The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
Axelrod's model of the evolution of cooperation was based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Empirical work following this approach has helped establish the prevalence of cooperation based on reciprocity. Theoretical work has led to a deeper understanding of the role of other factors in the evolution of cooperation: the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure.
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Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Cited by
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations.
Fiske, A. P. (1992) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.99.4.689 · Cited by 2,510
Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00032325 · Cited by 2,365
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Metadata
- Authors
- Axelrod, R., & Dion, D.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1988-12-09
- Volume
- 242
- Issue
- 4884
- Pages
- 1385-1390
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2121885874
- Cited by
- 840
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 43.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
