generate outputs without revealing how those outputs were reached, leaving users uncertain about whether and when to rely on them (Gunning and Aha, 2019; Miller, 2019; Buçinca et al., 2021; Lai et al., 2023).”
§ Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Gunning and Aha, 2019 source
The Abstract (p.1) states that modern ML techniques — explicitly including deep learning neural networks — 'exhibit high performance' but 'are opaque', and that the new wave of AI applications 'cannot explain their decisions and actions to human users', which is the opacity/hard-to-reveal-rationale part of the claim. The reliance/trust part is carried by the same paper's framing of XAI's goal (Abstract; XAI Concept and Approach): end users who 'depend on decisions or recommendations' need to understand the system's rationale in order to 'understand, appropriately trust, and effectively manage' it, and the IHMC section notes users must judge 'when to trust (or doubt) the system'. As a broad background attribution this paraphrase matches our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Supportedcites Miller, 2019 source
Section 2.6.4 (Explanatory model of self) states that researchers have investigated 'machine learning models that are uninterpretable, such as neural nets', matching the claim's point that deep learning systems do not reveal how outputs are reached. The Introduction (p.1) frames XAI as driven by 'evidence that many AI applications have limited take up, or are not appropriated at all, due to ethical concerns and a lack of trust on behalf of their users', and by the hypothesis that more transparent/interpretable/explainable systems leave users 'better equipped to understand and therefore trust' the agents — supporting the reliance/trust half of the claim. The Abstract likewise describes researchers seeking 'to provide more transparency to their algorithms'. As a broad background citation, the source clearly treats the topic the claim states. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Partly supportedcites Buçinca et al., 2021 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the second half of the claim: the abstract and Introduction (sections 1 and 2.2) treat people's difficulty in judging whether and when to follow AI suggestions, documenting frequent overreliance and the need for calibrated trust. However, the paper nowhere states the premise the claim leads with — that advanced models, 'particularly deep learning systems,' produce outputs without revealing how they were reached; searches for black-box/opaque/deep-learning framing returned only passages on XAI explanations and interface complexity, and the paper instead assumes explanations can give 'an insight into how the machine arrived at its recommendations' (Introduction). The deep-learning-opacity attribution therefore rests on the other citations in the sentence (Gunning and Aha, 2019; Miller, 2019), not on Buçinca et al. (2021). (LLM, conf=0.72)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“First, explainability, algorithmic transparency, perceived accuracy, and trust have mostly been examined as separate antecedents of AI acceptance or behavioral intention (Shin, 2021; Dwivedi et al., 2023).”
§ Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance > Introduction
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Shin, 2021 source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
- Could not verifycites Dwivedi et al., 2023 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Dwivedi et al. (2023) treats transparency, explainability, trust and accuracy as thematic concerns and open research questions — e.g. Theme 1 (p. 8) on techniques to 'enhance the transparency of generative and self-adaptive AI models that will facilitate explainability', Contribution 11 (p. 15) on trust and algorithmic bias, Richter's contribution (p. 10) asking 'How can we ensure that AI systems are transparent, explainable/contestable, and trustworthy?', and Contribution 2 (p. 7) noting drivers of AI adoption for innovation — but no passage states that these constructs have been examined as *separate* antecedents of AI acceptance or behavioural intention. Searches on 'antecedents of AI acceptance', 'perceived accuracy ... trust ... intention to adopt', 'technology acceptance model / behavioural intention' returned only these thematic passages and reference lists, so the claim's characterisation of the prior literature is not addressed in our copy (which is an opinion paper, not an acceptance study). Nothing in our copy contradicts it either. (LLM, conf=0.62)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not checked yet
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“AI literacy strengthened the association between AI explainability and cognitive understanding (β = 0.192).”
§ Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance > Abstract > Results
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“All hypothesized indirect effects were significant, and AI literacy strengthened the association between AI explainability and cognitive understanding (β = 0.192).”
§ Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance > Abstract > Results
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The model explained 38.1% of the variance in cognitive understanding, 54.3% in cognitive trust, 39.8% in trust calibration, and 36.0% in human reliance on AI (Table 7), indicating moderate explanatory power.”
§ Cognitive transparency and trust calibration in explainable AI systems: a psychological model of human-AI decision reliance > Results > Structural model
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Self-Generation, Energy Management and Firm Adaptation to Unreliable Electricity in Ethiopia
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Rehman, U.
- Affiliations
- Hoseo University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Rehman, Usman
- ORCID
- Rehman, Usman
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2026-10-14
- Volume
- 17
- Pages
- 1924913-1924913
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC13713401
- OpenAlex
- W7221796136
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- FWCI
- 1.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Hoseo University
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Human Factors and Ergonomics › Human-Automation Interaction and Safety
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- explainable AI, algorithmic transparency, trust calibration, cognitive trust, AI literacy, cognitive understanding, human-AI collaboration
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