Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 237

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Collective Intentions And Team Agency

Open access
Gold, Natalie, Sugden, Robert, Journal of Philosophy, Inc. · 2007 · Journal of Philosophy

Abstract

ollective intentions are those intentions associated with joint actions.The paradigm cases include two people singing a V^>* duet, painting a house, pushing a car, and taking a walk together.In these situations, there is a sense in which "we" intend the joint action, as well as a sense in which "I" intend my part in it.For instance, if we go to Edinburgh together and, as a part of this, I check the train timetable and you buy the tickets, then there is a sense in which our actions result from "our" intention to go to Edinburgh.This collective intention is not reducible to the summation of our individual intentions and, as such, is unlike the case where two agents happen to do the same thing independently.For instance, if I plan to go to Edinburgh and coincidentally meet you on the train, there is a use of the word 4we' in which it may be that "we went to Edinburgh"because "I went to Edinburgh" and "you went to Edinburgh," but this is not a joint action and the intentions behind it are not collective intentions.Analyses of collective intentions seek to elucidate the features that are peculiar to the joint action case and to explain how collective intentions are connected to individual intentions.The literature on collective intentions is exemplified by the work of

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5840/jphil2007104328

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 237

Metadata

Authors
Gold, N., Sugden, R., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
Venue
Journal of Philosophy
Published
2007
Volume
104
Issue
3
Pages
109-137
ISSN
0022-362X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W137156461
Cited by
237
References
0
FWCI
29.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective Intentions And Team Agency. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5840/jphil2007104328
The paper
Gold, N., Sugden, R., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2007). Collective Intentions And Team Agency. Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2007104328

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.