Individual differences in rational thought.

Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West·1998·Journal of Experimental Psychology General

Abstract

Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict

Cites (236)

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making
  2. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
    Cohen, Patricia, Cohen, Patricia, West, Stephen G., Aiken, Leona S. · 2014 · Psychology Press eBooks
  3. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
    Shafer, Glenn R., Kahnerman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul, Tversky, Amos · 1984 · Journal of the American Statistical Association
  4. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory
    Lyle E. Bourne · 1977
  5. Untitled work
    1987 · Medical Entomology and Zoology
  6. Unified theories of cognition
    1991 · Choice Reviews Online
  7. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
    Cherniak, Christopher, Nisbett, Richard, Ross, Lee · 1983 · The Philosophical Review
  8. Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years; A Scheme
    William G. Perry · 1970
  9. Measurement and Control of Response Bias
    Paulhus, Delroy L. · 1991 · Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes
  10. Human cognitive abilities a survey of factor-analytic studies
    John B. Carroll · 2004

Show all 236 references

Cited by (61)

  1. Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
    Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Stanovich, Keith E. · 2013 · Perspectives on Psychological Science
  2. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
    Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  3. The trouble with overconfidence.
    Moore, Don A., Healy, Paul J. · 2008 · Psychological Review
  4. The Affect Heuristic
    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  5. Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
    Mercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

See all 867

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Individual differences in rational thought. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0096-3445.127.2.161
The paper
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology General. https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-3445.127.2.161

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.