The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 60 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
A Zero-Trust Architecture for Remote Access in Industrial IoT Infrastructures
Open accessAbstract
This paper considers the domain of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) infrastructures and the recurring need for collaboration across teams and stakeholders by means of remote access. The paper describes a secure solution beyond the traditional perimeter-based security approach, which consists of an architecture that supports multi-level authorization to achieve fine-grained access control, better scalability, and maintainability. An implementation of the proposed solution, using open-source technologies, is also discussed and covers the protection of both the network and edge domains of a complex IIoT infrastructure. Finally, the paper presents a risk-driven and model-based process that is designed to support the migration of existing infrastructures to the solution architecture. The approach is validated, taking as a reference two relevant scenarios for the aerospace industry.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper proposes a two-layered zero-trust architecture for remote access in Industrial IoT, combining SDN-based network controls with TEE-based edge protection and a risk-driven model-based migration process. It demonstrates feasibility through an open-source prototype deployed on a manufacturing demonstrator and validates an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow.
Key findings
- The architecture separates network and edge security: SDN Data/Control/Application layers map to PEP/PDP/Trust Algorithm, while edge protection uses TEE and a Gateway Portal model for fine-grained access control down to memory regions and peripherals, including legacy equipment.
- The prototype was deployed on an existing manufacturing demonstrator with four network segments (public internet, enterprise, manufacturing, shop floor) and around 40 network nodes; validation followed a remote maintenance workflow with four phases: Preliminary Authorizations, Access Grant, Maintenance, and Cleanup.
- The solution is argued to satisfy SR1–SR4: least knowledge/privilege, resilience to denial-of-service via distributed/layered security, fine-grained access control, and robust logging. No quantitative performance or security results are reported.
- A migration methodology uses SysML architecture models, STRIDE threat analysis, risk evaluation/ranking, and mitigation patterns to guide ZTA adoption.
Methods
- Design and prototype implementation covering two application scenarios: Industry 4.0 secure remote maintenance and connected aircraft; threat analysis via STRIDE; security requirements SR1–SR4.
- Implementation uses OpenFloodlight SDN controller, Open vSwitch, Siemens Simatic IoT2050 gateway with ARM TrustZone, OP-TEE, Node-RED front-end, and a Linux back-end; deployed in the COLLABS EU project demonstrator.
- Validation is an end-to-end remote maintenance workflow on the manufacturing demonstrator, with qualitative mapping to security requirements; no quantitative metrics are reported.
Limitations
- Stated: performance evaluation (throughput and energy efficiency) is identified as an area of improvement/future work; the methodology is described as a first step, with future work on industrial-strength implementation, standard interfaces, automated analyses, and code generation.
- Stated: prototype tools may be replaced in the future for improved features, performance, or robustness.
- Evident: validation reports no quantitative measurements or comparative benchmarks, and only one of the two application scenarios is implemented in the prototype.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
10 Valid · 3 Not valid · 41 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The realization of the ZT concept at the edge, instead, is much less well investigated for several reasons [32]: (i) a lack of standardization in both the infrastructure and the software, (ii) a heterogeneity of computing resources and a (lack of) openness of the edge equipment platforms, (iii) the complexity to retrofit existing legacy, primarily for the required level of investment, and (iv) the”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [32] Li, S., Iqbal, M., and Saxena, N. (2022). Future Industry Internet of Things with Zero-trust Security. Inf. Syst. Front., 1–14. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.1 says zero-trust policy definition is challenging in 5G-IoT systems involving multiaccess edge networks, while section 5.2 describes standardization difficulties and section 2.2 notes a lack of standards. The paper does not say that zero trust at the edge is less investigated, or identify computing-resource heterogeneity, retrofitting costs, and stringent sector-specific regulations as reasons for that research gap. The indexed passages provide section labels but no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The threat analysis highlights some common security threats that concern all of the scenarios discussed previously.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In particular, the Data Layer acts as a PEP, the Control Layer acts as a PDP, and the Application Layer hosts the Trust Algorithm (TA), leveraging data collected from Data Layer appliances acting as a distributed network monitoring infrastructure.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“The problem of remote access to enterprise resources at the edge has been analyzed in Industrial IoT scenarios [9] or in Industrial Control Systems architectures [10,11], often with a reduced focus on security.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [9] 2020, Toward the future—upgrading existing remote monitoring concepts to IIoT concepts, IEEE Internet Things J. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [10] Zhang, 2021, A secure revocable fine-grained access control and data sharing scheme for SCADA in IIoT systems, IEEE Int. Things J. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [11] Craggs, B., Rashid, A., Hankin, C., Antrobus, R., Şerban, O., and Thapen, N. (2019, January 1–2). A reference architecture for IIoT and industrial control systems testbeds. Proceedings of the Living in the Internet of Things (IoT 2019), London, UK. source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Traditional perimeterbased security (focused on deploying perimeter controls) cannot easily cope with these threats.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
27 more claims
Create a free account to see all 163 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 115
- It may state two separate claims as one. 54
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“However, their work did not address BYOD-related threats, as we do.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as Federici et al., 2023
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The remote-access focus is well-suited to the realistic threat surface of modern OT but does not extend to in-plant traffic or to the deterministic timing constraints we consider here.”
From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Their architecture combines attribute-based access control with continuous attestation and is validated against industrial maintenance scenarios.”
From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3. Validation
“The workflow illustrates the four main phases of the remote maintenance test scenario.”
§ 5.3. Validation
“The implemented scenario has been extensively tested throughout the three phases on the manufacturing infrastructure for demonstration, with a variety of parameters and settings.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3. Validation
“The third phase, called Maintenance, is performed by the Remote Maintainer directly on the Edge Device, but the Gateway continuously checks the compliance of the requested operations and provides authentication.”
§ 5.3. Validation
“The third phase, called Cleanup, is in charge of reverting the network reconfiguration to the original state.”
Citations
Cites
The internet of things: a survey
Li, S., Xu, L. D., & Zhao, S. (2015) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1007/s10796-014-9492-7 · Cited by 2,297
The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & Their Consequences
Kitchin, R. (2014) · doi:10.4135/9781473909472 · Cited by 1,469
A survey on software-defined network and openflow: From concept to implementation
Hu, F., Hao, Q., & Bao, K. (2014) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2014.2326417 · Cited by 752
Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not
Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., & Bouabdallah, A. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.357 · Cited by 724
Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey
Pinto, S., & Santos, N. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3291047 · Cited by 505
A Survey on Zero Trust Architecture: Challenges and Future Trends
He, Y., Huang, D., Chen, L., Ni, Y., & Ma, X. (2022) · Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing · doi:10.1155/2022/6476274 · Cited by 348
Industry 4.0 reference architectures: State of the art and future trends
Nakagawa, E. Y., Antonino, P. O., Schnicke, F., Capilla, R., Kuhn, T., & Liggesmeyer, P. (2021) · Computers & Industrial Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.cie.2021.107241 · Cited by 167
Migrating to zero trust architecture: Reviews and challenges
Teerakanok, S., Uehara, T., & Inomata, A. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/9947347 · Cited by 134
Future Industry Internet of Things with Zero-trust Security
Li, S., Iqbal, M., & Saxena, N. (2024) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1007/s10796-021-10199-5 · Cited by 128
Implementing Zero Trust Cloud Networks with Transport Access Control and First Packet Authentication
DeCusatis, C., Liengtiraphan, P., Sager, A., & Pinelli, M. (2016) · 2016 IEEE International Conference on Smart Cloud (SmartCloud) · doi:10.1109/smartcloud.2016.22 · Cited by 110
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2015, Smart factory for industry 4.0: A review, Int. J. Mod. Manuf. Technol., 7, 28
- Shostack, A. (2014). Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, John Wiley & Sons.
- Friedenthal, S., Moore, A., and Steiner, R. (2014). A Practical Guide to SysML: The Systems Modeling Language, Morgan Kaufmann.
Cited by
A Review of Anomaly Detection Strategies to Detect Threats to Cyber-Physical Systems
Jeffrey, N., Tan, Q., & Villar, J. R. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12153283 · Cited by 160
Global Models of Smart Cities and Potential IoT Applications: A Review
Hassebo, A., & Tealab, M. (2023) · IoT · doi:10.3390/iot4030017 · Cited by 117
“This helps identify any damage or wear and tear and helps prioritize repairs at certain and specific points of damage at bridges [153,154].”
BackgroundZero Trust Architecture: A Systematic Literature Review
Gambo, M. L., & Almulhem, A. (2025) · Journal of Network and Systems Management · doi:10.1007/s10922-025-09998-x · Cited by 196
“…[26], [71], [72], [73] 12 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM [74], [75], [76], [77], [78] 5 Electronics (Switzerland) [79], [80], [81], [82 [27], [91] 2 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing [92], [18] 2 of Health Things (IoHT) and handles diverse types of people data [93].”
A Review and Comparative Analysis of Relevant Approaches of Zero Trust Network Model
Dhiman, P., Saini, N., Gulzar, Y., Turaev, S., Kaur, A., Nisa, K. U., & Hamid, Y. (2024) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s24041328 · Cited by 121
Huang, D., Na, Y., Liu, Y., Zhang, Z., & Mi, B. (2023) · IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/mits.2023.3319344 · Cited by 47
“The disadvantage of traditional network security frameworks in ICV systems is that the boundary-based security model cannot prevent internal attacks and risks related to remote access [6].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Federici, F., Martintoni, D., & Senni, V.
- Affiliations
- Collins Aerospace (United States) (US)
- Corresponding author
- Senni, Valerio
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2023-01-22
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 566
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4317743536
- Semantic Scholar
- 8da0fb57e226f3dff150b953d427b15b33fde52c
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 11
- FWCI
- 31.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program (871518)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, Industrial Internet of Things, remote access, fine-grained access control, perimeter security, edge security, network security, open-source security tools, aerospace industry
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-09, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
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Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.