Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks against Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey on Strategies and Defense
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Concerns about cybersecurity and attack methods have risen in the information age. Many techniques are used to detect or deter attacks, such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), that help achieve security goals, such as detecting malicious attacks before they enter the system and classifying them as malicious activities. However, the IDS approaches have shortcomings in misclassifying novel attacks or adapting to emerging environments, affecting their accuracy and increasing false alarms. To solve this problem, researchers have recommended using machine learning approaches as engines for IDSs to increase their efficacy. Machine-learning techniques are supposed to automatically detect the main distinctions between normal and malicious data, even novel attacks, with high accuracy. However, carefully designed adversarial input perturbations during the training or testing phases can significantly affect their predictions and classifications. Adversarial machine learning (AML) poses many cybersecurity threats in numerous sectors that use machine-learning-based classification systems, such as deceiving IDS to misclassify network packets. Thus, this paper presents a survey of adversarial machine-learning strategies and defenses. It starts by highlighting various types of adversarial attacks that can affect the IDS and then presents the defense strategies to decrease or eliminate the influence of these attacks. Finally, the gaps in the existing literature and future research directions are presented.
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Citations
Cites
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“On the other hand, some researchers have mentioned some methods for hardening the ML-based IDS against these attacks, but there are no experiments on these defenses in the adversarial attacks against the IDS section.”
Toward Generating a New Intrusion Detection Dataset and Intrusion Traffic Characterization
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“On the other hand, some researchers have mentioned some methods for hardening the ML-based IDS against these attacks, but there are no experiments on these defenses in the adversarial attacks against the IDS section.”
DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
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“Moosavi-Dezfooli suggested DeepFool in [45] to discover the shortest distance between the original input and the judgment boundary of adversarial cases.”
Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models
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“The attacker can also create a substitute model of the detection system and then use the transferability aspect of ML to create adversarial samples that fool both the substitute classifier and the actual detector [30,50].”
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“The second assault can obtain the victim’s identity by extracting a clean image from a blurred image by attacking the system [37,38].”
Cited by
A Systematic Review of Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks, Defensive Controls and Technologies
Malik, J., Muthalagu, R., & Pawar, P. M. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3423323 · Cited by 76
“By inserting malicious samples into the system while it is operating, an attacker can pollute this data and prevent retraining from functioning normally [66].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Alotaibi, A., & Rassam, M. A.
- Venue
- Future Internet
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2023-01-31
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 62
- ISSN
- 1999-5903 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4318815561
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 15.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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