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The Possibility of Physicalism
Abstract
It has been suggested that many philosophical theses—physicalism, normative naturalism, phenomenalism, and so on—should be understood in terms of ground. Against this, Ted Sider (2011) has argued that ground is ill-suited for this purpose. Here I develop Sider’s objection and offer a response. In doing so I develop a view about the role of ground in philosophy, and about the content of these distinctively philosophical theses.
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Citations
Cited by
Dasgupta, S. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12082 · Cited by 265
Self-citationLaws for Metaphysical Explanation
Schaffer, J. (2017) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12111 · Cited by 133
Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding
Audi, P. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12605 · Cited by 47
Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency
Pearce, K. L. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0011 · Cited by 28
What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?
Kovacs, D. M. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9934-y · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Dasgupta, S., & Journal of Philosophy Inc.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 557-592
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1130813267
- Cited by
- 473
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 23.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dasgupta, S., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2014). The Possibility of Physicalism. Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20141119/1037
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