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How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
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“Earlier formulations of the safety requirement tended to focus only on the first way in which a subject could fail to be correct (see, e.g., see Sosa 1 3 1999a, Sosa 1999b, and Williamson 2000, 128).However, such formulations are now commonly taken to be too weak, as there are certain cases of coincidentally true beliefs that they fail to capture.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
In the citing paper
“The Safety Requirement S knows that p only if there are no nearby worlds in which (i) she does not have a correct belief as to whether p and (ii) she uses the same method of beliefformation as the one we actually used to determine whether p is true.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press
- Corresponding author
- Sosa, Ernest
- ORCID
- Sosa, Ernest
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 373-384
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032232876
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemic modality, truth and knowledge, epistemic logic
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