Cited by 0Public Procurement and PolicyAdministrative Law and GovernanceComparative International Legal Studies

The Contractual Liability of the Administration in the Execution of Its Administrative Contracts: -The Fault Based Model- (Based on the Latest Legislation and Regulations on Public Procurement)

Open access
Zina, Zina, Benseghir, Mourad·2026·Journal of Science and Knowledge Horizons

Abstract

Administrative contracts derive their importance from their connection to public services, as these services constitute both the subject and the purpose of such contracts. This objective can only be achieved through full performance of administrative contracts. However, the administration itself may sometimes obstruct execution of the administrative contract's object by failing to fulfill its contractual obligations arising from its administrative contracts. These obligations are diverse and may take the form of technical or financial obligations. Moreover, proper execution of these obligations also requires the administration to exercise its exceptional powers and multiple privileges correctly, including its powers of supervision, control, direction, modification, imposition of sanctions, and termination of the contract for reasons of public interest. Therefore, any breach by the administration of its contractual obligations, or any deviation in the exercise of its powers, constitutes contractual fault on its part, which gives rise to its contractual liability toward the contracting party-thereby entitling the latter to claim compensation, or to request the annulment or termination of the contract

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This doctrinal legal study examines the fault-based contractual liability of the administration during execution of administrative contracts under recent Algerian public procurement legislation. It argues that liability arises from breach of technical or financial obligations, or from deviation in exercising supervisory, modification, penalty, and termination powers, entitling the contracting party to compensation or rescission.

Key findings

  • The administration’s fault-based liability arises when it fails to enable the contracting party to commence performance, improperly performs its obligations, breaches financial obligations, or refuses/delays return of the final performance bond. Delay in paying financial remuneration constitutes contractual fault and can trigger late-payment interest without proof of actual damage, unless otherwise provided by law.
  • Unilateral modification of financial remuneration is contractual fault; Algerian law instead provides for price updates and reassessment after agreement. The modification power is limited: Article 139 of Presidential Decree 15-247 sets 10% of total contract value as the maximum, while in public works contracts the limit is 20% under Article 36 of Decree 21-219, with exceeding it allowing compensatory damages.
  • Performance bonds are valued between 1% and 10% of contract value, and the final performance bond is fully recoverable within one month from final acceptance under Articles 130–134 of Presidential Decree 15-247. The administration is liable if it refuses release after full performance or delays return.
  • Deviation in exercising powers of supervision/direction, modification, penalties, or termination for public interest engages liability if unlawful or abusive. Termination for public interest requires public-interest justification and legality; the General Administrative Clauses for public works provide full compensation, while Law 23-12 remains silent according to the paper.

Methods

  • Doctrinal legal research using descriptive and analytical methods to identify, explain, and examine relevant legal issues and provisions.
  • Relies on recent public procurement legal texts—including Law No. 23-12, Presidential Decree No. 15-247, and Executive Decree No. 21-219—alongside academic and doctrinal references; no empirical sample or data collection is used.
  • Focuses on the execution phase of a fully constituted administrative contract and exclusively on liability grounded in contractual fault.

Limitations

  • The paper states that specialized studies focusing solely on this issue remain limited or rare, and that public procurement legislation lacks explicit provisions governing the administration’s fault-based contractual liability, especially for breach of obligations or deviation in discretionary powers, except in termination for public interest.
  • Evident from the text: there is no empirical data, sample, or quantitative analysis; the study is a doctrinal and comparative legal analysis based mainly on Algerian legislation, doctrine, and case law, with French references.
  • Evident from the text: the scope excludes no-fault liability such as unjust enrichment or threats to financial equilibrium, and no formal limitations section is provided.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.34118/jskp.v6i2.4635

Cites

0 references resolved

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 69 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisecitation

    The provisions governing the financial remuneration in the contract are contractual terms that the administration cannot modify unilaterally without the contracting party's consent.

    “It is settled that the provisions governing the financial remuneration in the contract are contractual terms that the administration cannot modify unilaterally without the contracting party's consent (Altemawi, 2011, pp. 557-558).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Interpretationreasoning

    Since administrative contracts are time-based, the administration must enable the contracting party to begin and proceed with execution until completion.

    “Since administrative contracts are time-based in nature, obliging the contracting party to complete the assigned tasks within a specified timeframe, the administration must enable the contracting party to begin and proceed with execution until completion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Administrative contracts are time-based in nature.
  • Premisereasoning

    Legislation, including Algerian law, provides for price updates and revisions through reexamination and reassessment following initial agreement in the contract.

    “Accordingly, legislation-including Algerian law-has intervened to prevent unilateral price modifications by the administration that would trigger liability.It provides for price updates and revisions through reexamination and reassessment following initial agreement in the contract 2 .”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Article 95 of Decree No. 15-247

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Article 73 of Law No. 23-12

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Premisecitation

    The administration's contractual liability rests on contractual fault, whether the administration's nonperformance constitutes deliberate breach or negligence.

    “Such liability rests on contractual fault, whether the administration's nonperformance constitutes deliberate breach or negligence (Khalifa, 2010, p. 219).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa, 2010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Premisecitation

    The administration must deliver the worksite free of material and legal impediments to commencement.

    “The administration must honor this obligation to avoid contractual liability, including delivering the site free of material and legal impediments to commencement (Khalifa A.-E. a.-E., 2010, p. 223)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A.-E. a.-E., 2010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims. 57
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 32
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In a concession contract granting exclusive and monopolistic operation of internal transport services, the administration may not enable third parties to exploit the same facility, nor allow them to engage in similar activities in the same location.

    “By way of example, where the administration enters into a concession contract with a contracting party granting it the exclusive and monopolistic operation of internal transport services, it may not enable third parties to exploit the same facility, nor even allow them to engage in similar activities in the same location (Kharbit, 2017, p. 44).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kharbit, 2017

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The ability to invoke the administration's contractual liability is a fundamental right of the contracting party during the contract's execution.

    “Among these rights, the ability to invoke the administration's contractual liability is particularly important.This study focuses on such liability as a fundamental right of the contracting party during the contract's execution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Where the contracting party serves the public directly, as in concession contracts, the financial remuneration takes the form of fees collected from users.

    “Conversely, where the contracting party serves the public directly (as in concession contracts), the financial remuneration takes the form of fees collected from users (Altemawi, 2011, pp. 556-557).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Contractual fault arises when the administration's exercise of its powers during execution causes harm or imposes undue burdens on the contracting party.

    “Contractual fault arises when the administration's exercise of its powers during execution causes harm or imposes undue burdens on the contracting party (Nabulsi, 2012, pp. 515-516).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nabulsi, 2012

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Any breach by the administration of its obligations triggers its contractual liability, entitling the contracting party to seek judicial enforcement of appropriate penalties, whether by way of compensation or contract rescission.

    “Any breach by the administration of its obligations triggers its contractual liability, entitling the contracting party to seek judicial enforcement of appropriate penalties, whether by way of compensation or contract rescission.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration must perform the administrative contract and adhere to all terms and obligations contained therein.

    “The administration must perform the administrative contract, as this encourages the contracting party to execute its own obligations.In executing the contract, it must adhere to all terms and obligations contained therein.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration is bound by the contract as a whole and may not undertake any act inconsistent with its capacity as a contracting party, or that would impose additional burdens or hardships on the contracting party in the performance of its contractual obligations, failing which it shall incur liability.

    “Furthermore, the administration is bound by the contract as a whole and may not undertake any act inconsistent with its capacity as a contracting party, or that would impose additional burdens or hardships on the contracting party in the performance of its contractual obligations, failing which it shall incur liability (Altemawi, 2011, p. 547).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Any deviation by the administration in the exercise of its powers constitutes contractual fault on its part, giving rise to its contractual liability toward the contracting party.

    “Therefore, any breach by the administration of its contractual obligations, or any deviation in the exercise of its powers, constitutes contractual fault on its part, which gives rise to its contractual liability toward the contracting party”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    The administration's contractual liability may arise in specific circumstances even in the absence of fault, such as unjust enrichment or threats to the contract's financial equilibrium.

    “It may also arise in specific circumstances even in the absence of fault, such as unjust enrichment or threats to the contract's financial equilibrium.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration must hand over the precise contractually stipulated site without unilateral alteration, as a change could impose additional costs and incur liability.

    “and handing over the precise contractually stipulated site without unilateral alteration, as a change could impose additional costs and incur liability (Khalifa A.-E. a.-E., 2010, p. 224).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A.-E. a.-E., 2010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration may not act arbitrarily in rejecting works in public works contracts, suspend performance without a reason related to public interest, refuse delivery of agreed goods and materials, or reject minor defects that do not affect usability.

    “It may not act arbitrarily in rejecting works in public works contracts, suspend performance without a reason related to public interest, refuse delivery of agreed goods and materials, or reject minor defects that do not affect usability (AlBalooshi, 2016, pp. 32-33).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites AlBalooshi, 2016

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Although the contracting party is primarily responsible for timelines, the administration must adhere to any explicitly stipulated deadlines.

    “Although the contracting party is primarily responsible for timelines to ensure the regular and continuous operation of public services, the administration must also adhere to any explicitly stipulated deadlines.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Given that administrative contracts involve public funds, the administration must first verify proper performance and service delivery before disbursing remuneration to the contracting party.

    “However, given that administrative contracts involve public funds, the administration must first verify proper performance and service delivery before disbursing remuneration to the contracting party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration's breach of its financial obligations may manifest in breach of the financial remuneration obligation or breach of the obligation to return the final performance bond.

    “Thus, the administration's breach of its financial obligations may manifest in: its breach of the financial remuneration obligation (First Section), which consists of: its failure to pay the financial remuneration or its unilateral modification thereof; the administration's delay in fulfilling its obligation to pay the financial this Decree”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The administration's contractual liability may arise when it breaches contractual obligations or deviates in the exercise of its powers.

    “The administration's liability may arise when it breaches contractual obligations or deviates in the exercise of its powers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration must fulfill all its financial obligations to the contracting party, and if it breaches them, its contractual liability arises on the basis of fault.

    “Accordingly, the administration must fulfill all its financial obligations to the contracting party, and if it breaches them, its contractual liability arises on the basis of fault.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The administration's purpose in entering administrative contracts is to achieve the public interest.
    • Rests on an assumption: The contracting party's primary goal through administrative contracts is to achieve profit.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration's contractual liability arises from the failure to supply the necessary, essential, and appropriate materials required for the execution of the contract, or from the failure to grant the authorizations required for that purpose.

    “Likewise, liability arises from the failure to supply the necessary, essential, and appropriate materials required for the execution of the contract, or from the failure to grant the authorizations required for that purpose, such as permits for construction materials (Khalifa A. E., 2008, p. 98).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A. E., 2008

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Failure by the administration to observe its obligations in executing the contract correctly and in good faith constitutes contractual fault.

    “This imposes numerous obligations on the administration, failure to observe which constitutes contractual fault.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Any unilateral modification of the financial remuneration by the administration constitutes contractual fault, engaging its contractual liability.

    “Thus, any unilateral modification of the financial remuneration by the administration constitutes contractual fault, engaging its contractual liability, since financial benefits are a key consideration for the contracting party when entering the contract (Khalifa A. E., 2008, pp. 101-102).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A. E., 2008

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Jurisprudence distinguishes two types of financial remuneration based on the differing legal nature of administrative contracts.

    “Jurisprudence distinguishes between two types thereof, based on the differing legal nature of administrative contracts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    In an administrative contract, the administration, by virtue of its status as a public authority, remains in a superior position vis-à-vis its contracting party and enjoys broad prerogatives in exercising its powers.

    “the administration-by virtue of its status as a public authority-remains in a superior position vis-à-vis its contracting party, enjoying broad prerogatives in exercising its powers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Contractual fault cannot be excused, and liability arises to restore equilibrium in the administrative contract while protecting the contracting party's interests, provided that the contracting party continues performing its obligations despite the administration's breach and does not contribute to the fault.

    “nevertheless, such fault cannot be excused, and liability arises to restore equilibrium in the administrative contract while protecting the contracting party's interestsprovided that the contracting party continues performing its obligations despite the administration's breach and does not contribute to the fault.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Contractual fault implies that the administration has acted negligently or failed to fulfill a duty, thereby breaching an existing obligation or infringing the rights of the contracting party.

    “Accordingly, contractual fault implies that the administration has acted negligently or failed to fulfill a duty, thereby breaching an existing obligation or infringing the rights of the contracting party (Delaunay, 2011, pp. 224-225).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Delaunay, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    The administration bases its prerogatives and powers within the administrative contract on the principle of ensuring the regular and continuous operation of public utilities to serve the public interest.

    “While the administration bases its prerogatives and powers within the administrative contract on the principle of ensuring the regular and continuous operation of public utilities to serve the public interest”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The administration's contractual obligations vary with the type of administrative contract and defy exhaustive classification.

    “It merits noting that the administration's contractual obligations vary with the type of administrative contract and defy exhaustive classification; breach of any triggers contractual liability.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Unilateral modification of financial remuneration may deter individuals from contracting with the administration.

    “Furthermore, such unilateral action may deter individuals from contracting with the administration.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration must execute its obligations correctly and in good faith, where good faith entails performing the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions.

    “The administration must execute its obligations correctly and in good faith, where good faith entails performing the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions (Kharbit, 2017, p. 42).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kharbit, 2017

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    A violation of financial authorization rules may trigger administrative, judicial, or political liability, but it does not render the contract null, and the contract remains binding on the administration.

    “Although a violation of financial authorization rules may trigger administrative, judicial, or political liability, it does not render the contract null, and the contract remains binding on the administration.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The power of modification does not encompass all contract terms but is limited to those related to public service management; it may not modify contract terms unconnected thereto, such as terms concerning the contracting party's financial benefits.

    “As for its scope, the power of modification does not encompass all contract terms but is limited to those related to public service management; it may not modify contract terms unconnected thereto”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Performance bonds are valued between 1% and 10% of contract value, varying by contract type.

    “These primarily consist of performance bonds valued between 1% and 10% of contract value, varying by contract type.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Articles 130 to 134 of Presidential Decree 15-247

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    While the administration has the right to direct the contractual process pursuant to its power of supervision and direction, it may not exceed direction to the extent of modifying the contract.

    “For instance, while the administration has the right to direct the contractual process pursuant to its power of supervision and direction, it may not exceed direction to the extent of modifying the contract.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    In concluding administrative contracts, the administration seeks to award them to financially capable contracting parties.

    “In concluding administrative contracts, the administration seeks to award them to financially capable contracting parties.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration derives these exceptional powers from its superior position to the contracting party, as it is responsible for ensuring the regular and continuous operation of the public service that is the subject of the administrative contract, in pursuit of the public interest.

    “The administration derives these exceptional powers from its superior position to the contracting party, as it is responsible for ensuring the regular and continuous operation of the public service that is the subject of the administrative contract, in pursuit of the public interest.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    The administration's exceptional powers comprise the power of supervision and direction, the power of modification, the power to impose penalties, and the power to terminate the administrative contract.

    “They comprise several powers, namely: the power of supervision and direction, the power of modification, the power to impose penalties, and the power to terminate the administrative contract.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The power of modification is subject to general restrictions: subsequent circumstances justifying modification must arise after contract conclusion; the modification must relate wholly or partially to the contract; it must occur during the contract term; sufficient financial authorization must exist to cover increased expenditures; its purpose must be to achieve the public interest; and the modif

    “Accordingly, the general restrictions on the power of modification are: that subsequent circumstances justifying modification must arise after contract conclusion; that the modification must relate wholly or partially to the contract; that it must occur during the contract term; that sufficient financial authorization must exist to cover increased expenditures resulting therefrom; that its purpose”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A. E., 2008

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites AlBalooshi, 2016

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    These powers constitute an inherent right of the administration, exercised pursuant to its privilege of direct execution, issued by its unilateral will without prior recourse to the courts.

    “These powers constitute an inherent right of the administration, exercised pursuant to its privilege of direct execution, issued by its unilateral will without prior recourse to the courts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Performance bonds must be provided no later than submission of the contracting party's first interim payment request and cover all stages up to provisional acceptance.

    “They must be provided no later than submission of the contracting party's first interim payment request and cover all stages up to provisional acceptance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Articles 130 to 134 of Presidential Decree 15-247

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In supply contracts, the administration's supervisory power is weaker, and the supplier acts independently in choosing execution methods unless the contract provides otherwise.

    “This power is weaker in supply contracts, where the link between performance and public service operation is tenuous; here the supplier acts independently in choosing execution methods unless the contract provides otherwise”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Altemawi, 2011

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Any delay by the administration in paying the financial remuneration constitutes contractual fault, giving rise to its contractual liability, including compensation to the contracting party, without the need to prove actual damage, even if the contract contains no explicit provision to that effect.

    “Any delay constitutes contractual fault, giving rise to its contractual liability (including compensation to the contracting party), without the need to prove actual damage, even if the contract contains no explicit provision to that effect (Khalifa A. a., 2009, p. 230).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A. a., 2009

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    Legality for the modification decision means it must be issued by the administration respecting all elements of legality required for administrative decisions: competence, form, procedure, subject matter, cause, and purpose of the public interest within applicable legal and regulatory texts.

    “Legality here means that the modification decision must be issued by the administration respecting all elements of legality required for administrative decisions: competence, form, procedure, subject matter, cause, and purpose of the public interest within the framework of applicable legal and regulatory texts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    For the exercise of the power of supervision and direction to be lawful, it must adhere to specific limits and constraints; deviation therefrom renders its conduct unlawful and engages its liability.

    “However, for the exercise of this power to be lawful, it must adhere to specific limits and constraints; deviation therefrom renders its conduct unlawful and engages its liability.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The administration must exercise the power of modification within limits and constraints, and this power is not absolute.

    “The administration must exercise the power of modification within limits and constraints that it is bound to respect, lest its liability arise, as this power is not absolute.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration's liability arises if it exercises supervisory power outside the public interest or what is required for the regular and continuous operation of the public service, or if supervision is conducted by an unauthorized authority in violation of laws and regulations.

    “Accordingly, the administration's liability arises if it exercises this power outside the public interest or what is required for the regular and continuous operation of the public service, or if supervision is conducted by an unauthorized authority in violation of laws and regulations.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Public interest requires the regular and continuous operation of the public service.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The modification concerns the quantity of the contracting party's obligations, increasing or decreasing them, where quantity means volume, not type.

    “concerns the quantity of the contracting party's obligations, increasing or decreasing them, where quantity here means volume, not type”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kharbit, 2017

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Where there is deviation in the exercise of powers beyond fault, this does not engage liability on the basis of fault; if compensation is required to restore contractual financial equilibrium, it falls under no-fault liability.

    “Where there is deviation in the exercise of powers beyond fault, this does not engage liability on the basis of fault; if compensation is required to restore contractual financial equilibrium, it falls under no-fault liability.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The contracting party must furnish a final performance bond as security for fulfilling its contractual obligations, which the administration retains until full execution.

    “Accordingly, the contracting party must furnish a final performance bond as security for fulfilling its contractual obligations (Khalifa A. E., 2008, p. 104), which the administration retains until full execution.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Khalifa A. E., 2008

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Two key principles for exercising the administration's supervisory power are adherence to legality and refraining from modifying contract terms.

    “This yields two key principles for exercising this power: adherence to legality, and refraining from modifying contract terms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Compensatory interest may be awarded where the damage suffered by the contracting party due to the administration's delay exceeds what late payment interest can cover, or where the delay is unusual and reflects bad faith.

    “In addition, compensatory interest may be awarded where the damage suffered by the contracting party due to the administration's delay exceeds what late payment interest can cover, or where the delay is unusual and reflects bad faith (AlBalooshi, 2016, pp.57-58).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites AlBalooshi, 2016

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    The administration has the right to monitor the contracting party to ensure performance according to the contract terms, and it may intervene to direct the execution process.

    “The administration has the right to monitor the contracting party to ensure performance according to the contract terms, and it may even intervene to direct the execution process.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The administration's liability arises when it fails to execute the contract properly, including delays in performance, failure to protect the contracting party from competition, or actions inconsistent with its role as contracting party that impose additional burdens or difficulties on the contracting party.

    “Liability also arises when the administration fails to execute the contract properly, including delays in performance, failure to protect the contracting party from competition, or actions inconsistent with its role as contracting party that impose additional burdens or difficulties on the contracting party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Justifications for termination for public interest reasons include: the contract becoming unnecessary; no longer aligning with the public service's needs for which it was concluded; or the public service being abolished or its scope modified such that contract continuation is incompatible with public good requirements and service needs.

    “Justifications for termination for public interest reasons include: the contract becoming unnecessary; no longer aligning with the public service's needs for which it was concluded; or the public service being abolished or its scope modified such that contract continuation is incompatible with public good requirements and service needs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kharbit, 2017

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The power to terminate for public interest is granted to the administration to preserve the regular and continuous operation of the public service and pertains to public policy.

    “This power is granted to the administration to preserve the regular and continuous operation of the public service and pertains to public policy”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites ABD EL-Hamid, 2014

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • Rests on an assumption: Public interest requires the regular and continuous operation of the public service.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    It matters not whether non-performance stems from intent, negligence, or otherwise, as the contracting party's breach in such cases impairs the public service and causes it significant harm.

    “It matters not whether non-performance stems from intent, negligence, or otherwise, as the contracting party's breach in such cases impairs the public service and causes it significant harm.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The administration's breach of its contractual obligations impairs the public service.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Contracting party breaches justify various penalties, including financial penalties (delay fines and bond forfeiture), coercive penalties (execution at the contracting party's expense, purchase at the supplier's expense, placing the service under guardianship), and terminatory penalties terminating the contractual relationship due to serious faults.

    “These justify various penalties, including financial penalties: delay fines 8 .and bond forfeiture 9 .coercive penalties involving performance at the contracting party's expense (execution at the contracting party's expense, purchase at the supplier's expense, placing the service under guardianship) 10 .and the most severe, terminatory penalties terminating the contractual relationship due to the”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The administration's powers are subject to judicial review, which serves as the most effective safeguard for protecting the contracting party's rights.

    “Accordingly, the administration's powers are subject to judicial review, which serves as the most effective safeguard for protecting the contracting party's rights.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Given the numerous obligations imposed on both parties and the exceptional privileges enjoyed by the administration in relation to the contracting party, who represents the weaker party, the breach of such obligations by the administration is deemed an impairment of the public service.

    “Given the numerous obligations imposed on both parties and the exceptional privileges enjoyed by the administration in relation to the contracting party-who represents the weaker party, as its obligations are tied to the public service-the breach of such obligations by the administration is deemed an impairment of the public service.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Administrative contracts are inherently linked to public services and the pursuit of the public interest.
    • Rests on an assumption: The contracting party in an administrative contract is the weaker party.
    • Rests on an assumption: The administration's breach of its contractual obligations impairs the public service.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Forms of contracting party breach include failure to provide financial guarantees; unjustified refusal or suspension of performance; non-personal performance without administration authorization; failure to respect execution deadlines; and non-conforming performance.

    “Forms of contracting party breach include: failure to provide financial guarantees; unjustified refusal or suspension of performance; non-personal performance without administration authorization; failure to respect execution deadlines; and non-conforming performance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Since administrative contracts impose reciprocal obligations on the administration and the contracting party, any breach, whether technical, financial, or resulting from deviation in exercising its powers contrary to the purpose of the public interest, their constraints, or legality limits, engages the administration's contractual liability on a fault-based principle, entitling the contracting

    “Since administrative contracts impose reciprocal obligations on the administration and the contracting party, any breach-whether technical, financial, or resulting from deviation in exercising its powers contrary to the purpose of the public interest, their constraints, or legality limits-engages the administration's contractual liability on a fault-based principle, entitling the contracting party”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Administrative contracts are inherently linked to public services and the pursuit of the public interest.
    • Rests on an assumption: The administration's breach of its contractual obligations impairs the public service.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The absence of explicit provisions for contractual liability in cases of breach of obligations or deviation in exercising discretionary powers may constitute inequity toward the contracting party.

    “The absence of explicit provisions for contractual liability in cases of breach of obligations or deviation in exercising discretionary powers may constitute inequity toward the contracting party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    The execution of administrative contracts is governed by the principle of good faith performance, requiring the optimal solution on the assumption that the creditor is in the debtor's position, i.e., presuming the best solutions for fulfilling obligations.

    “The execution of administrative contracts generally, and the administrative contract in particular, is governed by the principle of good faith performance, requiring the optimal solution on the assumption that the creditor (whether the contracting authority or the contracting party) is in the debtor's position, i.e., presuming the best solutions for fulfilling obligations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The silence of Algerian law on contractual liability raises issues regarding whether it results from oversight, will be rectified in the future, or was deliberate, considering it falls under the general rules of contractual liability, which are enforceable through administrative judicial review based on available evidence and the judge's conviction.

    “This silence raises issues regarding whether it results from oversight, will be rectified in the future, or was deliberate, considering it falls under the general rules of contractual liability, which are enforceable through administrative judicial review based on available evidence and the judge's conviction.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    The administration's right to terminate the administrative contract for public interest is not absolute but conditional upon two requirements: that the public good or service interest necessitates termination; and that the termination decision satisfies all conditions for the legality of discretionary acts, free from deviation in the exercise of powers.

    “The administration's right to terminate the administrative contract for public interest is not absolute but conditional upon two requirements: that the public good or service interest necessitates termination; and that the termination decision satisfies all conditions for the legality of discretionary acts (Meaning: free from deviation in the exercise of powers).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Articles 135 to 139 of Presidential Decree 15-247 address the power of modification, with Article 139 setting 10% of the total contract value as the maximum limit for modification authority; exceeding it entitles the contracting party to compensation.

    “Articles 135 to 139 of Presidential Decree 15-247 also address it, with Article 139 setting 10% of the total contract value as the maximum limit for modification authority; exceeding it entitles the contracting party to compensation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Article 139 of Presidential Decree 15-247

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    Penalties imposed by the administration aim to secure public service operation by ensuring optimal performance of the contracting party's obligations.

    “Accordingly, these penalties aim to secure public service operation by ensuring optimal performance of the contracting party's obligations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Explicit recognition of the administration's contractual liability for execution errors stemming from deviation in exercising discretionary powers is generally absent, except in cases of termination for public interest, where the General Administrative Clauses for public works provide for full compensation, whereas Law 23-12 on public procurement remains silent.

    “Explicit recognition of the administration's contractual liability for execution errors stemming from deviation in exercising discretionary powers is generally absent, except in cases of termination for public interest, where the General Administrative Clauses for public works provide for full compensation, whereas Law 23-12 on public procurement remains silent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Although the prevailing view does not require prior notice before imposing penalties, some laws mandate notifying the errant contracting party of its fault to allow correction prior thereto, including Algerian legislation.

    “Although the prevailing view does not require prior notice before imposing penalties, some laws mandate notifying the errant contracting party of its fault to allow correction prior thereto”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites AlBalooshi, 2016

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Unjustified refusal to pay financial remuneration constitutes contractual fault, as does the administration's unilateral modification of such remuneration, since financial terms in the contract are binding and cannot be altered without the contracting party's consent.

    “Unjustified refusal to pay financial remuneration constitutes contractual fault, as does the administration's unilateral modification of such remuneration, since financial terms in the contract are binding and cannot be altered without the contracting party's consent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Delays in paying financial remuneration, whether in good or bad faith, constitute contractual fault, triggering the administration's liability and entitling the contracting party to compensatory or late-payment interest, even without explicit contract provisions or proof of direct damage.

    “Delays in paying financial remuneration, whether in good or bad faith, constitute contractual fault, triggering the administration's liability and entitling the contracting party to compensatory or late-payment interest, even without explicit contract provisions or proof of direct damage.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In public works contracts, the limit for modification is 20%, and exceeding it allows a claim for compensatory damages based on harm suffered, per Article 36 of Decree 21-219.

    “In public works contracts, the limit is 20%, and exceeding it allows a claim for compensatory damages based on harm suffered, per Article 36 of Decree 21-219”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Article 36 of Decree 21-219

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If the administration breaches any of the restrictions on imposing penalties, or if its penalty decisions are unlawful or abusive, its power is deemed unlawful, engaging its contractual liability toward the contracting party.

    “Accordingly, if the administration breaches any of the aforementioned restrictions, or if its penalty decisions are unlawful or abusive, its power is deemed unlawful, engaging its contractual liability toward the contracting party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Algerian public procurement legislation primarily focuses on contracting party breaches and the penalties applicable, while the administration's power to impose coercive or terminatory sanctions exists even without explicit contractual provisions.

    “Algerian public procurement legislation primarily focuses on contracting party breaches and the penalties applicable, while the administration's power to impose coercive or terminatory sanctions exists even without explicit contractual provisions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The execution of administrative contracts is inherently complex due to their connection to public services and the pursuit of the public interest, often at the expense of public funds.

    “The execution of administrative contracts is inherently complex due to their connection to public services and the pursuit of the public interest, often at the expense of public funds.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Administrative contracts are inherently linked to public services and the pursuit of the public interest.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Penalties imposed via administrative decisions linked to the administrative contract must respect legality limits to prevent abuse; given the administration's discretionary power in imposing them, it must ensure proportionality.

    “Since these penalties are imposed via administrative decisions linked to the administrative contract, they must respect legality limits to prevent abuse; given the administration's discretionary power in imposing them, it must ensure proportionality.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The administration enjoys the power to terminate the administrative contract unilaterally before final completion, without contracting party fault, without judicial recourse, and even absent stipulation in the contract or general conditions, if public interest so requires.

    “The administration enjoys a significant privilege in the administrative contract: the power to terminate it unilaterally before final completion, without contracting party fault, without judicial recourse, and even absent stipulation in the contract or general conditions, if public interest so requires.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites ABD EL-Hamid, 2014

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The contract may not exclude the administration's power to terminate for public interest, nor may the administration waive it.

    “Consequently, the contract may not exclude this power, nor may the administration waive it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The contracting party's breach of contractual obligations justifies the administration imposing penalties, and even absent such breach, the administration may terminate the contract for public interest reasons linked to the public service.

    “Therefore, the contracting party's breach of contractual obligations justifies the administration imposing penalties, and even absent such breach, it may terminate the contract for public interest reasons linked to the public service.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Before imposing penalties, the administration must observe restrictions and conditions: existence of contracting party fault; adherence to prior notice where required by law as an essential procedure before penalizing the contracting party.

    “Accordingly, before imposing any of the foregoing penalties, the administration must observe several restrictions and conditions: existence of contracting party fault; adherence to prior notice where required by law as an essential procedure before penalizing the contracting party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites AlBalooshi, 2016

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

77 of 77
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Specialized studies focusing solely on the administration's fault-based contractual liability remain limited or rare.

    “While these works often address the topic within broader discussions of administrative contracts or public procurement, specialized studies focusing solely on this issue remain limited or rare.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The administration's purpose in entering administrative contracts is to achieve the public interest.

    “The administration's purpose in entering administrative contracts is to achieve the public interest, and this cannot be disputed”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The contracting party's primary goal through administrative contracts is to achieve profit.

    “However, at the same time, it is undeniable that the contracting party's primary goal through these contracts is to achieve profit”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Administrative contracts are time-based in nature.

    “Since administrative contracts are time-based in nature, obliging the contracting party to complete the assigned tasks within a specified timeframe”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The administration's exceptional powers are inherent to the administrative contract and exist without explicit stipulation.

    “They exist without need for explicit stipulation in the contract, due to the inherent nature of the administrative contract”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The administration's right to modify contracts is grounded in ensuring the regular and continuous operation of public services and the public good.

    “Moreover, the administration's right to modify contracts is grounded in ensuring the regular and continuous operation of public services and the public good”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Administrative contracts are inherently linked to public services and the pursuit of the public interest.

    “The execution of administrative contracts is inherently complex due to their connection to public services and the pursuit of the public interest, often at the expense of public funds.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The contracting party in an administrative contract is the weaker party.

    “the contracting party-who represents the weaker party, as its obligations are tied to the public service”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The administration's breach of its contractual obligations impairs the public service.

    “the breach of such obligations by the administration is deemed an impairment of the public service.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Public interest requires the regular and continuous operation of the public service.

    “to preserve the regular and continuous operation of the public service”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The regulatory texts referred to in Law 23-12 have not yet been issued.

    “since the regulatory texts referred to therein have not yet been issued”
11 of 11

Cites

None of the 13 references could be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Bahri, I. (2008-2009). Guarantees in the Field of Public Procurement,. Master's thesis. Algiers, Department of State law and Public Institutions, Faculty of Law, University of Ben Youcef Ben Khadda, Algeria.
  2. Delaunay, B. (2011). Administrative Fautt, translated by Salim Haddad (éd. 1st Edition). Beirut, Ebanon: the university institution for studies publishing &Distribution.
  3. Hashmi, F. (2018). The Effects of Public Procurement Contracts on Contracting Parties -A Comparative Study-. Doctoral Thesis, Specialization in Legal Sciences -Criminalization in Public Procurement Contracts. Sidi Belabbes, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Departement of Law, University-Belabbes, ALgeria.
  4. Jubeir, M. A. (2006). The Administrative Contract Between Legislation and Judiciary. Doctoral Thesis. Cairo, Faculty of Law, Ain Shams University, Egypt.
  5. Nabulsi, N. M. (2012). Administrative Contracts: Acomparative Study (éd. 2nd edition). Beirut, Lebanon: Zein Law Publications.

Authors
Zina, Z., & Benseghir, M.
Affiliations
University of Sharjah (AE)
Venue
Journal of Science and Knowledge Horizons
Published
2026-06-10
Volume
6
Issue
2
Pages
311-332
ISSN
  • 2800-1273 (ISSN-L)
  • 2830-8379
OpenAlex
W7165188600
Cited by
0
References
13
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
fr
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc
Locations
  • Science and Knowledge Horizons Journal (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Public Procurement and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Administrative Law and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Comparative International Legal Studies
Keywords
administrative contracts, fault-based liability, public procurement law, public services, compensation claims, contract annulment, contract termination, administrative power, public interest

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

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