The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Ventures
Abstract
Agency theory suggests that the interests of opportunistic, self-interested agents conflict with those of principals. Stewardship theory suggests instead that executives' interests are aligned with company interests and that executives are thus more intrinsically motivated than agency theory implies. This study develops hypotheses regarding the psychological and situational factors that affect the applicability of each theory to executive compensation. I tested hypotheses using a unique data set of 1,238 executives from 528 private companies. Results suggest significant differences between founder-stewards and nonfounder agents that diminish with company growth, and significant effects of equity ownership and outside rounds of financing.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms
Gómez‐Mejía, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & Castro, J. O. D. (2011) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2011.593320 · Cited by 2,230
Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives
Panda, B., & Leepsa, N. M. (2017) · Indian Journal of Corporate Governance · doi:10.1177/0974686217701467 · Cited by 732
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D., & Lester, R. H. (2011) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1100.0541 · Cited by 467
Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Kellermanns, F. W., & Chang, E. P. C. (2007) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.011 · Cited by 455
CEO servant leadership: Exploring executive characteristics and firm performance
Peterson, S. J., Galvin, B. M., & Lange, D. (2012) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2012.01253.x · Cited by 428
Metadata
- Authors
- Wasserman, N.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 960-976
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2126388201
- Cited by
- 404
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 45.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.