Terminal brain damage: exposing the graceless degradation in deep neural networks under hardware fault attacks
Open accessThe DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to tolerate brain damage: cumulative changes to the network's parameters (e.g., pruning, numerical perturbations) typically result in a graceful degradation of classification accuracy. However, the limits of this natural resilience are not well understood in the presence of small adversarial changes to the DNN parameters' underlying memory representation, such as bit-flips that may be induced by hardware fault attacks. We study the effects of bitwise corruptions on 19 DNN models--six architectures on three image classification tasks--and we show that most models have at least one parameter that, after a specific bit-flip in their bitwise representation, causes an accuracy loss of over 90%. For large models, we employ simple heuristics to identify the parameters likely to be vulnerable and estimate that 40-50% of the parameters in a model might lead to an accuracy drop greater than 10% when individually subjected to such single-bit perturbations. To demonstrate how an adversary could take advantage of this vulnerability, we study the impact of an exemplary hardware fault attack, Rowhammer, on DNNs. Specifically, we show that a Rowhammer-enabled attacker co-located in the same physical machine can inflict significant accuracy drops (up to 99%) even with single bitflip corruptions and no knowledge of the model. Our results expose the limits of DNNs' resilience against parameter perturbations induced by real-world fault attacks. We conclude by discussing possible mitigations and future research directions towards fault attack-resilient DNNs.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., & Sun, J. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2016.90 · Cited by 235,474
ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks
Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., & Hinton, G. E. (2017) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3065386 · Cited by 112,155
Gradient-based learning applied to document recognition
Lecun, Y., Bottou, L., Bengio, Y., & Haffner, P. (1998) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/5.726791 · Cited by 58,805
Han, S., Mao, H., & Dally, W. J. (2015) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1510.00149 · Cited by 4,662
XNOR-Net: ImageNet Classification Using Binary Convolutional Neural Networks
Rastegari, M., Ordonez, V., Redmon, J., & Farhadi, A. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46493-0_32 · Cited by 4,408
Automated Flower Classification over a Large Number of Classes
Nilsback, M.-E., & Zisserman, A. (2008) · 2008 Sixth Indian Conference on Computer Vision, Graphics & Image Processing · doi:10.1109/icvgip.2008.47 · Cited by 3,442
Pruning Filters for Efficient ConvNets
Li, H., Kadav, A., Durdanovic, I., Samet, H., & Graf, H. P. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1608.08710 · Cited by 2,928
Empirical Evaluation of Rectified Activations in Convolutional Network
Xu, B., Wang, N., Chen, T., & Li, M. (2015) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1505.00853 · Cited by 2,264
Poisoning Attacks against Support Vector Machines
Biggio, B., Nelson, B., & Laskov, P. (2012) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1206.6389 · Cited by 1,331
Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
Liu, K., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Garg, S. (2018) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-00470-5_13 · Cited by 1,055
Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs
Tramèr, F., Zhang, F., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1609.02943 · Cited by 796
Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks
Steinhardt, J., Koh, P. W., & Liang, P. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.03691 · Cited by 479
Cited by
Advances in Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Computer Vision: A Survey
Akhtar, N., Mian, A., Kardan, N., & Shah, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3127960 · Cited by 302
A survey on modeling and improving reliability of DNN algorithms and accelerators
Mittal, S. (2020) · Journal of Systems Architecture · doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2019.101689 · Cited by 175
Sponge Examples: Energy-Latency Attacks on Neural Networks
Shumailov, I., Zhao, Y., Bates, D., Papernot, N., Mullins, R., & Anderson, R. (2021) · 2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp51992.2021.00024 · Cited by 125
Bad Characters: Imperceptible NLP Attacks
Boucher, N., Shumailov, I., Anderson, R., & Papernot, N. (2022) · 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833641 · Cited by 102
Trustworthy AI Inference Systems: An Industry Research View
Cammarota, R., Schunter, M., Rajan, A., Boemer, F., Kiss, Á., Treiber, A., Weinert, C., Schneider, T., Stapf, E., Sadeghi, A.-R., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2008.04449 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Hong, S., Frigo, P., Kaya, Y., Giuffrida, C., & Dumitraş, T.
- Venue
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Publisher
- Cornell University
- Published
- 2019-08-14
- Pages
- 497-514
- ISSN
- 2331-8422 (ISSN-L)
- DOI
- 10.5555/3361338.3361373
- OpenAlex
- W2964923388
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 12
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.