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Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices

Gentry, Craig·2009·Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing

Abstract

We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable.

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Crossref · 10.1145/1536414.1536440

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58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty compute, and trusted execution environments allow collaborative computations to be performed with untrusted parties while maintaining confidentiality of the inputs.

    “Homomorphic encryption58, secure multiparty compute59, and trusted execution environments (TEEs)60,61 allow for collaborative computations to be performed with untrusted parties while maintaining confidentiality of the inputs to the computation.”
  • Backdoor detection algorithms rely on the statistical difference between latent representations of backdoor-enabled and clean inputs in the poisoned model.

    “These algorithms rely on the statistical difference between the latent representations of backdoor-enabled and clean (benign) inputs in the poisoned model.”

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Authors
Gentry, C.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
Gentry, Craig
Venue
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Publisher
ACM
Published
2009-05-31
Pages
169-178
OpenAlex
W2031533839
Cited by
6,806
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 382 · 2025: 636 · 2024: 499 · 2023: 476 · 2022: 424 · 2021: 467 · 2020: 472 · 2019: 430 · 2018: 407 · 2017: 416 · 2016: 403 · 2015: 448 · 2014: 384 · 2013: 360 · 2012: 274
FWCI
140.64
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Keywords
fully homomorphic encryption, ideal lattices, bootstrapping, lattice-based cryptography

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