The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance and Involuntary Delisting: Empirical Evidence from China
Open accessAbstract
This study aims to investigate the change in corporate governance structure of a firm in China as it approaches involuntary delisting. To this end, we try to identify corporate governance characteristics that have the most significant impact on probability of involuntary delisting at three years prior to the event, two years prior to the event, and one year prior to the event. The corporate governance characteristics examined in this study are board characteristics (board activity, board size, board independence, and presence of audit committee) and ownership characteristics (shareholder activism, ownership concentration, and insider ownership). We use logistic regression analysis on a match pair sample of surviving and delisting firms and evaluate how the governance characteristics vary over time for the two sets of firms. Our results confirm a widening gap between governance structures of delisting and surviving firms as the former approach delisting event.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Although not inherently a delisting mechanism, its implementation often results in delisting (Malik et al. 2014).”
From Schemes of arrangement and corporate exit: A South African perspective (2026) · cites this paper as Malik et al. 2014
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,914
FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Altman, E. I. (1968) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x · Cited by 14,888
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Jensen, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 9,834
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 7,585
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
MTW, & Long, J. S. (1997) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2965458 · Cited by 6,891
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,659
Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy
Ohlson, J. A. (1980) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490395 · Cited by 6,250
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables
Calvin, J. A., & Long, J. S. (1998) · Technometrics · doi:10.2307/1271407 · Cited by 5,290
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Cox, D. R., & Snell, E. J. (1989). The analysis of binary data (2nd ed.). London: Chapman and Hall.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Aslam, A. L. M., & Sivarajasingham, S. (2020) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/ijse-03-2020-0157 · Cited by 15
Corporate voluntary disclosures and board independence of Indian companies
Sahore, N. S., & Verma, A. (2019) · Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review · doi:10.22495/cgsrv3i1p4 · Cited by 8
Lansdell, P., Botha, I., & Marx, B. (2025) · Journal of Risk and Financial Management · doi:10.3390/jrfm18040194 · Cited by 4
The influence of selected non-financial and macroeconomic determinants on delistings in South Africa
Lansdell, P., Botha, I., & Marx, B. (2025) · Investment Analysts Journal · doi:10.1080/10293523.2025.2557739 · Cited by 1
Hidayat, W. C., Manalu, S., & Octavianus, R. J. N. (2017) · EKUITAS (Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan) · doi:10.24034/j25485024.y2015.v19.i4.79 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Malik, M. N., Xinping, X., & Shabbir, R.
- Affiliations
- Huazhong University of Science and Technology (CN)
- Venue
- International Journal of Economics and Finance
- Published
- 2014-05-27
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 6
- ISSN
- 1916-971X (ISSN-L)
- 1916-9728
- OpenAlex
- W2122050599
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 1.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- International Journal of Economics and Finance (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Law › Corporate Insolvency and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, board characteristics, board independence, board size, board activity, audit committee, ownership concentration, shareholder activism, managerial ownership, Chinese listed companies, delisting risk
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
