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An introduction to the philosophy of induction and probability
Abstract
Part 1 The origins of the problem: an outline of the issues the Baconian tradition in the philosophy of induction the rise of Pascalian probability the combination of Baconian and Pascalian themes. Part 2 The controversy about the nature of Pascalian probability: some general considerations indifference theories frequency theories propensity theories personalist theories multi-valued logic theories logical relation theories. Part 3 The foundations of pluralism in the analysis of probability: some logical distinctions exploited by differing analyses of Pascalian probability the appropriateness of different conceptions of Pascalian probability to different purposes the need to supplement Pascalian judgements by non-Pascalian ones how are different conceptions of probability possible? Part 4 The Pascalian gradation of ampliative induction: inductive probability under a realist construal inductive probability under a range-theoretical construal Pascalian gradation for variative induction inductive probability under a personalist construal. Part 5 The Baconian gradation of ampliative induction: inductive support by the method of relevant variables the logical syntax of the method of relevant variables some non-standard interpretations of Baconian logical syntax. Part 6 Four paradoxes about induction: the classical problem of induction the paradox of the ravens the grue paradox the lottery paradox.
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Citations
Cited by
Cosmides, L. (1996) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8 · Cited by 1,293
BIASES IN THE INTERPRETATION AND USE OF RESEARCH RESULTS
MacCoun, R. J. (1998) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.259 · Cited by 417
Howson, C. (1995) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/46.1.1 · Cited by 287
Generalization Bias in Science
Peters, U., Krauss, A., & Braganza, O. (2022) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13188 · Cited by 63
“13 The question of whether generalizations derive more support from the variety of instances that are cited as evidence for them or from the multiplicity of those instances is a matter of philosophical debate (see, e.g., Cohen, 1988).”
BackgroundBayesian Data Analysis in Empirical Software Engineering Research
Furia, C. A., Feldt, R., & Torkar, R. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2019.2935974 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1989-11-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 03
- Pages
- 27-1479-27-1479
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2132672495
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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