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Epistemic Domination
Open accessAbstract
This paper identifies and elucidates the underappreciated phenomenon of epistemic domination. Epistemic domination is the nonmutual capacity of one party to control the evidence available to another. Where this capacity is exercised, especially by parties that are ill-intentioned or ill-informed, the dominated party may have difficulty attaining epistemically valuable states. I begin with a discussion of epistemic domination and how it is possible. I then highlight three negative consequences that may result from epistemic domination.
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“I would concede to Bagwala that the conception of exclusion as broader than testimonial and hermeneutical injustice (the Frickerian heritage Bagwala engages with) is acceptable, but following Harris [18] I think epistemic injustice is a broader term, encompassing both distributive and discriminatory kinds.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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Research works printed but not linked: 25
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Cited by
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Mollema, W. J. T. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-025-00801-w · Cited by 24
“But others, for example Harris [18], and later Fricker 1 Were we not to use this rule, a subclass of testimonial injustice for instance, could also inherit properties from ‘sibling concepts’ like hermeneutical injustice.”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, K. R., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Affiliations
- Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Harris, Keith Raymond
- Venue
- Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 134-141
- ISSN
- 2161-2234 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4365934598
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1
- FWCI
- 8.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Thought A Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic hegemony, epistemic value, epistemic injustice, epistemic agency
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