The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements
Open accessAbstract
Repetition increases the likelihood that a statement will be judged as true. This illusory truth effect is well established; however, it has been argued that repetition will not affect belief in unambiguous statements. When individuals are faced with obviously true or false statements, repetition should have no impact. We report a simulation study and a preregistered experiment that investigate this idea. Contrary to many intuitions, our results suggest that belief in all statements is increased by repetition. The observed illusory truth effect is largest for ambiguous items, but this can be explained by the psychometric properties of the task, rather than an underlying psychological mechanism that blocks the impact of repetition for implausible items. Our results indicate that the illusory truth effect is highly robust and occurs across all levels of plausibility. Therefore, even highly implausible statements will become more plausible with enough repetition.
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Cites
Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news
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Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth.
Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000098 · Cited by 598
Self-citationThe truth about the truth: a meta-analytic review of the truth effect
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309352251 · Cited by 592
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Cited by
The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction
Ecker, U. K. H., Lewandowsky, S., Cook, J., Schmid, P., Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N., Kendeou, P., Vraga, E. K., & Amazeen, M. A. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-021-00006-y · Cited by 1,372
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“Remarkably, this is evident even if the headline is extremely implausible (also [51]) and inconsistent with one's political partisanship [49].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12476 · Cited by 879
Self-citationGuess, A. M., Lerner, M., Lyons, B., Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., & Sircar, N. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1920498117 · Cited by 773
Misinformation: susceptibility, spread, and interventions to immunize the public
van der Linden, S. (2022) · Nature Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41591-022-01713-6 · Cited by 570
Metadata
- Authors
- Fazio, L. K., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G.
- Venue
- Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Published
- 2019-08-16
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1705-1710
- ISSN
- 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5320
- OpenAlex
- W2967223230
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 50.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Funders
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
- Miami Foundation
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- Fazio, L. K., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-019-01651-4
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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