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Cited by 68Philosophical Ethics and TheoryFree Will and AgencyEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

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Framing Joint Action

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Pacherie, Elisabeth·2011·Review of Philosophy and Psychology
DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5
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Research works printed but not linked: 42

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Metadata

Authors
Pacherie, E.
Venue
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2011-05-01
Volume
2
Issue
2
Pages
173-192
ISSN
  • 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
  • 1878-5166
DOI
10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5
OpenAlex
W1999539841
Cited by
68
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
FWCI
47.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
joint action, shared intentionality, shared agency, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, team reasoning, group identification

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Framing Joint Action. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5
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Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5