The Epigenesis of Mind
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Abstract
Reflecting the focus of a Jean Piaget Symposium entitled Biology and Knowledge: Structural Constraints on Development, this volume presents many of the emergent themes discussed. Among these themes are: Structural constraints on cognitive development and learning come in many shapes and forms and involve appeal to more than one level of analysis. To postulate innate knowledge is not to deny that humans can acquire new concepts. It is unlikely that there is only one learning mechanism, even if one prefers to work with general as opposed to domain-specific mechanisms. The problems of induction with respect to concept acquisition are even harder than originally thought.
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Cited by
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
“For instance, rats choose the food that they recognize having eaten before (or having smelled on the breath of fellow rats) and avoid novel foods (Gallistel, Brown, Carey, Gelman, & Keil, 1991).”
BackgroundCosmides, L. (1996) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8 · Cited by 1,293
How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives.
Mandler, J. M. (1992) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.99.4.587 · Cited by 1,265
Cognitive Development: Foundational Theories of Core Domains
Wellman, H. M., & Gelman, S. A. (1992) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.43.020192.002005 · Cited by 931
Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitude for Mathematics and Science?: A Critical Review.
Spelke, E. S. (2005) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.9.950 · Cited by 751
Metadata
- Venue
- Psychology Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Psychology Press
- Published
- 2014-01-14
- OpenAlex
- W2034955950
- Cited by
- 120
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.79
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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