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Cited by 166

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring

He, Jinyu, Wang, Heli C. · 2009 · Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are generally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant managers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based governance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.

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Metadata

Authors
He, J., & Wang, H. C.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
2009-10
Volume
52
Issue
5
Pages
919-938
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W1974662353
Cited by
166
References
3
FWCI
21.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amj.2009.44633414
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He, J., & Wang, H. C. (2009). Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.44633414

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.