The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Extended deterrence and the prevention of war
Abstract
A government seeking to prevent an attack on an ally may threaten the use of force to protect the ally. This is called or third-party deterrence. This book defines the political and military conditions under which a policy of extended deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration
Fukuyama, F., Axelrod, R., & Jervis, R. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048800 · Cited by 2,189
The Evolution of International Security Studies
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817762 · Cited by 1,238
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs
Fearon, J. D. (1997) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002797041001004 · Cited by 1,141
The Renaissance of Security Studies
Walt, S. M. (1991) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600471 · Cited by 1,074
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns
Jones, D. M., Bremer, S. A., & Singer, J. D. (1996) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/073889429601500203 · Cited by 1,015
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Axelrod, R., & Dion, D. (1988) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.242.4884.1385 · Cited by 840
Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science
Fearon, J. D. (1991) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010470 · Cited by 729
War and Peace in International Rivalry
Diehl, P., & Goertz, G. (2000) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.16693 · Cited by 504
International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War
Gaddis, J. L. (1992) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539129 · Cited by 424
Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations
Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2013) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066113494320 · Cited by 412
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002794038002004 · Cited by 403
Leeds, B. A. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00031 · Cited by 392
Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others
Walter, B. F. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00186.x · Cited by 376
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
Morrow, J. D. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111116 · Cited by 358
Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory
Schroeder, P. (1994) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539150 · Cited by 335
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles
CEDERMAN, L.-E. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000571 · Cited by 300
From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy
Layne, C. (1997) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.22.1.86 · Cited by 289
Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield
Bennett, A., & Elman, C. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414006296346 · Cited by 286
Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises
Morgan, T. C., & Schwebach, V. L. (1997) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00032 · Cited by 277
The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda
Lupovici, A. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x · Cited by 126
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1989-04-01
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 08
- Pages
- 26-4714-26-4714
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2020502825
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.