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Towards Secure Legacy Manufacturing: A Policy-Driven Zero Trust Architecture Aligned with NIST CSF 2.0

Open access
Min, Cheon-Ho, Kim, Deuk-Hun, Yang, Haomiao, Kwak, Jin · 2025 · Electronics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

As smart manufacturing environments continue to evolve, operational technology systems are increasingly integrated with external networks and cloud-based platforms. However, many manufacturing facilities still use legacy systems running on end-of-support/life operating systems with discontinued security updates. It is difficult to mitigate the cyber threats and risks for these systems using perimeter-based security models that isolate them from other networks. To address these constraints, a Zero Trust-based security architecture tailored for legacy manufacturing environments with practical field applicability is proposed. Our architecture builds upon the six core functions outlined in National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 2.0—identify, protect, detect, respond, recover, and govern—adapting them specifically to manufacturing environment security challenges. To achieve this, the architecture combines asset identification, policy-driven access control, secure SMB gateway transfers, automated anomaly detection and response, clean image recovery, and organizational governance procedures. This study validates the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed architecture through scenario-based simulations. When combining the EoSL defense hardening and gateway-based perimeter control, the architecture achieves approximately 99% overall threat suppression and a 98% reduction in critical-asset infection rates, demonstrating its strong resilience and scalability in large-scale legacy OT environments.

Overview

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TL;DR

The paper proposes a policy-driven Zero Trust architecture for legacy manufacturing, aligned with NIST CSF 2.0 and centered on an SMB gateway, PBAC, anomaly detection/response, clean-image recovery, and governance. Simulations report that combining EoSL hardening with gateway boundary protection yields approximately 99% overall threat suppression and 98% critical-asset protection.

Key findings

  • Plant OS analysis found legacy exposure: Plant A had 10,925 of 20,498 systems (65.7%) running EoSL Windows, and Plant B had 277 of 700 systems (39.6%) on outdated platforms; a cited DCS study found only 22.5% on current Windows and 77.5% on discontinued versions.
  • Scenario 1: increasing EoSL defense from 20% to 80% reduced the overall infection rate from 78.51% ± 3.95% to 22.91% ± 13.87% (about 70% reduction) and critical-asset infection from 59.66% ± 3.88% to 7.32% ± 6.31% (about 88% reduction); MTTD stayed near 6 s, while MTTR fell from 682.80 ± 45.69 s to 515.52 ± 89.97 s (about 25%).
  • Scenario 2: at EoSL defense 20%, raising gateway TPR from 60% to 98% reduced delivered malicious files from 30.9 to 0.8 and Total Inf from 3.09% to 0.08% (about 97% reduction); internal blocking was mostly 0% in this boundary-only setup.
  • Integrated analysis reports approximately 99% overall threat suppression and 98% protection of critical assets when EoSL hardening and gateway-based boundary protection are combined.

Methods

  • Design: a ZTA for legacy manufacturing aligned to NIST CSF 2.0’s six functions, integrating asset identification, policy-based access control, SMB gateway file control, anomaly detection and response, clean-image recovery, and governance.
  • Data/sample: empirical OS analysis of two manufacturing plants (Plant A: 20,498 systems; Plant B: 700 systems; data collected April 2025) plus Python/SimPy simulations. Scenario 1 used N = 1000 nodes, T = 3600 s, EoSL ratio 0.60, critical ratio 0.20, defense levels 20/40/60/80%, and 20 runs per level. Scenario 2 used gateway TPR values {60, 80, 90, 98}%, fixed FPR = 2.0%, file rate λf = 0.2 s−1, malicious file proportion p_mal = 0.10, inactive internal propagation, and 10 repeats per parameter combination.
  • Analysis: event-driven simulation of infection, detection, isolation, and recovery; metrics included blocking rate, total/EoSL/non-EoSL/critical infection rates, MTTD, MTTR, delivered malicious files, and gateway blocking rate, reported as mean ± standard deviation.

Limitations

  • Stated in the paper: network-based/agentless detection may need EDR or HIDS for APTs; non-networked assets are hard to identify; organizational barriers include operator acceptance, PBAC administrative overhead, and security-productivity balance; policy/regulatory gaps include lack of legal mandates and scarce OT-specific ZT guidelines; no full proof-of-concept was performed because reconstructing EoSL operating systems is difficult, with future limited pilots planned at Plant A and Plant B; the architecture is scoped to user-initiated file transfers and does not address strict real-time file-transfer requirements.
  • Evident from the text: validation is simulation-based rather than a real deployment; Scenario 2’s boundary-only evaluation sets internal propagation inactive (λ_int = 0), isolating gateway effects; plant-level OS data are not publicly available due to confidentiality agreements.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/electronics14204109

Cites

6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

6 Valid · 1 Not valid · 7 Not checked · 54 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Li, J., Zhou, H., Wu, S., Luo, X., Wang, T., Zhan, X., and Ma, X. (2022, January 10–12). FOAP: Fine-Grained Open-World Android App Fingerprinting. Proceedings of the 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22), Boston, MA, USA.
  2. Ni, T., Lan, G., Wang, J., Zhao, Q., and Xu, W. (2023, January 9–11). Eavesdropping Mobile App Activity via Radio-Frequency Energy Harvesting. Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23), Anaheim, CA, USA.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Min, C.-H., Kim, D.-H., Yang, H., & Kwak, J.
Affiliations
  • Ajou University (KR)
  • University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN)
Corresponding author
Kwak, Jin
Venue
Electronics
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2025-10-20
Volume
14
Issue
20
Pages
4109
ISSN
2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4415369977
Cited by
6
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 6
FWCI
3.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • ICT R&D program of MSIT/IITP (RS-2024-00438597)
  • Korea government (RS-2024-00400302)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
zero-trust architecture, NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, operational technology security, anomaly detection, image restoration, organizational governance, perimeter security

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