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The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics
Abstract
Introduction To many, the transformation of West European party systems since the 1970s and 1980s was seen as evidence that the era of cleavage-based politics was over. The rise of identity politics was interpreted not only as a result of the waning of the traditional class and religious cleavages, but as evidence for a new era in which political preferences de-coupled from social structure began to shape voting behavior. It was assumed that voters were “beginning to choose” parties for their policy propositions, the quality of their personnel, or based on their value preferences. The more recent successes of the extreme populist right once again were taken to indicate that anti-establishment populist mobilization was cutting across class alignments. From this point of view, the by now well established finding that the working class is over-represented in the extreme populist right’s electorate came unexpectedly. While a host of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the propensity of parts of the working class to support the extreme right, the phenomenon still awaits a theoretical explanation and a systematic empirical test of the rival theses. In this chapter, we review the explanations that have been put forward and test whether economic grievances or cultural world-views are better in explaining the phenomenon. Both are related to the processes of modernization and globalization, which have a cultural as well as an economic component. We argue that the changing nature of conflicts in West European party systems is crucial in explaining the shift of the manual working class to the extreme right. In particular, the dual transformation of political space has resulted in a new cultural divide that plays a pivotal role in explaining the extreme populist right’s appeal for the working class. Preferences along this divide are structured by education and by the experiences individuals undergo at their workplace, either making them more open to cultural liberalism, or leading them to endorse an anti-universalistic counter-model of community that is based on the exclusion of immigrants. In conceptual terms, we make an innovative contribution by focusing both on the individual-level characteristics accounting for participation in elections as well as on those explaining the choice of extreme right-wing populist parties.
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Cited by
Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279 · Cited by 1,438
The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right
Gidron, N., & Hall, P. A. (2017) · The British Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12319 · Cited by 890
Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages
Lockwood, M. (2018) · Environmental Politics · doi:10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411 · Cited by 666
The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right
Kurer, T. (2020) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414020912283 · Cited by 317
The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support
Engler, S., & Weisstanner, D. (2021) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Venue
- Class Politics and the Radical Right
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2012-12-20
- Pages
- 28-48
- OpenAlex
- W2892426017
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.92
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics. (2012). Class Politics and the Radical Right. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203079546-7
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