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Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements

Open access
Fazio, Lisa K., Rand, David G., Pennycook, Gordon · 2019 · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

Abstract

Repetition increases the likelihood that a statement will be judged as true. This illusory truth effect is well established; however, it has been argued that repetition will not affect belief in unambiguous statements. When individuals are faced with obviously true or false statements, repetition should have no impact. We report a simulation study and a preregistered experiment that investigate this idea. Contrary to many intuitions, our results suggest that belief in all statements is increased by repetition. The observed illusory truth effect is largest for ambiguous items, but this can be explained by the psychometric properties of the task, rather than an underlying psychological mechanism that blocks the impact of repetition for implausible items. Our results indicate that the illusory truth effect is highly robust and occurs across all levels of plausibility. Therefore, even highly implausible statements will become more plausible with enough repetition.

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1988). Artifactual and genuine relationships of lateral difference scores to overall accuracy in studies of laterality. Psychological Bulletin, 104(1), 127. · DOI
  2. Fazio, L. K. (2019). Preventing the illusory truth effect: When repetition does not increase perceived truth. Manuscript under review.
  3. Gulliksen, H. (1945). The relation of item difficulty and inter-item correlation to test variance and reliability. Psychometrika, 10(2), 79-91. · doi:10.1007/bf02288877
  4. Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth. Consciousness & Cognition, 8, 338–342. · DOI · Paper page
  5. Unkelbach, C. (2007). Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 33(1), 219–230.
  6. Unkelbach, C., & Greifeneder, R. (2018). Experiential fluency and declarative advice jointly inform judgments of truth. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 79, 78–86. · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Fazio, L. K., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G.
Venue
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Published
2019-08-16
Volume
26
Issue
5
Pages
1705-1710
ISSN
  • 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5320
OpenAlex
W2967223230
Cited by
205
References
4
FWCI
50.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze
Licence
Funders
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
  • Miami Foundation

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3758/s13423-019-01651-4
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Fazio, L. K., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-019-01651-4

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