Cited by 460Cryptography and Data SecuritySecurity and Verification in ComputingDigital and Cyber Forensics

Secure audit logs to support computer forensics

Open access
Schneier, Bruce, Kelsey, John·1999·ACM Transactions on Information and System Security

Abstract

In many real-world applications, sensitive information must be kept it log files on an untrusted machine. In the event that an attacker captures this machine, we would like to guarantee that he will gain little or no information from the log files and to limit his ability to corrupt the log files. We describe a computationally cheap method for making all log entries generated prior to the logging machine's compromise impossible for the attacker to read, and also impossible to modify or destroy undetectably.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/317087.317089

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Key-evolution schemes provide forward integrity but require careful key management and offer only sequential verification.

    “Key-evolution schemes (Schneier and Kelsey, 1999) chain successive log entries through evolving cryptographic keys, providing forward integrity but requiring careful key management and offering only sequential verification.”

    From Lightweight Tamper-Evident Log Integrity Verification for IoT Edge Environments: A Merkle Tree Pipeline with Adaptive Chunking (2026) · cites this paper as Schneier and Kelsey, 1999

    Section 3 and Section 3.1 describe evolving authentication keys, deleting earlier keys, and chaining log entries to protect records after compromise. Section 3.5 has the verifier check each entry in the hash chain, supporting sequential checking, but Section 3 also says all previous entries can be remotely authenticated using a single hash value. The paper therefore does not support the unqualified claim that verification is *only* sequential; it also does not explicitly characterize key management as requiring special care. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

2 of the 26 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. KELSEY, J., SCHNEIER, B., AND WAGNER, D. 1998. Protocol interactions and the chosen protocol attack. In Proceedings of the 1997 Workshop on Protocols. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 91-104.
  2. MCCORMAC, J. 1996. European Scrambling Systems. Waterford University Press.
  3. SCHNEIER, B. 1995. Applied cryptography (2nd ed.): protocols, algorithms, and source code in C. 2ND John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY.

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Authors
Schneier, B., & Kelsey, J.
Affiliations
University of Minnesota (US)
Venue
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
Published
1999-05
Volume
2
Issue
2
Pages
159-176
ISSN
  • 1094-9224 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7406
OpenAlex
W1987593503
Cited by
443
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 21
FWCI
3.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital and Cyber Forensics
Keywords
audit logs, log integrity, digital forensics, secure logging

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