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Secure Data Aggregation with Fully Homomorphic Encryption in Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Networks

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

With the rapid development of wireless communication technology, sensor technology, information acquisition and processing technology, sensor networks will finally have a deep influence on all aspects of people’s lives. The battery resources of sensor nodes should be managed efficiently in order to prolong network lifetime in large-scale wireless sensor networks (LWSNs). Data aggregation represents an important method to remove redundancy as well as unnecessary data transmission and hence cut down the energy used in communication. As sensor nodes are deployed in hostile environments, the security of the sensitive information such as confidentiality and integrity should be considered. This paper proposes Fully homomorphic Encryption based Secure data Aggregation (FESA) in LWSNs which can protect end-to-end data confidentiality and support arbitrary aggregation operations over encrypted data. In addition, by utilizing message authentication codes (MACs), this scheme can also verify data integrity during data aggregation and forwarding processes so that false data can be detected as early as possible. Although the FHE increase the computation overhead due to its large public key size, simulation results show that it is implementable in LWSNs and performs well. Compared with other protocols, the transmitted data and network overhead are reduced in our scheme.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/s150715952

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Figures

Figure 1 The packet structure of FESA scheme, where MAC is composed of T + 1 subMACs. The byte size of each field is enclosed in parentheses. The acronyms of the fields are destination address (Dest), active message type (AM), message length (Len), packet sequence number (PNum).
Figure 1 The packet structure of FESA scheme, where MAC is composed of T + 1 subMACs. The byte size of each field is enclosed in parentheses. The acronyms of the fields are destination address (Dest), active message type (AM), message length (Len), packet sequence number (PNum).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 The network structure of FESA, where the three nodes within a dotted line are in the same group and share one group key.
Figure 2 The network structure of FESA, where the three nodes within a dotted line are in the same group and share one group key.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 The message transmission process in the formation of MFN-group.
Figure 3 The message transmission process in the formation of MFN-group.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 The total number of computations (which includes the computations of encryption, decryption and MACs) versus the number of network monitoring nodes for FESA and DAA.
Figure 4 The total number of computations (which includes the computations of encryption, decryption and MACs) versus the number of network monitoring nodes for FESA and DAA.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 The performance in aggregator under DAA, SDA-PH and our scheme. Although it is more complex using FHE, the performance of our scheme is also better than other two schemes. (a) The average delay of aggregator; (b) The average delivery ratios of the aggregator; (c) The average throughput of the aggregator. In (b), when there are less than seven neighboring nodes forward data to an aggregator at the same time, the average data delivery ratios of the aggregator are close to 1.
Figure 5 The performance in aggregator under DAA, SDA-PH and our scheme. Although it is more complex using FHE, the performance of our scheme is also better than other two schemes. (a) The average delay of aggregator; (b) The average delivery ratios of the aggregator; (c) The average throughput of the aggregator. In (b), when there are less than seven neighboring nodes forward data to an aggregator at the same time, the average data delivery ratios of the aggregator are close to 1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 The impact of monitoring nodes on the communication overhead for FESA and DAA.
Figure 6 The impact of monitoring nodes on the communication overhead for FESA and DAA.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 The entire network performance under DAA, SDA-PH and our scheme. Although using FHE increases the communication overhead, the performance of our scheme is still approaching to the other two schemes. (a) The average delay of the entire network; (b) The average delivery ratios of the entire network; (c) The average throughput of the entire network. In (b), when there are less than six aggregators forward data to the base station at the same time, the data delivery ratios are close to 1.
Figure 7 The entire network performance under DAA, SDA-PH and our scheme. Although using FHE increases the communication overhead, the performance of our scheme is still approaching to the other two schemes. (a) The average delay of the entire network; (b) The average delivery ratios of the entire network; (c) The average throughput of the entire network. In (b), when there are less than six aggregators forward data to the base station at the same time, the data delivery ratios are close to 1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 8 The total data transmission for FESA, DAA and SDA-PH, where in FESA and DAA detect false data during data aggregation and forwarding while SDA-PH detects only in BS.
Figure 8 The total data transmission for FESA, DAA and SDA-PH, where in FESA and DAA detect false data during data aggregation and forwarding while SDA-PH detects only in BS.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Li, X., Chen, D., Li, C., & Wang, L.
Affiliations
  • Jiangsu University (CN)
  • Sichuan University (CN)
Corresponding author
Wang, Liangmin
Venue
Sensors
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2015-07-03
Volume
15
Issue
7
Pages
15952-15973
ISSN
1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1481916896
Cited by
41
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 5
FWCI
6.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61272074, U1405255)
  • the Industrial Science and Technology Foundation of Zhenjiang City (GY2013030)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Wireless Communication Security Techniques
Keywords
secure aggregation, fully homomorphic encryption, large-scale wireless sensor networks, data confidentiality, data integrity, message authentication codes, false data detection, energy efficiency, network lifetime, computational overhead
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Computer Communication Networks, Confidentiality, Computer Security, Remote Sensing Technology, Wireless Technology

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Secure Data Aggregation with Fully Homomorphic Encryption in Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/s150715952
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Li, X., Chen, D., Li, C., & Wang, L. (2015). Secure Data Aggregation with Fully Homomorphic Encryption in Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Networks. Sensors. https://doi.org/10.3390/s150715952

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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