RETHINKING AGENCY THEORY: THE VIEW FROM LAW.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We draw from legal theory to offer a fundamental rethinking of agency theory along three key dimensions: redefining the principal from shareholders to the corporation, redefining the status of the board from shareholders' agents to autonomous fiduciaries, and redefining the role of the board from monitors to mediating hierarchs. These dimensions contrast with classic agency theory, offering novel conceptions that can inform further theorization and empirical research in corporate governance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
(2010) · Cited by 24,023
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255 · cited 1×
“He later elaborated that this cost includes identifying parties, negotiating with them, drawing up contracts, and monitoring the fulfillment of the terms of contracts (Coase, 1960: 15).”
BackgroundAgency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Dilemmas in a general theory of planning
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973) · Policy Sciences · doi:10.1007/bf01405730 · Cited by 16,338 · cited 1×
“…ongoing problems interlinked with other problems, in which competing objectives are involved and there are no clear or optimal solutions; Rittel & Webber, 1973) where debate and judgment are needed to balance competing interests, we believe that it would be premature to offer a…”
BackgroundA Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 2×
“…& Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), has become a cornerstone of the corporate governance field, not only in terms of its impact on the literature but also in terms of policy and practice (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).”
BackgroundA BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338 · cited 5×
“In this context boards of directors—in theory, appointed by shareholders—are seen as an important monitoring mechanism of management on behalf of shareholders (Coffee, 1999; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; Eisenberg, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989),(1) although they are not always successful (Mizruchi, 1983, 1988).”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Corporate governance and environmental performance: is there really a link?
Walls, J. L., Berrone, P., & Phan, P. H. (2012) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.1952 · Cited by 1,160
State-owned Enterprises Around the WORLD as Hybrid Organizations
Bruton, G. D., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Stan, C., & Xu, K. (2015) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2013.0069 · Cited by 783
Looking Inside the Black Box: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility
Jain, T., & Jamali, D. (2016) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12154 · Cited by 530
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313515519 · Cited by 414
The Challenges of Building Theory by Combining Lenses
Okhuysen, G., & Bonardi, J.-P. (2011) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.36.1.zok006 · Cited by 285
Beyond institutional voids: Business groups, incomplete markets, and organizational form
Manikandan, K. S., & Ramachandran, J. (2015) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2226 · Cited by 238
Exceptional boards: Environmental experience and positive deviance from institutional norms
Walls, J. L., & Hoffman, A. J. (2013) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.1813 · Cited by 221
Beyond primacy: a stakeholder theory of corporate governance
Stoelhorst, J. W., & Vishwanathan, P. (2024) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2020.0268 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- LAN, L. L., & HERACLEOUS, L.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Review
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2010-04-01
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 294-314
- ISSN
- 0363-7425 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2067430228
- Cited by
- 330
- References
- 75
- FWCI
- 42.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.