Beliefs about Thinking
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Attempts to improve thinking and reasoning assume that people do not think as well as they might. The actual conduct of thinking does not measure up to an ideal standard. For example, I and others have argued that people are often biased toward views they already hold. They often fail to consider alternative views, counterevidence, or goals that their favorite plans will subvert. In making this argument, I hold up (and defend) a standard of active open-mindedness as an ideal.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Duncker, K. (1945) · Psychological Monographs · doi:10.1037/h0093599 · Cited by 2,938
Cited by
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Individual differences in rational thought.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037//0096-3445.127.2.161 · Cited by 867
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1997) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-0663.89.2.342 · Cited by 729
Means, M. L., & Voss, J. F. (1996) · Cognition and Instruction · doi:10.1207/s1532690xci1402_1 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Venue
- Informal Reasoning and Education
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2012-11-12
- Pages
- 187-204
- OpenAlex
- W2989298819
- Cited by
- 91
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 33.25
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Beliefs about Thinking. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9780203052228-14
- The paper
- Beliefs about Thinking. (2012). Informal Reasoning and Education. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203052228-14
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.