Causes That Make a Difference
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Biologists studying complex causal systems typically identify some factors as causes and treat other factors as background conditions. For example, when geneticists explain biological phenomena, they often foreground genes and relegate the cellular milieu to the background. But factors in the milieu are as causally necessary as genes for the production of phenotypic traits, even traits at the molecular level such as amino acid sequences. Gene-centered biology has been criticized on the grounds that because there is parity among causes, the “privileging” of genes reflects a reductionist bias, not an ontological difference. The idea that there is an ontological parity among causes is related to a philosophical puzzle identified by John Stuart Mill: what, other than our interests or biases, could possibly justify identifying some causes as the actual or operative ones, and other causes as mere background? The aim of this paper is to solve this conceptual puzzle and to explain why there is not an ontological parity among genes and the other factors. It turns out that solving this puzzle helps answer a seemingly unrelated philosophical question: what kind of causal generality matters in biology?
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation
Woodward, J. (2010) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9200-z · Cited by 474
Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared
Ylikoski, P. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9513-9 · Cited by 186
“The idea of the explanans as the difference-maker (Mackie 1973, Woodward 2003, Waters 2007, Strevens 2008) is a natural partner of the idea of contrastive explanandum .”
BackgroundThe philosophical basis of algorithmic recourse
Venkatasubramanian, S., & Alfano, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3351095.3372876 · Cited by 114
Griffiths, P. E., & Hochman, A. (2015) · Encyclopedia of Life Sciences · doi:10.1002/9780470015902.a0003452.pub2 · Cited by 106
Griffiths, P. E., & Tabery, J. (2013) · Advances in Child Development and Behavior · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-397947-6.00003-9 · Cited by 101
External representations and scientific understanding
Kuorikoski, J., & Ylikoski, P. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0591-2 · Cited by 71
Towards a Truly Developmental Epigenetics
Lickliter, R., & Witherington, D. C. (2017) · Human Development · doi:10.1159/000477996 · Cited by 63
Convergent evolution and the limits of natural selection
Powell, R. (2012) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0047-9 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Waters, C. K., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 551-579
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121761140
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 37.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.