The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring
Abstract
We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are generally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant managers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based governance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Barney, J. (1991) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639101700108 · Cited by 48,334
Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business Strategy
Barney, J. B. (1986) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.32.10.1231 · Cited by 5,548
How dynamics, management, and governance of resource deployments influence firm‐level performance
Kor, Y. Y., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.459 · Cited by 497
Cited by
Methodological Urban Legends: The Misuse of Statistical Control Variables
Spector, P. E., & Brannick, M. T. (2011) · Organizational Research Methods · doi:10.1177/1094428110369842 · Cited by 1,146
Rethinking Sustained Competitive Advantage from Human Capital
Campbell, B. A., Coff, R., & Kryscynski, D. (2012) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2010.0276 · Cited by 763
CEO Duality: A Review and Research Agenda
Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. A. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313503013 · Cited by 563
Corporate social responsibility as an employee governance tool: Evidence from a quasi‐experiment
Flammer, C., & Luo, J. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2492 · Cited by 547
Jia, N., Huang, K. G., & Man Zhang, C. (2019) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0543 · Cited by 532
Metadata
- Authors
- He, J., & Wang, H. C.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2009-10
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 919-938
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974662353
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 21.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amj.2009.44633414
- The paper
- He, J., & Wang, H. C. (2009). Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.44633414
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.