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Cited by 278

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Effective affirmative action in school choice

Open access
Hafalir, Isa E., Yenmez, M. Bumin, Yildirim, Muhammed A.·2013·Theoretical Economics
DOI 10.3982/te1135
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Abstract

The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools. There have been numerous efforts to reconcile affirmative action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms. Nevertheless, it is theoretically shown that under these algorithms, the policy based on majority quotas may be detrimental to minorities. Using simulations, we find that this is a more common phenomenon rather than a peculiarity. To circumvent the inefficiency caused by majority quotas, we offer a different interpretation of the affirmative action policies based on minority reserves. With minority reserves, schools give higher priority to minority students up to the point that the minorities fill the reserves. We compare the welfare effects of these policies. The deferred acceptance algorithm with minority reserves Pareto dominates the one with majority quotas. Our simulations, which allow for correlations between student preferences and school priorities, indicate that minorities are, on average, better off with minority reserves while adverse effects on majorities are mitigated.

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Metadata

Authors
Hafalir, I. E., Yenmez, M. B., & Yildirim, M. A.
Venue
Theoretical Economics
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Published
2013-05
Volume
8
Issue
2
Pages
325-363
ISSN
  • 1555-7561 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-6837
DOI
10.3982/te1135
OpenAlex
W1946154213
Cited by
278
References
45
FWCI
26.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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