The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance
Open accessAbstract
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · cited 1×
“Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton [146]) states that a trait that reduces the fitness of each of its holders by c and gives a combined fitness benefit of b to others can spread in a population if and only if rb ≥ c, where r is the coefficient of relatedness, the probability that any given recipient of the benefit also holds t…”
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
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A Natural History of Human Thinking
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The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War
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Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism
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“Examples include repeated interaction (Trivers [344]), kin-selection (Fisher [119], Hamilton [145]) and group selection (Bowles [70], Choi and Bowles [89], Haldane [144]).”
Cited by
Jusup, M., Holme, P., Kanazawa, K., Takayasu, M., Romić, I., Wang, Z., Geček, S., Lipić, T., Podobnik, B., Wang, L., et al. (2022) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2021.10.005 · Cited by 643
Metadata
- Authors
- Newton, J.
- Venue
- Games
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2018-05-24
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 31
- ISSN
- 2073-4336 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2773741927
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 48.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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