Epistemic Communities under Active Inference
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 165 of the 165 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The spread of ideas is a fundamental concern of today’s news ecology. Understanding the dynamics of the spread of information and its co-option by interested parties is of critical importance. Research on this topic has shown that individuals tend to cluster in echo-chambers and are driven by confirmation bias. In this paper, we leverage the active inference framework to provide an in silico model of confirmation bias and its effect on echo-chamber formation. We build a model based on active inference, where agents tend to sample information in order to justify their own view of reality, which eventually leads to them to have a high degree of certainty about their own beliefs. We show that, once agents have reached a certain level of certainty about their beliefs, it becomes very difficult to get them to change their views. This system of self-confirming beliefs is upheld and reinforced by the evolving relationship between an agent’s beliefs and observations, which over time will continue to provide evidence for their ingrained ideas about the world. The epistemic communities that are consolidated by these shared beliefs, in turn, tend to produce perceptions of reality that reinforce those shared beliefs. We provide an active inference account of this community formation mechanism. We postulate that agents are driven by the epistemic value that they obtain from sampling or observing the behaviours of other agents. Inspired by digital social networks like Twitter, we build a generative model in which agents generate observable social claims or posts (e.g., ‘tweets’) while reading the socially observable claims of other agents that lend support to one of two mutually exclusive abstract topics. Agents can choose which other agent they pay attention to at each timestep, and crucially who they attend to and what they choose to read influences their beliefs about the world. Agents also assess their local network’s perspective, influencing which kinds of posts they expect to see other agents making. The model was built and simulated using the freely available Python package pymdp. The proposed active inference model can reproduce the formation of echo-chambers over social networks, and gives us insight into the cognitive processes that lead to this phenomenon.
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## TL;DR
This paper presents a multi-agent active inference model of opinion dynamics in which agents infer both an abstract binary “Idea” and other agents’ beliefs from observable “Hashtags,” and use those inferences to choose whom to attend to and what to tweet. Simulations show that epistemic confirmation bias, network connectivity, inverse social volatility, and habit learning jointly shape whether groups polarize into echo-chambers or converge toward consensus.
## Key findings
- The model reproduces confirmation-bias-like dynamics: higher epistemic confirmation bias \(\gamma\) makes agents preferentially sample like-minded neighbours and can drive echo-chamber formation.
- In the network experiments, increasing connectivity \(p\) generally reduced polarisation, but high \(\gamma\) could counteract this: even at \(p=0.8\), many trials still ended in polarised dynamics.
- For the \(\gamma\)–\(\omega_{\mathrm{Soc}}\) sweep, the authors report 15 values of \(\gamma\) over \((3,9)\), 15 values of \(\omega_{\mathrm{Soc}}\) over \((0.05,1.0)\), \(N=15\) agents, and \(p=0.4\); low inverse social volatility led to more re-attendance to neighbours.
- In the habit-formation experiment, higher learning rate \(\eta\) increased polarisation; the average re-attendance rate was “seemingly maximised” when \(\eta \approx 0.3\), and the effect was strongest at high \(\gamma\) and \(\eta\).
## Methods
- Multi-agent simulations were built under a discrete active inference/POMDP framework, with agents inferring an abstract binary hidden state (“Idea 1” vs “Idea 2”), neighbours’ meta-beliefs, and their own actions from observed tweets/hashtags.
- The simulations used Erdős–Rényi networks and the freely available Python package `pymdp`; network size ranged from \(N=12\)–30 in general, and the main quantitative experiments used \(N=15\) agents with 100 independent realisations per condition and \(T=100\) timesteps.
- Main analyses were parameter sweeps over epistemic confirmation bias \(\gamma\), inverse social volatility \(\omega_{\mathrm{Soc}}\), habit-learning rate \(\eta\), and connectivity \(p\), with outcomes summarized using polarisation index \(\rho\) and re-attendance rate \(r\).
## Limitations
- The paper states that the parameter search “was not exhaustive,” and that large regions of parameter space remain unexplored.
- It states that network size was largely fixed/small for computational reasons: simulations mainly used \(N=30\) or \(N=15\), \(\omega_{\mathrm{Idea}}=9.0\) was fixed, and the authors say results are not guaranteed to generalise to larger networks.
- It also says the outcome measures were relatively simple: the polarisation metric is one-dimensional and does not distinguish different belief-network configurations. Evidence from the text also makes clear that the model omits any true environmental signal and only models two mutually exclusive Ideas; this is a modeling simplification the authors themselves acknowledge as needing future extension.
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![Figure A1 Exploration of the relationship between ‘agreement’ between an agent and one of its neighbours, the epistemic confirmation bias parameter γ, and the epistemic value of reading that neighbour’s tweet content. Here, the two marginal posteriors Q(s^Idea) and Q(s^MBk) are expressed as two Bernoulli distributions with respective parameters p and q, where ‘agreement’ is the case when p=q and hence (1−p)=(1−q). The top row shows heatmaps of the negative ambiguity H, entropy H[Q(o)], and the full epistemic value EV=H+H[Q(o)] for a fixed value of γ=15.0, under all possible values of p and q. The ‘epistemic confirmation bias‘ effect is seen in the negative ambiguity surface H (upper left plot), which is maximised when posterior beliefs about the validity of Idea 1, measured by p, are aligned with posterior beliefs about a neighbour’s meta-belief about Idea 1, q. The bottom row of plots shows a complementary perspective, demonstrating the effect of increasing γ on the epistemic value and its components, for different settings of q when p=0.0. The subplot on furthest to the right of the bottom row shows that increasing γ increases epistemic value most when q is on the same side of 0.5 as p (q=0.2,q=0.4), and the effect of γ on epistemic value deceases once q passes 0.5. Note that the epistemic value is 0 when p=q=0, because although the negative ambiguity is maximised in this case, it is counteracted by the entropy term which is 0 since both posteriors are certain.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/40807d345f294dc09789dfbc849e50d4/epistemic-communities-under-active-inference-figure-1.jpg)






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In the paper
“However, clearly defined clusters and group boundaries can sometimes act as buffers [132,133,134,135,136].”
§ Epistemic Communities under Active Inference > 5. Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [132] Almogren, 2019, An efficient networking protocol for internet of things to handle multimedia big data, Multimed. Tools Appl. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [133] 2005, Gated communities: Sprawl and social segregation in Southern California, Hous. Stud. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [134] Aldrich, 1977, Boundary spanning roles and organization structure, Acad. Manag. Rev. source
- Partly supportedcites [135] Jaemthaworn, 2021, Topological clustering of regulatory genes confers pathogenic tolerance to cassava brown streak virus (CBSV) in cassava, Sci. Rep. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results section on microscopic-scale clustered topology says that a highly connected gene-cluster structure buffered network disruption during simulated perturbation. It does not show that clearly defined group boundaries themselves act as buffers; the protective feature studied was connectivity within gene clusters. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [136] Richter, 2006, Boundary spanners’ identification, intergroup contact, and effective intergroup relations, Acad. Manag. J. source
boostedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“With high enough γ or high enough ωSoc, the focal agent’s beliefs, faced with these two conflicting sources of information, converge to one Idea.”
§ Epistemic Communities under Active Inference > 4. Results > 4.1. Opinion Formation in a Single Agent
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In general, Figure 2 shows that beliefs in more meta-belief volatility (lower ωSoc) lead to higher posterior uncertainty about the sIdea hidden state, as is shown by the red lines in subplots (a) and (c).”
§ Epistemic Communities under Active Inference > 4. Results > 4.1. Opinion Formation in a Single Agent
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
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In the paper
“The proposed active inference model can reproduce the formation of echo-chambers over social networks, and gives us insight into the cognitive processes that lead to this phenomenon.”
§ Epistemic Communities under Active Inference > Abstract
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In the paper
“We show that, once agents have reached a certain level of certainty about their beliefs, it becomes very difficult to get them to change their views.”
§ Epistemic Communities under Active Inference > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Albarracin, M., Demekas, D., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Heins, C.
- Affiliations
- Université du Québec à Montréal (CA)
- Imperial College London (GB)
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University of Konstanz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Albarracin, Mahault
- Heins, Conor
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2022-03-29
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 476
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC9027706
- OpenAlex
- W4220746083
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 157
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 6
- FWCI
- 5.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Preprints.org (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- U.S. Office of Naval Research (N00014-19-1-2556)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Keywords
- active inference, confirmation bias, echo chambers, epistemic communities, belief updating, information dissemination, social networks, in silico models, belief certainty, generative models
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-06, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-06 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.