A Zero-Trust Architecture for Remote Access in Industrial IoT Infrastructures
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 60 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper considers the domain of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) infrastructures and the recurring need for collaboration across teams and stakeholders by means of remote access. The paper describes a secure solution beyond the traditional perimeter-based security approach, which consists of an architecture that supports multi-level authorization to achieve fine-grained access control, better scalability, and maintainability. An implementation of the proposed solution, using open-source technologies, is also discussed and covers the protection of both the network and edge domains of a complex IIoT infrastructure. Finally, the paper presents a risk-driven and model-based process that is designed to support the migration of existing infrastructures to the solution architecture. The approach is validated, taking as a reference two relevant scenarios for the aerospace industry.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper proposes a two-layered zero-trust architecture for remote access in Industrial IoT, combining SDN-based network controls with TEE-based edge protection and a risk-driven model-based migration process. It demonstrates feasibility through an open-source prototype deployed on a manufacturing demonstrator and validates an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow.
Key findings
- The architecture separates network and edge security: SDN Data/Control/Application layers map to PEP/PDP/Trust Algorithm, while edge protection uses TEE and a Gateway Portal model for fine-grained access control down to memory regions and peripherals, including legacy equipment.
- The prototype was deployed on an existing manufacturing demonstrator with four network segments (public internet, enterprise, manufacturing, shop floor) and around 40 network nodes; validation followed a remote maintenance workflow with four phases: Preliminary Authorizations, Access Grant, Maintenance, and Cleanup.
- The solution is argued to satisfy SR1–SR4: least knowledge/privilege, resilience to denial-of-service via distributed/layered security, fine-grained access control, and robust logging. No quantitative performance or security results are reported.
- A migration methodology uses SysML architecture models, STRIDE threat analysis, risk evaluation/ranking, and mitigation patterns to guide ZTA adoption.
Methods
- Design and prototype implementation covering two application scenarios: Industry 4.0 secure remote maintenance and connected aircraft; threat analysis via STRIDE; security requirements SR1–SR4.
- Implementation uses OpenFloodlight SDN controller, Open vSwitch, Siemens Simatic IoT2050 gateway with ARM TrustZone, OP-TEE, Node-RED front-end, and a Linux back-end; deployed in the COLLABS EU project demonstrator.
- Validation is an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow on the manufacturing demonstrator, with qualitative mapping to security requirements; no quantitative metrics are reported.
Limitations
- Stated: performance evaluation (throughput and energy efficiency) is identified as an area of improvement/future work; the methodology is described as a first step, with future work on industrial-strength implementation, standard interfaces, automated analyses, and code generation.
- Stated: prototype tools may be replaced in the future for improved features, performance, or robustness.
- Evident: validation reports no quantitative measurements or comparative benchmarks, and only one of the two application scenarios is implemented in the prototype.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
10 Valid · 3 Not valid · 41 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The realization of the ZT concept at the edge, instead, is much less well investigated for several reasons [32]: (i) a lack of standardization in both the infrastructure and the software, (ii) a heterogeneity of computing resources and a (lack of) openness of the edge equipment platforms, (iii) the complexity to retrofit existing legacy, primarily for the required level of investment, and (iv) the”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [32] Li, S., Iqbal, M., and Saxena, N. (2022). Future Industry Internet of Things with Zero-trust Security. Inf. Syst. Front., 1–14. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.1 says zero-trust policy definition is challenging in 5G-IoT systems involving multiaccess edge networks, while section 5.2 describes standardization difficulties and section 2.2 notes a lack of standards. The paper does not say that zero trust at the edge is less investigated, or identify computing-resource heterogeneity, retrofitting costs, and stringent sector-specific regulations as reasons for that research gap. The indexed passages provide section labels but no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The threat analysis highlights some common security threats that concern all of the scenarios discussed previously.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In particular, the Data Layer acts as a PEP, the Control Layer acts as a PDP, and the Application Layer hosts the Trust Algorithm (TA), leveraging data collected from Data Layer appliances acting as a distributed network monitoring infrastructure.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“The problem of remote access to enterprise resources at the edge has been analyzed in Industrial IoT scenarios [9] or in Industrial Control Systems architectures [10,11], often with a reduced focus on security.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [9] 2020, Toward the future—upgrading existing remote monitoring concepts to IIoT concepts, IEEE Internet Things J. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [10] Zhang, 2021, A secure revocable fine-grained access control and data sharing scheme for SCADA in IIoT systems, IEEE Int. Things J. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [11] Craggs, B., Rashid, A., Hankin, C., Antrobus, R., Şerban, O., and Thapen, N. (2019, January 1–2). A reference architecture for IIoT and industrial control systems testbeds. Proceedings of the Living in the Internet of Things (IoT 2019), London, UK. source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Traditional perimeterbased security (focused on deploying perimeter controls) cannot easily cope with these threats.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
27 more claims
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“However, their work did not address BYOD-related threats, as we do.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as Federici et al., 2023
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The remote-access focus is well-suited to the realistic threat surface of modern OT but does not extend to in-plant traffic or to the deterministic timing constraints we consider here.”
From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Their architecture combines attribute-based access control with continuous attestation and is validated against industrial maintenance scenarios.”
From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3. Validation
“The workflow illustrates the four main phases of the remote maintenance test scenario.”
§ 5.3. Validation
“The implemented scenario has been extensively tested throughout the three phases on the manufacturing infrastructure for demonstration, with a variety of parameters and settings.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3. Validation
“The third phase, called Maintenance, is performed by the Remote Maintainer directly on the Edge Device, but the Gateway continuously checks the compliance of the requested operations and provides authentication.”
§ 5.3. Validation
“The third phase, called Cleanup, is in charge of reverting the network reconfiguration to the original state.”
Citations
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Jeffrey, N., Tan, Q., & Villar, J. R. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12153283 · Cited by 160
Global Models of Smart Cities and Potential IoT Applications: A Review
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“This helps identify any damage or wear and tear and helps prioritize repairs at certain and specific points of damage at bridges [153,154].”
BackgroundZero Trust Architecture: A Systematic Literature Review
Gambo, M. L., & Almulhem, A. (2025) · Journal of Network and Systems Management · doi:10.1007/s10922-025-09998-x · Cited by 199
“…[26], [71], [72], [73] 12 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM [74], [75], [76], [77], [78] 5 Electronics (Switzerland) [79], [80], [81], [82 [27], [91] 2 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing [92], [18] 2 of Health Things (IoHT) and handles diverse types of people data [93].”
A Review and Comparative Analysis of Relevant Approaches of Zero Trust Network Model
Dhiman, P., Saini, N., Gulzar, Y., Turaev, S., Kaur, A., Nisa, K. U., & Hamid, Y. (2024) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s24041328 · Cited by 121
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“The disadvantage of traditional network security frameworks in ICV systems is that the boundary-based security model cannot prevent internal attacks and risks related to remote access [6].”
BackgroundMustafa, R., Sarkar, N. I., Mohaghegh, M., & Pervez, S. (2024) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s24227209 · Cited by 67
“[72] suggests a multi-level authorization architecture that allows for fine-grained access control, scalability, and maintainability.”
Emerging Authentication Technologies for Zero Trust on the Internet of Things
Bast, C., & Yeh, K. (2024) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym16080993 · Cited by 40
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Enhancing Zero Trust Security in Edge Computing Environments: Challenges and Solutions
Ashfaq, F., Ahad, A., Hussain, M., Shayea, I. A. M., & Pires, I. M. (2024) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-60221-4_41 · Cited by 16
Chowdhury, A. P., Nur, F. N., Islam, A. H. M. S., Alam, K., Karim, A., & Shah, M. A. (2025) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2025.110827 · Cited by 21
Is Trust Misplaced? A Zero-Trust Survey
Poirrier, A., Cailleux, L., & Clausen, T. (2025) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2025.3555131 · Cited by 24
“SDP is extended with a trusted execution environment (TEE) in [91] for the IoT architectures.”
Xu, D., Gondal, I., Yi, X., Sušnjak, T., Watters, P., & McIntosh, T. R. (2025) · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · doi:10.3390/jcp5040087 · Cited by 25
The Evolution of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) from Concept to Implementation
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“The philosophy of “never trust, always verify” is deeply rooted in the approach [4] of ZTA.”
Hardware Security Modules for Secure Communications in the Industrial Internet of Things
Latif, S., Djenouri, D., Idrees, Z., Ahmad, J. E., Mastoi, Q.-U.-A., & Zou, Z. (2025) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2025.3600161 · Cited by 25
“3) HSMs With Zero Trust Architectures for IIoT: Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) are becoming essential to secure IIoT environments, where trust is never assumed and verification is required continuously [238], [239].”
Singh, A., Dhanaraj, R. K., Ali, M. A., Balaji, P., & Alharbi, M. (2023) · Alexandria Engineering Journal · doi:10.1016/j.aej.2023.08.084 · Cited by 10
SecT: A Zero-Trust Framework for Secure Remote Access in Next-Generation Industrial Networks
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“Similarly, Federici et al. [51] suggested a ZTA for enhancing IIoT security with dynamic access control.”
Success Factors of IoT Security: A Structured Analysis Using Fuzzy-AHP
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“Every access request is checked and validated to ensure the selective access control system implemented by ZTA allows resources to only be accessed by the correct entities even if the latter has already entered the network [82], [83].”
Muriithi, G., Papari, B., Arsalan, A., Timilsina, L., Muriithi, A., Buraimoh, E., Khan, A., Özkan, G., Edrington, C. S., & Papari, A. (2025) · IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/ojvt.2025.3592041 · Cited by 13
“Federici et al. [41] focus on secure remote access in IIoT through multi-level authorization and fine-grained access control, while Lei et al. [42] introduce a ZTA framework for wireless IIoT, incorporating device authentication and cryptographic security zones.”
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“Zero trust architecture with PEP, PDP, PIP, PA and PE have been applied by authors to address malicious access requests, authentication issues and the zero trust principle of “authentication before authorisation” [47–53].”
$ZTD_{\text{JAVA}}$: Mitigating Software Supply Chain Vulnerabilities via Zero-Trust Dependencies
Amusuo, P. C., Robinson, K. A., Singla, T., Peng, H., Machiry, A., Torres-Arias, S., Simon, L., & Davis, J. C. (2025) · ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion Proceedings (ICSE-Companion) · doi:10.1109/icse55347.2025.00148 · Cited by 26
“…[7], Zero-Trust Architecture is a set of cybersecurity concepts focused on protecting services ( resources ) within a system, grants no The Zero-Trust Architecture has been applied to security-sensitive domains [41] including network infrastructure [42], [43] and cloud systems [8], [9], [11].”
ProTECT: A Programmable Threat Evaluation and Control Unit for Zero Trust Networks
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“The proposed ZTA integration aims to counter these weaknesses by using dynamic verification and behavior-based access control.”
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Quality Attributes for Zero Trust Architecture-Based Systems
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“5) Maintainability: Maintainability in ZTA is essential to ensure that components, such as PDP and PEP, can be easily updated, maintained and modified to adapt to changes in the security policies and system requirements, thus ensuring operational continuity and ongoing security [27], [32], [33].”
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“Another study presented in [31] focuses on the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) domain, proposes a two layered ZTA which surpasses conventional perimeter security, providing an architecture with layered authorisation enabling granular access, and enhanced scalability.”
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“Network segmentation [3] is the critical feature, which divides the network into smaller subsections, enabling enforcement of security policies around protected resources.”
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“It means there's no need to trust each other, even if your services are in the same security zone [18, 19].”
BackgroundA Software Integrity Authentication Protocol for Zero Trust Architecture
Liu, W., Zhang, Z., Qiao, X., Li, Y., Tan, Y., & Meng, W. (2024) · doi:10.1145/3672200.3673874 · Cited by 2
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“Furthermore, the implementation of zero-trust principles has been proposed to safeguard the security of entire IIoT deployments [19].”
Remote Attestation for High Assurance ATM Communications Through Commercial Networks
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“Notice that the PDP/PEP concepts are basic Zero-trust components [20] that are commonly used in secure architectures to design and implement zero-trust principles [21].”
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Implementation and Evaluation of a Zero-Trust Security Model in Distributed Industrial Networks
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“Similar to [26], which implements a Zero-Trust architecture using SDN and TEE for IIoT, our approach focuses on edge-level security through hardware-based anomaly detection and real-time encryption, offering a more lightweight and adaptable solution.”
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“These operational changes not only strengthen the enterprise’s security posture but also ensure regulatory compliance by making security practices more transparent (Federici, Martintoni, and Senni 2023; Yeoh et al. 2023).”
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“…recognize that a primary challenge faced by farmers contemplating the adoption of such solutions lies in the interplay between the costs associated with these technologies and their suitability for deployment in rural areas characterized by limited access to the internet and electricity [7], [8].”
BackgroundAdaptive Sharing of IoT Resources Through SDN-Based Microsegmentation of Services Using Mininet
Martínez, A. R. G., Padrón, J. D., Zambrano-Martínez, J. L., & Calafate, C. T. (2024) · Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57523-5_18 · Cited by 2
ZTD$_{JAVA}$: Mitigating Software Supply Chain Vulnerabilities via Zero-Trust DependenciesPreprint
Amusuo, P. C., Robinson, K. A., Singla, T., Peng, H., Machiry, A., Torres-Arias, S., Simon, L., & Davis, J. C. (2023) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2310.14117
“…[7], Zero-Trust Architecture is a set of cybersecurity concepts focused on protecting services ( resources ) within a system, grants no The Zero-Trust Architecture has been applied to security-sensitive domains [41] including network infrastructure [42], [43] and cloud systems [8], [9], [11].”
Distributed Fault Detection Scheme for Snake Robot Platoon
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“Reference [7] proposed an innovative two-layer access control architecture based on the zero-trust model, which combines with the risk-driven process, supports the migration of existing infrastructure, and prioritizes the identification of network security risk changes.”
BackgroundIdentification Management for Zero Trust Through Network Analysis
Alshehri, A., Tüfekçi, B., & Tunc, C. (2024) · IEEE/ACS International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA) · doi:10.1109/aiccsa63423.2024.10912537
“Federici et al. proposed a detailed ZTA solution beyond the traditional perimeter-based security method for industrial IoT (IIoT), with fine-grained access control, scalability, and main-tainability using multi-level authorization architecture [12].”
The Evolution of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) from Concept to ImplementationPreprint
Nasiruzzaman, M., Ali, M., Salam, I., & Miraz, M. H. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5219493 · Cited by 1
DPZTN: Data-Plane-Based Access Control Zero-Trust Network
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CRYPTNA: A Purely Cryptographic Zero Trust Network Access with 1-RTT Packet Authorization
Guerrieri, P.-L., Bouakkaz, F., & Ahmed, T. (2025) · Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet) · doi:10.1109/csnet67572.2025.11288178
“Federici et al. [8] validated a ZTNA platform for industrial IoT through a real-world deployment, demonstrating the model’s practical feasibility, although their implementation lacks dynamic tunnel establishment or anti-replay protections.”
A Comprehensive Survey on Zero Trust Architecture in IoT Networks
Harish, R., Marothia, F., Nag, S., et al. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things and Intelligence Systems (IoTaIS) · doi:10.1109/iotais67227.2025.11282130
Wang, X., Hu, A., Liu, X., & Wang, B. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-5294-8_36
A Zero-Trust based Security Protection Scheme for Industrial IoT
Cheng, R. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Frontiers Technology of Information and Computer (ICFTIC) · doi:10.1109/icftic68075.2025.11324911 · Cited by 1
“Federici et al. [10] identified key challenges confronting Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in IIoT environments, such as the absence of standardized infrastructure and software, heterogeneity of computing resources, limited openness of edge device platforms, complexity of legacy systems, and…”
Hybrid Cryptosystem to Secure Access Policies for Zero Trust Environment
Soni, A., Rout, J., Sathua, M., Nanda, S. K., & Priyadarshini, R. (2025) · International Conference on Electrical, Electronics, and Computer Science with Advance Power Technologies - A Future Trends (ICE2CPT) · doi:10.1109/ice2cpt66440.2025.11340566
“The researchers in [11] proposed a ZTA to secure the Internet of Things (IoT) and Operational Technologies (OT) devices in industries requiring remote access.”
Kountché, D. A., Gordan, M., Soroudi, M., McCrum, D. P., Zavvos, E., Connolly, L., König, S., Schauer, S., Carrasco, J. C., Aubert, J., et al. (2026) · Signals and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-11119-7_2
Immutable DLT and Intolerant Zero Trust for Robust Identity and Access Management
Mthethwa, S., Dlamini, M. T., & Jembere, E. (2025) · doi:10.1109/icecer65523.2025.11401255
“Another study presented in [17] focuses on the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) domain, proposes a dual-layered ZTA transcending traditional perimeter-based models to facilitate fine-grained access control, along enhanced scalability and maintainability.”
Formal Security of Zero Trust Architectures
Poirrier, A. (2024) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/368679edzc429z4365z9ed8z98bd52899a61 · Cited by 7
Mummidi, S. S., & Srinivasan, S. (2026) · doi:10.1109/ic3et64989.2026.11467497
“In this model, a dual layer of protection is introduced where TEEs take care that sensitive operations are performed within a trusted enclave, but policy engines are what protects from being only legitimate users which are able to trigger such an operation in the first place [7,8].”
Zero Trust Architecture for Secure IoT-Enabled Medical Device Networks
Chauhan, D., & Gaikwad, V. P. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22065-3_2
Zero Trust for NHIs Based on Robust Identity and Access Management for a Resilient IoT Future
Mthethwa, S., Dlamini, M. T., & Jembere, E. (2026) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s26082392
An AI-Driven Zero Trust Framework for Resilient Digital Twins in Smart Industry
Imran, H. M., & Hauenstein, J. D. (2026) · Proceedings of IEEE Southeastcon · doi:10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11476145
“Recent research also proposes risk-driven, model-SoutheastCon based processes for migrating legacy infrastructures to these modern ZT architectures using open-source technologies to secure network and edge domains [9].”
Basharat, M. U., Hussain, J., Kwong, C. F., & Khalid, W. (2026) · International Conference on Computer Communication and Artificial Intelligence (CCAI) · doi:10.1109/ccai69603.2026.11641906
“…complex attacks like APTs, reducing false positives, and ensuring scalability in distributed systems, so that integrating AI-driven anomaly detection with Zero Trust principles may advance cybersecurity and influence future infrastructure designs to be more robust and proactive [11, 12].”
Zero-Trust Security Architecture for Protecting Critical Infrastructure Cyber Physical Systems
Nittala, E. P. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icmlas67792.2026.11483911
“According to the recent works, hybrid and smart adaptive mechanisms are necessary to respond and effectively respond to the changing cyber threats without disrupting the operation of the systems [6][9][10].”
BIM-Contextual Zero-Trust Digital Twins for IoT Security in Smart Buildings
Alauthman, M., Aldweesh, A. Y., Al–Qerem, A., et al. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icciaa68481.2026.11543599
“…AI-powered digital twins in buildings ✓ ✓ partial Empl & Pernul [18] 2023 Digital-twin-based security analytics (DT2SA) context ✓ ✓ Federici et al. [13] 2023 ZTA for remote access in IIoT infrastructures – ✓ ✓ Zanasi et al. [14] 2024 Micro-segmentation ZTA for IIoT infrastructures – ✓ ✓ Emulator…”
Bobček, M., Bencsik, J., Varga, Z., Szomosi, V., & Čonka, Z. (2026) · EPJ Web of Conferences · doi:10.1051/epjconf/202637201003 · Cited by 1
Dynamic Access Control and Privacy Compliance Strategies in a Zero-Trust Data Security Architecture
Sun, L., Zhang, L., Yuan, Y., Xue, J., Lv, Y., & Yue, Y. (2026) · International Seminar on Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Information Technology (AINIT) · doi:10.1109/ainit70033.2026.11557827
Experimental Comparison of Zero Trust and Perimeter-Based Security Architectures in Small Networks
Salim, M., Al-Khayat, M. S., Abdulazeez, O. H., & Miran, A. (2026) · International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals & Devices (SSD) · doi:10.1109/ssd69655.2026.11558953
“Comparative analysis points out to the rough inside/outside segmentation of PBA and the fine-grained and context-aware control of ZTA [14], and the majority of the breaches involve lateral movements after an attacker obtains access [15].”
Rameesa, K., Sulthana, S., Krishna, R. P., Naik, S. G., & Kavya (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Emerging Synergy Science and Technology (ICESST) · doi:10.1109/icesst69086.2026.11582862 · Cited by 1
“Federici et al. [11] and Awan et al. [17] highlight blockchain and quantum-safe encryption as viable solutions for next-gen industrial and 5G/6G networks, though latency optimization remains a concern.”
InfluentialZTNA: Sector-Specific Analysis on the ’NO TRUST’ Security Paradigm
P, S. M., Chandran, S., Rajeev, D., Jain, K., & Achuthan, K. (2026) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-026-01286-2 · Cited by 1
“Research [17, 35, 82] into hardware-based cryptography methods, lightweight, blockchain, and SDN-based access control solutions for mission-critical IoT use cases, and secure device-to-device communication across multiple zero-trust zones.”
Akhmetkaliyev, A., Ala’anzy, M. A., Almsafir, M. K., & Musleh, S. (2026) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112695
State-Aware Zero Trust Architecture for Offshore Wind Farms Based on Software-Defined Perimeter
Lim, C.-M., Shin, D.-H., Kim, K.-K., & Euom, I.-C. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3732584
“[19] proposed a zero-trust architecture for remote access in industrial IIoT infrastructures, emphasizing multi-level authorization, fine-grained access control, better scalability, and maintainability.”
Alwash, W. M., Aljabbari, W. H., Al‐Khateeb, B., & Balık, H. H. (2026) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics15184338
Amirkhanova, G., Zhasuzakova, M., Abdulkhamit, N., Amirkhanov, B., Alipbeki, O., & Raeva, A. (2026) · Frontiers in Communications and Networks · doi:10.3389/frcmn.2026.1822183
Qadri, S. M. (2026) · Frontiers in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.32996/fcsai.2026.5.9.2
“Federici, Martintoni, and Senni [18] take a complementary angle, focusing specifically on remote-access ZT for Industrial IoT infrastructures.”
A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems
Song, M. W., Nguyen, T., & Irvine, C. (2025) · Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences · doi:10.24251/hicss.2025.849
Metadata
- Authors
- Federici, F., Martintoni, D., & Senni, V.
- Affiliations
- Collins Aerospace (United States) (US)
- Corresponding author
- Senni, Valerio
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2023-01-22
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 566
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4317743536
- Semantic Scholar
- 8da0fb57e226f3dff150b953d427b15b33fde52c
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 11
- FWCI
- 31.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program (871518)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, Industrial Internet of Things, remote access, fine-grained access control, perimeter security, edge security, network security, open-source security tools, aerospace industry
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.