New Directions in Human Associative Learning
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Abstract
The editor and authors of this book present a synthesis of work on human associative learning, tracing some of its historical roots but concentrating mainly on recent developments. It is divided into three sections: an introduction to the recent data and controversies in the study of human associative learning; recent developments in the formal theories of how associative learning occurs; and applied work on human associative learning, particularly its application to depression and to the development of preferences. The book is designed to be accessible to undergraduates, providing a clear illustration of how principles most commonly introduced in animal cognition courses are relevant to the contemporary study of human cognition.
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Venue
- Psychology Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Psychology Press
- Published
- 2005-01-15
- OpenAlex
- W4300580573
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 1.72
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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