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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory

Open access
Sánchez-Cañizares, Javier · 2021 · Entropy

Abstract

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is currently one of the most promising frameworks with which to address a unified explanation of life-related phenomena. With powerful formalism that embeds a small set of assumptions, it purports to deal with complex adaptive dynamics ranging from barely unicellular organisms to complex cultural manifestations. The FEP has received increased attention in disciplines that study life, including some critique regarding its overall explanatory power and its true potential as a grand unifying theory (GUT). Recently, FEP theorists presented a contribution with the main tenets of their framework, together with possible philosophical interpretations, which lean towards so-called Markovian Monism (MM). The present paper assumes some of the abovementioned critiques, rejects the arguments advanced to invalidate the FEP's potential to be a GUT, and overcomes criticism thereof by reviewing FEP theorists' newly minted metaphysical commitment, namely MM. Specifically, it shows that this philosophical interpretation of the FEP argues circularly and only delivers what it initially assumes, i.e., a dual information geometry that allegedly explains epistemic access to the world based on prior dual assumptions. The origin of this circularity can be traced back to a physical description contingent on relative system-environment separation. However, the FEP itself is not committed to MM, and as a scientific theory it delivers more than what it assumes, serving as a heuristic unification principle that provides epistemic advancement for the life sciences.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that the Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a useful scientific framework for life sciences but that its Markovian Monism interpretation is philosophically circular. It rejects broad claims that the FEP fails as a grand unifying theory, while arguing that FEP theorists’ dual-information-geometry metaphysics overstates what the framework justifies.

## Key findings

  • The paper’s main conclusion is that FEP is “not committed to MM” and still “delivers more than what it assumes,” functioning as a “heuristic unification principle” for the life sciences.
  • It argues that Markovian Monism (MM) “obtains what it assumes”: a dual information geometry that allegedly explains epistemic duality only because of prior dual assumptions.
  • The paper says the circularity in FEP is tied to a non-fundamental system/environment separation via the Markov blanket, but that this circularity is harmless for FEP as a scientific framework and problematic mainly for MM.
  • It disputes the idea that explanatory pluralism defeats FEP as a GUT, stating that FEP still offers a “new paradigm” that could encompass partial frameworks and “shallower explanatory logics.”

## Methods

  • The paper is a philosophical/theoretical review and critique of the FEP literature, not an empirical study.
  • It analyzes the formal assumptions of FEP, especially Markov blankets, non-equilibrium steady states, probabilistic beliefs, and free-energy minimization, and then examines their philosophical implications.
  • It uses close reading and conceptual critique of Colombo and Wright’s objections and of Friston et al.’s MM interpretation.

## Limitations

  • The paper itself notes that its argument depends on assuming the FEP’s implicit claim of epistemic reduction and on reviewing the framework’s explanatory power rather than testing it empirically.
  • It does not provide new data, experiments, or formal proof; this is evident from the text.
  • It also acknowledges that its critique is limited by the framework’s own contextual dependence on system/environment separation and by unresolved questions about individuality, representation, and meaning; this is evident from the text.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/e23020238

Cites

60 of 60 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 3 Not valid · 2 Not checked · 31 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 68 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Fuller, 2020, Teleology Writ Large: In Search of New Optimization Principles in Nature, Studies in Science and Theology (2019–2020): Are We Special?, Volume 17, 327
  2. Kauffman, S.A. (2016). Humanity in a Creative Universe, Oxford University Press.
  3. Pautz, 2019, What is the integrated information theory of consciousness? A catalogue of questions, J. Conscious. Stud., 26, 188

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Sánchez-Cañizares, J.
Affiliations
Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra, 31009 Pamplona, Spain
Venue
Entropy
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2021-02-19
Volume
23
Issue
2
Pages
238
ISSN
1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3131787597
Cited by
16
References
68
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1
FWCI
1.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Deposito Adademico Digital Universidad De Navarra (University of Navarra) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Systems and Dynamics
Keywords
free energy principle, information geometry, circularity, philosophy of biology, complex adaptive systems, epistemic access

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/e23020238
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Sánchez-Cañizares, J. (2021). The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory. Entropy. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23020238

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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