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Philosophical Theories of Probability
Abstract
The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. Philosophical Theories of Probability is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
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Citations
Cited by
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Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199269750.001.0001 · Cited by 635
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Douven, I. (2006) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010 · Cited by 357
Cho, J.-H., Chan, K., & Adali, S. (2015) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2815595 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Gillies, D.
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2012-09-10
- OpenAlex
- W1581247215
- Cited by
- 596
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 62.90
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gillies, D. (2012). Philosophical Theories of Probability. Routledge eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203132241
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.