The DOI matches its Crossref record.
How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Earlier formulations of the safety requirement tended to focus only on the first way in which a subject could fail to be correct (see, e.g., see Sosa 1 3 1999a, Sosa 1999b, and Williamson 2000, 128).However, such formulations are now commonly taken to be too weak, as there are certain cases of coincidentally true beliefs that they fail to capture.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
In the citing paper
“The Safety Requirement S knows that p only if there are no nearby worlds in which (i) she does not have a correct belief as to whether p and (ii) she uses the same method of beliefformation as the one we actually used to determine whether p is true.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
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Sorted by citations
Aarnio, M. L. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00183.x · Cited by 444
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Greco, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006 · Cited by 366
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.001.0001 · Cited by 205
The Place of Truth in Epistemology
Sosa, E. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0008 · Cited by 196
Self-citationUnderstanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding
Riggs, W. D. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0010 · Cited by 189
Metadata
- Authors
- Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press
- Corresponding author
- Sosa, Ernest
- ORCID
- Sosa, Ernest
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 373-384
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032232876
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemic modality, truth and knowledge, epistemic logic
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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