The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game of Complete Information
Open accessAbstract
We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. We demonstrate that the model is identified under weak functional form assumptions using exclusion restrictions and an identification at infinity approach. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately sized samples. As an application, we study entry decisions by construction contractors to bid on highway projects in California. We find that an equilibrium is more likely to be observed if it maximizes joint profits, has a higher Nash product, uses mixed strategies, and is not Pareto dominated by another equilibrium.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem
Manski, C. F. (1993) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298123 · Cited by 6,209
Nash, J. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.007 · Cited by 5,595
Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., & Pakes, A. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171802 · Cited by 4,883
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
Discrete Choice with Social Interactions
Brock, W. A., & Durlauf, S. N. (2001) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00168 · Cited by 1,664
McFadden, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913621 · Cited by 1,637
Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators
Pakes, A., & Pollard, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913622 · Cited by 1,494
The Career Decisions of Young Men
Keane, M. P., & Wolpin, K. I. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262080 · Cited by 1,390
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.
Stinchcombe, A. L., Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1989) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2073314 · Cited by 1,264
Heckman, J. J. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,194
Identification in Parametric Models
Rothenberg, T. J. (1971) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913267 · Cited by 1,038
The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Bajari, P., Hortaçsu, A., & Hortacsu, A. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593721 · Cited by 1,024
Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
Berry, S. T. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951571 · Cited by 1,005
Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., & Levin, J. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.x · Cited by 836
Harvey, A. C., & Amemiya, T. (1987) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554459 · Cited by 799
An MCMC approach to classical estimation
Chernozhukov, V., & Hong, H. (2003) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(03)00100-3 · Cited by 758
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00123 · Cited by 710
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
Aguirregabiria, V., & Mira, P. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00731.x · Cited by 704
The Effect of Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints on Educational Attainment
Keane, M. P., & Wolpin, K. I. (2001) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.00146 · Cited by 677
What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry
(2008) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta6649 · Cited by 655
The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
Gale, D., & Nikaidô, H. (1965) · Mathematische Annalen · doi:10.1007/bf01360282 · Cited by 646
Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta5368 · Cited by 634
Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure
Mazzeo, M. J. (2002) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3087431 · Cited by 611
Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298085 · Cited by 524
Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples)
Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M., & Berry, S. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00073.x · Cited by 482
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
Maskin, E. S., & Riley, J. G. (2000) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00138 · Cited by 450
The Diffusion of Wal-Mart and Economies of Density
(2011) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7699 · Cited by 445
Chiappori, P.-A., Levitt, S., & Groseclose, T. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344678 · Cited by 414
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465303772815871 · Cited by 385
Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.224950 · Cited by 372
Empirical models of discrete games
Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1991) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(91)90032-9 · Cited by 371
Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
El-Gamal, M. A., & Grether, D. M. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1995.10476620 · Cited by 367
Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556080 · Cited by 356
Moment Inequalities and Their Application
Pakes, A., Porter, J., Ho, K., & Ishii, J. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta6865 · Cited by 323
Identification of Binary Response Models
Manski, C. F. (1988) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1988.10478655 · Cited by 316
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
Bajari, P., Hong, H., Krainer, J., & Nekipelov, D. (2010) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2009.07264 · Cited by 267
Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., & Levin, J. D. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.537443 · Cited by 244
Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
LI, T., & ZHENG, X. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00558.x · Cited by 242
CLASSICAL ESTIMATION METHODS FOR LDV MODELS USING SIMULATION
Hajivassiliou, V. A., & Ruud, P. A. (1993) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 238
A discrete‐choice model with social interactions: with an application to high school teen behavior
Soetevent, A. R., & Kooreman, P. (2007) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.924 · Cited by 176
Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games
McKelvey, R. D., & McLennan, A. (1996) · Handbook of computational economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0021(96)01004-0 · Cited by 161
LONG‐TERM CARE AND FAMILY BARGAINING*
Engers, M. P., & Stern, S. N. (2002) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00004 · Cited by 160
Moment inequalities and their application
Ho, K., Ishii, J., Pakes, A., & Porter, J. (2017) · doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2007.1607 · Cited by 155
Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry
Ackerberg, D. A., & Gowrisankaran, G. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00040.x · Cited by 146
Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games
Pesendorfer, M., & Schmidt‐Dengler, P. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9726 · Cited by 143
Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
Lebrun, B. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213659 · Cited by 133
Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions
Hiedemann, B. G., & Stern, S. N. (1999) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00041-4 · Cited by 114
Identification and estimation.
Bush, R. R., & Mosteller, F. C. (2014) · John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eBooks · doi:10.1037/14496-009 · Cited by 103
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber AuctionsPreprint
Levin, J., Athey, S. C., & Seira, E. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.624443 · Cited by 98
A new use of importance sampling to reduce computational burden in simulation estimation
Ackerberg, D. A. (2009) · Quantitative Marketing and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11129-009-9074-z · Cited by 95
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12051 · Cited by 83
Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interaction
Bajari, P., HONG, H. P., Krainer, J. R., & Denis Nekipelov, C. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12013 · Cited by 82
Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
El-Gamal, M. A., & Grether, D. M. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291506 · Cited by 64
The Diffusion of Wal-Mart and Economies of Density
Holmes, T. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13783 · Cited by 62
Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
McLennan, A., & Berg, J. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.008 · Cited by 55
A New Use of Importance Sampling to Reduce Computational Burden in Simulation Estimation
Ackerberg, D. A. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0273 · Cited by 51
Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the Ach Banking IndustryPreprint
Ackerberg, D. A., & Gowrisankaran, G. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.618044 · Cited by 47
Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry
Ackerberg, D. A., & Gowrisankaran, G. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12488 · Cited by 46
Cited by
The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry
(2012) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta6750 · Cited by 668
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Modeling Lane-Changing Behavior in a Connected Environment: A Game Theory Approach
Talebpour, A., Mahmassani, H. S., & Hamdar, S. H. (2015) · Transportation Research Procedia · doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2015.06.022 · Cited by 283
Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
Bajari, P., Hong, H., Krainer, J., & Nekipelov, D. (2010) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2009.07264 · Cited by 267
Microeconometrics with partial identification
(2020) · Handbook of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/bs.hoe.2020.05.002 · Cited by 99
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1529-1568
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118944179
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 32.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.