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Meaning and mental representation
Abstract
In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is, in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the different contexts of commonsense or folk psychology, orthodox computation, connectionism, or neuroscience. Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context. A Bradford Book.
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Citations
Cited by
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Fodor, J. A. (1998) · doi:10.1093/0198236360.001.0001 · Cited by 1,274
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
The Dynamics of Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent
Beer, R. D. (2003) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712303114001 · Cited by 508
Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science
Searle, J. R. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00029587 · Cited by 490
The psychology of folk psychology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028648 · Cited by 469
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1989-10-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 02
- Pages
- 27-0891-27-0891
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2038362250
- Cited by
- 540
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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