Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 26 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Abstract
Clinical AI systems rely on evolving machine learning pipelines and large-scale medical imaging data, creating persistent challenges in trust, auditability, consent governance, and reproducibility. This paper proposes a decentralized governance framework for clinical AI that uses blockchain as a verification and policy-enforcement overlay without decentralizing sensitive medical data storage or clinical inference. Raw images and clinical artifacts remain in secure repositories, while cryptographic commitments, consent states, access events, and reproducibility manifests are anchored to a tamper-evident ledger. The framework enables verifiable provenance, programmable consent enforcement, auditable execution, and deterministic reconstruction of AI-assisted decisions while preserving regulatory alignment and clinical usability. In a medical imaging proof-of-concept spanning nine simulated scenarios and approximately 43,500 inference attempts across cohorts of 50 to 1000 subjects, the framework achieved a mean Governance Quality Index of 0.93, governance overhead below 11 ms per operation under routine settings, and throughput above 220 requests per second on average. Complementary validation over a real-world paired imaging-and-clinical dataset structure further showed that the same governance abstractions can be instantiated for 625 subjects and 6349 MR images. Overall, the framework separates governance from data and computation, providing verifiable auditability and reproducibility without disrupting existing clinical infrastructures.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper proposes a blockchain-based governance overlay for clinical AI that anchors consent, audit events, and reproducibility manifests on a tamper-evident ledger while keeping medical data and inference off-ledger. In a simulated dermoscopic imaging proof-of-concept across nine scenarios and approximately 43,500 inference attempts, it reports a mean Governance Quality Index of 0.927, mean governance latency of 10.54 ms, and average throughput of 224.27 requests/s.
Key findings
- The composite Governance Quality Index (GQI) achieved a mean of 0.927 (95% CI: [0.880, 0.975]); security and compliance components each had a mean of 1.000, performance 0.850, and auditability 0.667 (SD 0.500). Six of nine scenarios (67%) met the production-readiness threshold (GQI ≥ 0.90), and the remaining three were classified as acceptable.
- Across all scenarios, mean governance latency was 10.54 ms per operation, median latency was 4.39 ms, and the 95th percentile was 30.29 ms; average throughput exceeded 224 requests/s, with peak throughput near 798 requests/s in small-scale settings. In ablation, as patient population increased from 50 to 1000, mean per-request governance latency rose from 1.25 ms to 42.9 ms and throughput fell from 798.2 RPS to 23.3 RPS.
- Hash-chain verification detected all injected ledger tampering attempts, and off-ledger manifest integrity checks achieved 100% sensitivity, 100% specificity, and zero false alarms, correctly detecting all 50 tampered manifests while verifying all 150 legitimate manifests. Mean audit completeness was 1.169, exceeding 100% of anticipated events.
- Complementary validation over a real-world paired imaging-and-clinical dataset structure showed the same governance abstractions could be instantiated for 625 subjects and 6349 MR images.
Methods
- Design: A layered decentralized governance overlay for clinical AI, where the ledger records cryptographic commitments, consent states, access events, and reproducibility manifests; raw images and clinical artifacts remain off-ledger, and no AI inference is performed on-chain. The GQI is a weighted linear combination of security (w=0.35), compliance (w=0.35), performance (w=0.15), and auditability (w=0.15).
- Data or sample: A medical imaging proof-of-concept using simulated dermoscopic image analysis across nine scenarios varying patient scale (50–1000), inference runs (500–20,000), consent revocation probability (0.00–0.30), and tampering (yes/no), totaling approximately 43,500 inference attempts. A complementary real-world paired imaging-and-clinical dataset structure included 625 subjects and 6349 MR images.
- Main analysis: The prototype ledger, LocalLedger, was implemented in Python 3.11+ as a single-node, file-based append-only ledger using JSON Lines records, SHA-256 hash chaining, and deterministic serialization. Evaluation combined scenario-based simulation, descriptive statistics and confidence intervals, security testing for authorization and integrity, and ablation studies; algorithms formalize request-time governance enforcement, ledger integrity verification, and off-ledger manifest verification.
Limitations
- The paper states that the experimental evaluation is based on a limited set of simulated scenarios that primarily explore monotonic scaling of patient population, workload intensity, and consent revocation probability, and does not capture bursty workloads, multi-institutional access patterns, or heterogeneous mixes of authorized and unauthorized requests.
- The paper states that adversarial fault-injection scenarios are evaluated alongside normal-operation scenarios, and future work should separate normal and adversarial evaluation tracks; it also states that the current evaluation does not fully model high-concurrency conditions, long-term longitudinal operation, or geographically distributed deployments.
- The paper states that the prototype does not include distributed consensus, Byzantine fault tolerance, or formal protocol verification, and that deployment would require integration with PACS/VNA, EHR, DICOM/FHIR workflows, identity federation, key management, policy administration, audit export, operational monitoring, and institutional approval. The text also makes evident that the single-node LocalLedger measurements are an empirical lower-bound baseline rather than a distributed-ledger deployment benchmark.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures






Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 2 Not valid · 17 Not checked · 197 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“governance overhead below 11 ms per operation under routine settings”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Abstract
plainn = 1,000- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Complementary validation over a real-world paired imaging-and-clinical dataset structure further showed that the same governance abstractions can be instantiated for 625 subjects and 6349 MR images.”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Abstract
plainn = 625- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“throughput above 220 requests per second on average”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Abstract
plainn = 1,000- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Pretest integrity verification passed in 100% of scenarios, reinforcing that integrity violations were detected only when deliberately introduced and underscoring the diagnostic value of ledger verification.”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Auditability and Ledger Integrity
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Across these scenarios, authorization and consent enforcement remained perfect, ledger integrity verification succeeded, and audit completeness exceeded expected event counts because additional governance events were recorded beyond core inference execution.”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > 4.3.1. Scenarios Baseline Operation Scenarios
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
48 more claims
Create a free account to see all 216 claims and to verify the 25 references still open.
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
- It may state two separate claims as one. 94
- Probably not a substantial claim. 113
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > 4.2. Analytical Process
“Auditability Score (A ∈ [0, 1]).”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Auditability and Ledger Integrity
“Auditability analysis (Figure 3) showed that ledger completeness consistently exceeded expected event counts, with a mean audit completeness of 1.169 and all scenarios recording more than 100% of anticipated events.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > 4.2. Analytical Process
“where I ledger ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function denoting whether ledger integrity verification succeeds (as evaluated in Equation (A11)).”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Additional information
“I L (Γ) = 1(ledger verification fails) (A11”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > 4.2. Analytical Process
“One scenario intentionallyincludes post-execution ledger tampering to evaluate integrity violation detection.”
§ Blockchain-Enabled Trust and Compliance for Clinical AI: Decentralized Governance Without Decentralized Data Storage > Integrity Stress and Adversarial Scenarios
“Three adversarial scenarios introduced post-execution ledger or manifest tampering under different random seeds.”
Citations
Cites
Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning
Kairouz, P., & McMahan, H. B. (2021) · Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000083 · Cited by 7,772
Dwork, C. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11787006_1 · Cited by 5,291
Practical Secure Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Bonawitz, K., Ivanov, V., Kreuter, B., Marcedone, A., McMahan, H. B., Patel, S., Ramage, D., Segal, A., & Seth, K. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3133982 · Cited by 3,956
Gebru, T., Morgenstern, J., Vecchione, B., Vaughan, J. W., Wallach, H., III, H. D., & Crawford, K. (2021) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3458723 · Cited by 2,469
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
(2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6749 · Cited by 1,383
Ethical and regulatory challenges of AI technologies in healthcare: A narrative review
Mennella, C., Maniscalco, U., De Pietro, G., & Esposito, M. (2024) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26297 · Cited by 1,229
Software Engineering for Machine Learning: A Case Study
Amershi, S., Begel, A., Bird, C., DeLine, R., Gall, H., Kamar, E., Nagappan, N., Nushi, B., & Zimmermann, T. (2019) · 2019 IEEE/ACM 41st International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP) · doi:10.1109/icse-seip.2019.00042 · Cited by 1,135
Blockchain technology in healthcare: a systematic review
Agbo, C. C., Mahmoud, Q. H., & Eklund, J. M. (2019) · Healthcare · doi:10.3390/healthcare7020056 · Cited by 1,131
Scaling distributed machine learning with the parameter server
Li, M., Andersen, D. G., Park, J. W., Smola, A. J., Ahmed, A. A., Josifovski, V., Long, J. E., Shekita, E. J., & Su, B.-Y. (2014) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/2685048.2685095 · Cited by 1,021
(2015) · neural information processing systems · Cited by 912
Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century research networks
Kaye, J., Whitley, E. A., Lund, D., Morrison, M., Teare, H., & Melham, K. (2015) · European Journal of Human Genetics · doi:10.1038/ejhg.2014.71 · Cited by 780 · cited 2×
“Dynamic consent frameworks extend this by supporting evolving policies and fine-grained revocation, which is particularly relevant for longitudinal imaging datasets and secondary research use [32,33].”
Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not
Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., & Bouabdallah, A. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2015.357 · Cited by 724
Deng, M., Wuyts, K., Scandariato, R., Preneel, B., & Joosen, W. (2011) · Requirements Engineering · doi:10.1007/s00766-010-0115-7 · Cited by 533
Explainable AI for Healthcare 5.0: Opportunities and Challenges
Saraswat, D., Bhattacharya, P., Verma, A., Prasad, V. K., Tanwar, S., Sharma, G., Bokoro, P. N., & Sharma, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3197671 · Cited by 523
Secure audit logs to support computer forensics
Schneier, B., & Kelsey, J. (1999) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/317087.317089 · Cited by 443 · cited 2×
“Tamper-evidence implies that any post hoc modification or deletion of records becomes detectable, for example through mechanisms such as hash chaining, digital signatures, and append-only transparency logs [28–30].”
The ML test score: A rubric for ML production readiness and technical debt reduction
Breck, E., Cai, S., Nielsen, E., Salib, M., & Sculley, D. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data) · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2017.8258038 · Cited by 310
A Survey of Blockchain-Based Strategies for Healthcare
De Aguiar, E. J., Faiçal, B. S., Krishnamachari, B., & Ueyama, J. (2021) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3376915 · Cited by 275
Vorisek, C. N., Lehne, M., Klopfenstein, S. A. I., Mayer, P. J., Bartschke, A., Haese, T., & Thun, S. (2022) · JMIR Medical Informatics · doi:10.2196/35724 · Cited by 247
Pineau, J., Vincent-Lamarre, P., Sinha, K., Larivière, V., Beygelzimer, A., d'Alché-Buc, F., Fox, E., & Larochelle, H. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.12206 · Cited by 232 · cited 1×
“The proposed governance layer therefore supports verifiable execution, consent-aware enforcement, and reproducible clinical AI workflows while preserving existing clinical data infrastructures [83,85].”
Secure Multi-Party Computation for Machine Learning: A Survey
Zhou, I., Tofigh, F., Piccardi, M., Abolhasan, M., Franklin, D. R., & Lipman, J. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3388992 · Cited by 193
Commitment Schemes and Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Damgård, I. (1999) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48969-x_3 · Cited by 191
SinGAN-Seg: Synthetic training data generation for medical image segmentation
Thambawita, V. L., Salehi, P., Sheshkal, S. A., Hicks, S. A., Hammer, H. L., Parasa, S., de Lange, T., Halvorsen, P., & Riegler, M. A. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0267976 · Cited by 162
Morley, J., Murphy, L., Mishra, A., Joshi, I., & Karpathakis, K. (2022) · JMIR Formative Research · doi:10.2196/31623 · Cited by 139
Developments in MLflow: A System to Accelerate the Machine Learning Lifecycle
Chen, A., Chow, A., Davidson, A., DCunha, A., Ghodsi, A., Hong, S. A., Konwinski, A., Mewald, C., Murching, S., Nykodym, T., et al. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Data Management for End-to-End Machine Learning · doi:10.1145/3399579.3399867 · Cited by 112 · cited 2×
“Outside healthcare, reproducibility and traceability have been addressed through ML experiment tracking and data/version control systems (e.g., MLflow, DVC), as well as software supply-chain frameworks (e.g., in-toto, SLSA) that produce signed attestations about builds and executions [13–16].”
Seol, K., Kim, Y.-G., Lee, E., Seo, Y.-D., & Baik, D.-K. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2800288 · Cited by 96
Health Information System Role-Based Access Control Current Security Trends and Challenges
de Carvalho, M. A., & Bandiera‐Paiva, P. (2018) · Journal of Healthcare Engineering · doi:10.1155/2018/6510249 · Cited by 88
Atkins, D. L., Ball, T., Graves, T. L., & Mockus, A. (2002) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2002.1019478 · Cited by 82
Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
Onken, M., Eichelberg, M., Riesmeier, J., & Jensch, P. F. (2010) · Biological and medical physics series · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15816-2_17 · Cited by 81
Towards detection of software supply chain attacks by forensic artifacts
Ohm, M., Sykosch, A., & Meier, M. (2020) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3407023.3409183 · Cited by 58
Zilch: A Framework for Deploying Transparent Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Mouris, D., & Tsoutsos, N. G. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2021.3074869 · Cited by 57
Privacy-aware cloud auditing for GDPR compliance verification in online healthcare
Barati, M., Aujla, G. S., Llanos, J. T., Duodu, K. A., Rana, O. F., Carr, M., & Ranjan, R. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2021.3100152 · Cited by 57
Toward responsible AI governance: Balancing multi-stakeholder perspectives on AI in healthcare
Rozenblit, L., Price, A. I., Solomonides, A. E., Joseph, A. L., Koski, E., Srivastava, G., Labkoff, S. E., Bray, D. A., López-González, M., Singh, R., et al. (2025) · International Journal of Medical Informatics · doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2025.106015 · Cited by 50
Panagoulias, D. P., Tsoureli‐Nikita, E., Virvou, M. K., & Tsihrintzis, G. A. (2025) · International Journal of Medical Informatics · doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2025.105898 · Cited by 49
Self-citationLeiva, V., & Castro, C. (2025) · Bioanalysis · doi:10.1080/17576180.2025.2452774 · Cited by 47
SHAREChain: Healthcare data sharing framework using Blockchain-registry and FHIR
Lee, A. R., Kim, M., & Kim, I. K. (2019) · IEEE International Conference on Bioinformatics and Biomedicine (BIBM) · doi:10.1109/bibm47256.2019.8983415 · Cited by 46
Health Research, Consent and the GDPR Exemption.
Donnelly, M., & McDonagh, M. (2019) · European Journal of Health Law · doi:10.1163/15718093-12262427 · Cited by 42
MedRec: A Network for Personal Information Distribution
Nchinda, N., Cameron, A., Retzepi, K., & Lippman, A. (2019) · 2012 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC) · doi:10.1109/iccnc.2019.8685631 · Cited by 41
Tsang, Y. P., Lee, C. K. M., Zhang, K., Wu, C. H., & Ip, W. H. (2024) · Journal of Grid Computing · doi:10.1007/s10723-023-09739-x · Cited by 39
De-identification of medical imaging data: a comprehensive tool for ensuring patient privacy
Rempe, M., Heine, L., Seibold, C., Hörst, F., & Kleesiek, J. (2025) · European Radiology · doi:10.1007/s00330-025-11695-x · Cited by 32
Role-Based access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
Khan, J. A. (2024) · Advances in Information Security, Privacy, and Ethics · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-1431-9.ch005 · Cited by 30
Security and Privacy Issues and Requirements for Healthcare Cloud Computing
Gavrilov, G., & Trajkovik, V. (2012) · Cited by 28
Centralized vs. Decentralized: Performance Comparison between BigchainDB and Amazon QLDB
Lupaiescu, S., Cioată, P., Turcu, C. E., Gherman, O., Turcu, C. O., & Paslaru, G. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app13010499 · Cited by 26
Collusion-Resistant and Time-Aware Co-Verification for Edge Data Integrity
Zhao, Y., Qu, Y., Li, B., Zhao, L., Chen, F., Xiang, Y., & Gao, L. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2025.3639688 · Cited by 24
CAPE: Commitment-Based Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Scheme in Blockchain
Gai, K., Guo, Y., Yu, J., Chan, W., Zhu, L., Zhang, Y., & Meng, W. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2025.3542906 · Cited by 19
Is Your AI Truly Yours? Leveraging Blockchain for Copyrights, Provenance, and Lineage
Wang, Q., Yu, G., Sai, Y., Bandara, H. M. N. D., & Chen, S. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Services Computing · doi:10.1109/tsc.2025.3586091 · Cited by 17
Panagoulias, D. P., Virvou, M. K., & Tsihrintzis, G. A. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI) · doi:10.1109/ictai56018.2022.00157 · Cited by 17
Self-citationBlockchain and the GDPR: New Challenges for Privacy and Security
Giordano, M. T. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-52722-8_20 · Cited by 15
Bandara, E., Shetty, S. S., Rahman, A., & Mukkamala, R. (2021) · IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) · doi:10.1109/milcom52596.2021.9653024 · Cited by 14
Finding the Evidence in Tamper-Evident Logs
Sandler, D. R., Derr, K., Crosby, S. A., & Wallach, D. S. (2008) · International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE) · doi:10.1109/sadfe.2008.22 · Cited by 12
An MLOps Framework for Explainable Network Intrusion Detection with MLflow
Spadari, V., Cerasuolo, F., Bovenzi, G., & Pescapè, A. (2024) · IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) · doi:10.1109/iscc61673.2024.10733700 · Cited by 11
Enhancing data provenance in AI with blockchain technology: a comprehensive quality model
Jalbani, A. A., Weerawarna, R., & Al-Zubaidi, K. (2025) · CSI Transactions on ICT · doi:10.1007/s40012-025-00419-7 · Cited by 10
BEATS: Practical Audit Trail in Blockchain Systems
Alagha, B., & Özçelik, İ. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3582722 · Cited by 8
Huerta, T. R., Bartlett, C. W., Alain, G., Bentley, T. D., Bradford, C. R., Bridges, J. F. P., Chakravarti, A., Farag, A. A., Gerhardt, C. A., Gorham, T., et al. (2025) · npj Health Systems · doi:10.1038/s44401-025-00051-2 · Cited by 8
Privacy-Preserving Autonomous Vehicle Group Formation in a Collusive Attack Scenario
Xiang, Z., Cheng, J., Liu, C., Mao, Q., Yuan, G., & Gao, S. (2025) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3559151 · Cited by 7
ARGO-SLSA: Software Supply Chain Security in Argo Workflows
Mohomed, T., & Ekanayake, I. (2025) · Moratuwa Engineering Research Conference (MERCon) · doi:10.1109/mercon67903.2025.11217128 · Cited by 7
Robust Defensive Cyber Agent for Multi-Adversary Defense
Farooq, M. O. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Machine Learning in Communications and Networking · doi:10.1109/tmlcn.2025.3605855 · Cited by 7
The University of Texas Southwestern Glioma Dataset - MRI, Molecular Markers and Segmentations
Reddy, D. D., Saadat, N., Holcomb, J. M., Wagner, B. C., Truong, N. C. D., Bowerman, J., Hatanpaa, K. J., Patel, T. R., Pinho, M. C., Yu, F., et al. (2026) · Scientific Data · doi:10.1038/s41597-026-07274-4 · Cited by 6
A Model-Driven Approach for Systematic Reproducibility and Replicability of Data Science Projects
Melchor, F., Rodriguez-Echeverria, R., Conejero, J. M., Prieto, Á. E., & Gutiérrez, J. D. (2022) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-07472-1_9 · Cited by 6
Xue, M., Zhong, H., Shi, Y., Zeng, Y., Zhang, J., & Zhao, N. (2025) · Cybersecurity · doi:10.1186/s42400-025-00366-5 · Cited by 6
Transchain: Blockchain-Based Management of Allografts for Enhancing Data Provenance
Haq, R. U., Khan, R., Alturise, F., Sahrani, S., Alkhalaf, S., & Sarker, M. R. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3552576 · Cited by 6
Othman, W., Zhong, H., Miao, F., Xue, K., Hawbani, A., Amin, R., Zhao, L., & Li, T. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2025.3528491 · Cited by 6
Panagoulias, D. P., Tsihrintzis, G. A., & Virvou, M. K. (2025) · Learning and analytics in intelligent systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-90174-4 · Cited by 6
Self-citationPappas, C., Papadopoulos, D., & Papamanthou, C. (2025) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp61157.2025.00204 · Cited by 4
Ratio1 meta-OS - decentralized MLOps and beyond
Damian, A. I., Bleotiu, C., Grigoras, M., Butusina, P., Franceschi, A. D., Toderian, V., & Ţăpuş, N. (2025) · International Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science · doi:10.1109/cscs66924.2025.00046 · Cited by 4
Self-citationLattice-Based Key-Value Commitment Scheme
Miyaji, H., & Miyaji, A. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.2025.3559974 · Cited by 4
Varma, I. M., Kumar, N., & Bartolini, N. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics · doi:10.1109/tce.2025.3553876 · Cited by 4
A HIPAA Security and Privacy Compliance Audit and Risk Assessment Mitigation Approach
Choi, Y. B., & Williams, C. E. (2021) · International Journal of Cyber Research and Education · doi:10.4018/ijcre.2021070103 · Cited by 3
Privacy by Design Enabled Dynamic Consent Management Systems: A Demonstration Perspective
Yaqub, N., Zhang, J., Khalid, M. I., Ahmed, M., & Helfert, M. (2025) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-97799-2_30 · Cited by 3
Procko, T., & Ochoa, O. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4852748 · Cited by 2
ForenSync: Real-Time IoT Platform for Forensic Evidence Tracking and Audit Logging
Surenderkumar, S., Sanjay, S., Saran, K., Shanjith, V., & Shrivarshan, C. (2025) · International Conference on Smart Structures and Systems (ICSSS) · doi:10.1109/icsss66939.2025.11346132 · Cited by 2
Commit-Reveal2: Randomized Reveal Order Mitigates Last-Revealer Attacks in Commit-Reveal
Lee, S., & Gee, E. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC) · doi:10.1109/icbc64466.2025.11114691 · Cited by 2
DP-Mix: Differentially Private Routing in Mix Networks
Rahimi, M. (2025) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1109/acsac67867.2025.00043 · Cited by 1
HideMe: Hiding VMs from Co-Residency Attacks Using Network-Level Traffic Redirection
Stănculete, B.-N., & Sommese, R. (2025) · International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM) · doi:10.23919/cnsm67658.2025.11297446 · Cited by 1
Ratio1 -- AI meta-OSPreprint
Damian, A. I., Butusina, P., De Franceschi, A., Toderian, V., Grigoras, M., & Bleotiu, C. (2025) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2509.12223 · Cited by 1
Self-citationCoordinate plane based authentication method for detecting clone node in wireless sensor networks
Liu, W., Shi, J., Wang, H., Chen, T., Han, Z., & Li, Q. (2025) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104148
(2019) · USENIX Security Symposium
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Panagoulias, D.P.; Tsihrintzis, G.A.; Virvou, M. Challenges in Regulating and Validating AI-Driven Healthcare. In Artificial Intelligence-Empowered Bio-medical Applications; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2025; pp. 135-152. · DOI
- McMahan, B.; Moore, E.; Ramage, D.; Hampson, S.; y Arcas, B.A. Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized data. In Proceedings of the Artificial Intelligence and Statistics; PMLR: New York, NY, USA, 2017; pp. 1273-1282.
- Zaharia, M.; Chen, A.; Davidson, A.; Ghodsi, A.; Hong, S.A.; Konwinski, A.; Murching, S.; Nykodym, T.; Ogilvie, P.; Parkhe, M.; et al. Accelerating the machine learning lifecycle with MLflow. IEEE Data Eng. Bull. 2018, 41, 39-45.
Cited by
Ka Chun, W. O. N. G., & Sparks, T. D. (2026) · ChemRxiv · doi:10.26434/chemrxiv.15010668/v1
Metadata
- Authors
- Panagoulias, D. P., Damian, A. I., Stamate, C., Toderian, V., Butusina, P., De Franceschi, A., Bleotiu, C., Sakkopoulos, E., & Tsichrintzi, E.-A.
- Affiliations
- University of Piraeus (GR)
- Universitatea Națională de Știință și Tehnologie Politehnica București (RO)
- Birkbeck, University of London (GB)
- Ratio1.ai, 031681 Bucharest, Romania
- Noetiv PC, Valaoritou 18, 106 71 Athens, Greece
- ORCID
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2026-07-10
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 14
- Pages
- 3046
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7167886567
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 75
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- FWCI
- 2.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Preprints.org (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- University of Piraeus Research Centre
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Keywords
- blockchain, decentralized governance, diagnostic imaging, data provenance, consent management, auditability, reproducibility, cryptographic commitments, regulatory compliance, MRI images
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-11-22, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-11-22 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.