The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory
Open accessAbstract
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is currently one of the most promising frameworks with which to address a unified explanation of life-related phenomena. With powerful formalism that embeds a small set of assumptions, it purports to deal with complex adaptive dynamics ranging from barely unicellular organisms to complex cultural manifestations. The FEP has received increased attention in disciplines that study life, including some critique regarding its overall explanatory power and its true potential as a grand unifying theory (GUT). Recently, FEP theorists presented a contribution with the main tenets of their framework, together with possible philosophical interpretations, which lean towards so-called Markovian Monism (MM). The present paper assumes some of the abovementioned critiques, rejects the arguments advanced to invalidate the FEP's potential to be a GUT, and overcomes criticism thereof by reviewing FEP theorists' newly minted metaphysical commitment, namely MM. Specifically, it shows that this philosophical interpretation of the FEP argues circularly and only delivers what it initially assumes, i.e., a dual information geometry that allegedly explains epistemic access to the world based on prior dual assumptions. The origin of this circularity can be traced back to a physical description contingent on relative system-environment separation. However, the FEP itself is not committed to MM, and as a scientific theory it delivers more than what it assumes, serving as a heuristic unification principle that provides epistemic advancement for the life sciences.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper argues that the Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a useful scientific framework for life sciences but that its Markovian Monism interpretation is philosophically circular. It rejects broad claims that the FEP fails as a grand unifying theory, while arguing that FEP theorists’ dual-information-geometry metaphysics overstates what the framework justifies.
## Key findings
- The paper’s main conclusion is that FEP is “not committed to MM” and still “delivers more than what it assumes,” functioning as a “heuristic unification principle” for the life sciences.
- It argues that Markovian Monism (MM) “obtains what it assumes”: a dual information geometry that allegedly explains epistemic duality only because of prior dual assumptions.
- The paper says the circularity in FEP is tied to a non-fundamental system/environment separation via the Markov blanket, but that this circularity is harmless for FEP as a scientific framework and problematic mainly for MM.
- It disputes the idea that explanatory pluralism defeats FEP as a GUT, stating that FEP still offers a “new paradigm” that could encompass partial frameworks and “shallower explanatory logics.”
## Methods
- The paper is a philosophical/theoretical review and critique of the FEP literature, not an empirical study.
- It analyzes the formal assumptions of FEP, especially Markov blankets, non-equilibrium steady states, probabilistic beliefs, and free-energy minimization, and then examines their philosophical implications.
- It uses close reading and conceptual critique of Colombo and Wright’s objections and of Friston et al.’s MM interpretation.
## Limitations
- The paper itself notes that its argument depends on assuming the FEP’s implicit claim of epistemic reduction and on reviewing the framework’s explanatory power rather than testing it empirically.
- It does not provide new data, experiments, or formal proof; this is evident from the text.
- It also acknowledges that its critique is limited by the framework’s own contextual dependence on system/environment separation and by unresolved questions about individuality, representation, and meaning; this is evident from the text.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 3 Not valid · 2 Not checked · 31 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“This methodological separation of domains obeys practical criteria—including ranges of energy [24]—that are founded on weak grounds.”
§ The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory > 2. The Main Assumptions of FEP Formalism > 2.1. The Markov Blanket at the Core of the System/Environment Distinction
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [24] Tegmark, 2015, Consciousness as a State of Matter, Chaos Solitons Fractals sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section III.G (p. 14) examines whether minimizing interactions can divide the physical world into objects, and Appendix B (p. 35) mentions a measurable range of energies. Neither passage addresses a methodological separation of domains by energy ranges or says that such criteria rest on weak grounds. Searches for energy ranges and domain boundaries found no passage establishing the attributed point. (LLM, conf=0.73)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The present work maintains both that foregoing critiques—especially those by Colombo and Wright [12]—can be rejected on grounds other than MM and that the latter is a misleading basis for the FEP framework due to its circular reasoning.”
§ The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [12] Colombo, M., and Wright, C. (2018). First principles in the life sciences: The free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism. Synthese. source
The citation identifies critiques by Colombo and Wright, and Section 4 (p. 18) explicitly argues that FEP is inconsistent with mechanism. The statement that MM is misleading because of circular reasoning is framed as the citing authors’ own position, not as a claim attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Friston and colleagues adopt MM as the better metaphysical position to support the FEP framework.”
§ The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory > 5. MM as the Philosophical Position Adopted by FEP Theorists > 5.2. MM Rejects Dualism
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] Friston, K.J., Wiese, W., and Hobson, J.A. (2020). Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism. Entropy, 22. source
Section 9, “Markovian Monism” (page unavailable), says the formalism favors monistic views and calls physicalism its most plausible interpretation, while acknowledging alternatives. Section 13, “Markovian Monism as Reductive Materialism” (page unavailable), calls the authors’ preferred view the most coherent interpretation of the formal treatment. This supports the claim that they favor Markovian monism as a metaphysical interpretation of the free-energy framework. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Hence, the dual information geometry itself does not entail property dualism”
§ The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory > 5. MM as the Philosophical Position Adopted by FEP Theorists > 5.2. MM Rejects Dualism
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] Friston, K.J., Wiese, W., and Hobson, J.A. (2020). Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism. Entropy, 22. source
Section 9, “Markovian Monism,” states the claim verbatim. It explains that the two perspectives can be described without treating internal states as representations, so the dual information geometry does not itself entail property dualism. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The present work maintains both that foregoing critiques—especially those by Colombo and Wright [12]—can be rejected on grounds other than MM and that the latter is a misleading basis for the FEP framework due to its circular reasoning.”
§ The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [12] Colombo, M., and Wright, C. (2018). First principles in the life sciences: The free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism. Synthese. source
The citation identifies Colombo and Wright’s work as a critique of the FEP. The Introduction (p. 2) raises concerns about the FEP’s explanatory power and epistemic status, and the Conclusion (p. 23) describes disagreements with organicism and mechanism. The assertion that these critiques can be rejected on grounds other than MM is explicitly the citing authors’ own position, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Supported
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Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 2×
“Ergodicity “only holds over certain temporal scales for real organisms that are on a trajectory from birth to death” ([5], sec.”
BackgroundThe Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution
Kauffman, S. A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195079517.001.0001 · Cited by 7,855
The origins of order; self organization and selection in evolution
(1994) · International Journal of Biochemistry · doi:10.1016/0020-711x(94)90119-8 · Cited by 6,649
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1×
“All these formulations are internally consistent with frameworks like the Bayesian brain hypothesis [28].”
MethodThe Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588 · cited 1×
“In fact, human observers behave as optimal Bayesian observers in many ways ([38], p.”
BackgroundMitchell, M. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195124415.001.0001 · Cited by 2,310
Hohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831
Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529 · cited 1×
“, [3], where phenomenological axioms are straightforwardly translated into mathematical axioms.”
BackgroundA free energy principle for the brain
Friston, K., Kilner, J., & Harrison, L. (2006) · Journal of Physiology-Paris · doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001 · Cited by 1,369 · cited 1×
“Information is encoded and computed through probability density functions or approximations thereof: “This treatment assumes that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment” ([18], p.”
Method
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Fuller, 2020, Teleology Writ Large: In Search of New Optimization Principles in Nature, Studies in Science and Theology (2019–2020): Are We Special?, Volume 17, 327
- Kauffman, S.A. (2016). Humanity in a Creative Universe, Oxford University Press.
- Pautz, 2019, What is the integrated information theory of consciousness? A catalogue of questions, J. Conscious. Stud., 26, 188
Cited by
The Emperor's New Markov Blankets
Bruineberg, J. P., Dołęga, K., Dewhurst, J., & Baltieri, M. (2021) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21002351 · Cited by 169
Structurally informed models of directed brain connectivity
Greaves, M. D., Novelli, L., L., S. M., Zalesky, A., & Razi, A. (2024) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-024-00881-3 · Cited by 32
“The alignment with these theoretical perspectives has attendant benefits (for example, it suggests some testable hypotheses), and drawbacks (for example, similar to regularization, the hypothesized effects do not clearly map to a specific biological mechanism) 100 .”
A quantum–classical model of brain dynamics
Sergi, A., Messina, A., Vicario, C. M., & Martino, G. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25040592 · Cited by 16
“An interesting connection of GS to quantum models of decision making, which is yet to be fully explored, may be founded on the free energy principle [132, 133].”
BackgroundFree energy and inference in living systems
Kim, C. S. (2023) · Interface Focus · doi:10.1098/rsfs.2022.0041 · Cited by 17
“Despite being a promising universal biological principle, the IFEP has led to controversy regarding its success as the universal principle and its distance between biophysical reality and epistemological grounds [29, 62, 13, 87, 93, 63, 8, 2, 9, 86].”
BackgroundDynamical Free Energy Based Model for Quantum Decision Making
Tanaka, S., Umegaki, T., Nishiyama, A., & Kitoh‐Nishioka, H. (2022) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2022.127979 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Sánchez-Cañizares, J.
- Affiliations
- Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra, 31009 Pamplona, Spain
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2021-02-19
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7922226
- OpenAlex
- W3131787597
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 1.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Deposito Adademico Digital Universidad De Navarra (University of Navarra) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Systems and Dynamics
- Keywords
- free energy principle, information geometry, circularity, philosophy of biology, complex adaptive systems, epistemic access
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